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 Abstract 
 
 
 
Economic diplomacy is defined as the actions of both state and non-state 
actors aimed at promoting cross-border trade and investment flows. This 
thesis focuses on the heterogeneous effects of economic diplomacy as im-
plemented by national governments as well as the factors that determine 
said heterogeneity.  
The subject of economic diplomacy is increasingly popular in economic 
literature and is also a widely used tool in the policies of governments. With-
in bilateral relations between developed and developing countries, economic 
diplomacy plays an increasingly important role. Chapter 2 discusses this de-
velopment from the perspective of development studies. Insights from this 
thesis can be helpful for the development of further research on economic 
diplomacy and policy design on this subject. 
This thesis shows the great diversity of (possible) effects of economic 
diplomacy and the causes of this heterogeneity in economic diplomacy ef-
fects. For this, various research methods are used, varying from document 
analysis, literature reviews and statistical analyses for which new and unique 
data were collected. To analyze the factors behind said heterogeneity of 
economic diplomacy effects, 32 econometric studies (published in the peri-
od from 1985 to 2011) are investigated by means of a meta-analysis in 
Chapter 3. This meta-analysis, which has been published in a peer-reviewed 
journal, shows the influence of research characteristics (statistical method, 
model, period, etc.) and the instrument of economic diplomacy that is ex-
amined in the corresponding primary study. The meta-analysis suggests the 
need to make a distinction between specific instruments (such as between 
embassies and consulates) and the desirability to conduct further research 
into foreign direct investment. 
The meta-analysis is supplemented in Chapter 4 by a review of 12 empir-
ical studies on the impact of economic diplomacy on entry into new markets 
 Abstract xix 
 
(extensive margin) and the volume of bilateral trade (intensive margin). This 
literature review, which has been published in a peer-reviewed journal, 
makes apparent that the effect of economic diplomacy for Latin American 
countries is primarily observed for the entry into new markets. For OECD 
countries, the literature in particular stresses the effect on the traded vol-
ume. The study in Chapter 5, which has been accepted as a peer-reviewed 
publication, uses a gravity model with 63 countries for the year 2006 to ex-
amine the market entry and volume effects of economic diplomacy. With 
the use of the Rauch classification, internationally tradable goods have been 
subjected to further investigation. The analysis at this level of tradeable 
groups of goods offers a previously unexplored opportunity to address the 
problem of causality, which is fundamental to literature on economic di-
plomacy: does economic diplomacy lead to more trade, or does the total 
trading volume determine the use of economic diplomacy? Chapter 6 inves-
tigates the relationship between economic diplomacy and bilateral invest-
ment. The chapter shows again that economic diplomacy promotes interna-
tional economic activities and the need to differentiate to the specific 
economic diplomacy instrument used. 
This thesis contributes to the literature in four important ways: 
1. The agenda of economic diplomacy is connected to the agenda for 
development cooperation. Based on the growing role of (former) de-
veloping countries in the world economy, issues are proposed that 
can be part of the bilateral agenda with these countries. Various com-
ponents of economic diplomacy can play a role in the transition of bi-
lateral relations with (former) developing countries, in which the 
combination of development cooperation and trade and investment 
relationships can be mutually reinforcing (Chapter 2). 
2. This thesis is the first to present the meta-effect of economic diplo-
macy on international trade and investment as positive and signifi-
cant. In the 32 studies that were investigated especially embassies and 
consulates (combined in one variable) and embassies (separately 
measured) are associated with a significantly positive meta-effect. 
Other instruments that were investigated, including export and in-
vestment promotion agencies, trade missions and state visits have a 
lower meta-significance (Chapter 3). 
3. The diplomatic network is shown to be especially relevant to the 
market entry decision and traded volume for products that are not 
traded in organized exchanges. In this type of transaction, trust be-
tween buyers and sellers plays an important role and can be enhanced 
xx Abstract 
  
through the use of economic diplomacy trust between buyers and 
sellers. The analysis shows that the observed effect of embassies is 
greater than the observed effect of consulates (Chapter 5). 
4. For a large group of developed and developing countries it is, for the 
first time, established that the diplomatic network is a significant fac-
tor for outward foreign direct investment. Results show that invest-
ments beyond regional boundaries are particularly stimulated by eco-
nomic diplomacy. It, furthermore, seems that, on average, countries 
with a larger share in the total number of diplomatic representations 
in the host country facilitate more investment from their home coun-
try (Chapter 6). 
In addition to in-depth and policy-relevant findings on the heterogene-
ous impact of economic diplomacy, this study offers three methodological 
innovations that are also relevant and applicable outside the field of eco-
nomic diplomacy research: 
1. In the meta-analysis in Chapter 3, the number of available observa-
tions is doubled by focusing on the reported minimum levels of sig-
nificance. This innovation is relevant to each meta-analysis for a mul-
tidisciplinary field of research with different reporting standards. 
2. In the investigation into Rauch classified internationally tradable 
goods, an easily applicable solution is provided for goods that have 
no Rauch classification at the 4 digit SITC level. By interpolating, the 
number of not classified goods is brought back from 10 per cent to 3 
per cent. The method of interpolation is easily applicable in other 
studies in which Rauch classified goods are used. 
3. In the regression analysis in Chapter 5, groups of traded goods are 
used as dependent variables instead of the more frequently used total 
trade flows. By using these lower aggregated data in the presented re-
search the concerns about causality are reduced. This approach is also 
relevant for other areas of research where causality is an issue. 
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Hetrogene effecten van economische diplomatie: instru-
menten, determinanten en ontwikkelingen.  
 Samenvatting 
 
 
Economische diplomatie betreft de acties van statelijke en niet statelijke ac-
toren gericht op het bevorderen van handel- en investeringsstromen. Dit 
proefschrift richt zich op de heterogene effecten van economische diploma-
tie zoals uitgevoerd door nationale overheden en de factoren die deze hete-
rogeniteit bepalen. Het onderwerp economische diplomatie is de afgelopen 
jaren steeds populairder geworden binnen de economische wetenschap en is 
daarnaast een veel gebruikt instrument in het beleid van Ministeries van Bui-
tenlandse Zaken. Ook binnen bilaterale relatie tussen ontwikkelde en ont-
wikkelingslanden vervult economische diplomatie een steeds belangrijker 
rol, zoals blijkt in Hoofdstuk 2 dat deze beleidsontwikkeling bespreekt van-
uit het perspectief van ontwikkelingsstudies. De inzichten uit dit proef-
schrift kunnen behulpzaam zijn voor zowel de verdere ontwikkeling van het 
onderzoek naar economische diplomatie als de beleidsvorming op dit on-
derwerp.  
Dit proefschrift toont de grote diversiteit aan (mogelijke) effecten van 
economische diplomatie en de oorzaken van deze heterogeniteit. Daarvoor 
worden verschillende onderzoeksmethodes gebruikt variërend van bron-
nenonderzoek, literatuuronderzoek tot statistische analyses waarvoor ook 
nieuwe en unieke data zijn verzameld. Om de factoren achter de diversiteit 
in de effecten van economische diplomatie te onderzoeken worden 32 eco-
nometrische studies (gepubliceerd in de periode 1985-2011) door middel 
van een meta-analyse geanalyseerd in Hoofstuk 3. Deze meta-analyse, die 
inmiddels als wetenschappelijk artikel is gepubliceerd, toont de invloed van 
onderzoekkarakteristieken (statistische methode, model, periode etc.) en het 
instrument dat in de desbetreffende primaire studie wordt onderzocht. Uit 
de meta-analyse blijkt de noodzaak onderscheid te maken tussen specifieke 
instrumenten (zoals tussen ambassades en consulaten) en de wenselijkheid 
nader onderzoek te verrichten naar directe buitenlandse investeringen. 
xxii Samenvatting 
De meta-analyse wordt in Hoofdstuk 4 aangevuld met een bespreking 
van 12 empirische studies  naar de invloed van economische diplomatie op 
toetreding tot nieuwe markten (extensieve marge) en het volume (intensieve 
marge) van bilaterale handel. Uit dit literatuuroverzicht, dat inmiddels als 
wetenschappelijk artikel is gepubliceerd, blijkt dat dat het effect van econo-
mische diplomatie voor Latijns-Amerikaanse landen primair loopt via 
markttoetreding. Voor OECD-landen wijst de literatuur met name op een 
effect op het verhandelde volume. Hoofdstuk 5, dat ook als wetenschappe-
lijk artikel geaccepteerd is voor publicatie, onderzoekt met een gravitatie-
model voor 63 landen in 2006 toetreding- en volume-effecten van economi-
sche diplomatie. Daarbij zijn internationaal verhandelde goederensoorten, 
met behulp van de classificatie van Rauch, aan een nader onderzoek onder-
worpen. De analyse op het niveau van goederensoorten biedt een nog niet 
eerder geëxploreerde mogelijkheid om een causaliteitsprobleem te onder-
vangen dat elementair is voor deze literatuur: leidt economische diplomatie 
tot meer handel of is het totale handelsvolume bepalend voor de inzet van 
economische diplomatie? In Hoofdstuk 6 wordt de relatie tussen economi-
sche diplomatie en bilaterale investeringen nader onderzocht.  Hierbij blijkt 
wederom dat economische diplomatie de internationale activiteiten stimu-
leert en wordt de noodzaak te differentiëren naar specifieke instrumenten 
tevens aangetoond 
Het onderzoek biedt vier belangrijke nieuwe inzichten ten opzichte van 
de eerdere studies naar economische diplomatie: 
1. De agenda voor economische diplomatie wordt verbonden met de 
agenda voor ontwikkelingssamenwerking. Op basis van de groeiende 
rol die (voormalig) ontwikkelingslanden spelen in de wereldeconomie 
wordt een voorstel ontwikkeld voor onderwerpen die in de bilaterale 
agenda met deze landen kunnen worden opgepakt. Verschillende on-
derdelen van economische diplomatie kunnen een rol spelen in het 
transitiepad van bilaterale relaties waarbij combinaties van ontwikke-
lingssamenwerking en  handels- en investeringsrelaties elkaar kunnen 
versterken (Hoofdstuk 2).   
2. Voor het eerst kon worden vastgesteld dat het meta-effect van econo-
mische diplomatie op internationale economische stromen positief en 
significant is. In de 32 onderzochte studies worden met name ambas-
sades en consulaten (gecombineerd in 1 variabele) en ambassades (se-
paraat gemeten) geassocieerd met een significant positief meta-effect. 
Andere instrumenten die zijn onderzocht, waaronder export- en inves-
 Samenvatting xxiii 
teringspromotie-agentschappen, handelsmissies en staatsbezoeken 
hebben een lagere meta-significantie (Hoofdstuk 3). 
3. Het diplomatieke netwerk blijkt bij de markttoetredingsbeslissing en 
het handelsvolume vooral relevant voor producten die niet via beurzen 
en platforms verhandeld worden. Bij dit type transactie speelt vertrou-
wen tussen de kopers en verkopers een grote rol en kan door de inzet 
van economische diplomatie vertrouwen tussen kopers en verkopers 
versterkt worden. Hierbij blijkt dat het waargenomen effect van ambas-
sades groter is dan het waargenomen effect van consulaten (Hoofdstuk 
5). 
4. Voor het eerst is voor een grote groep van ontwikkelde en ontwikke-
lingslanden vastgesteld dat het diplomatieke netwerk een significante 
factor is voor uitgaande investeringen. Daarbij blijkt vooral dat investe-
ringen die over regionale grenzen heen gaan door economische diplo-
matie gestimuleerd worden. Ook lijken landen die een groter aandeel 
hebben in het totaal aantal diplomatieke representaties in een land ge-
middeld genomen meer investeringen vanuit hun moederland facilite-
ren (Hoofdstuk 6). 
Naast verdiepende en beleidsrelevante inzichten over de heterogene in-
vloed van de economische diplomatie biedt dit  onderzoek drie methodische 
innovaties die ook buiten dit onderzoeksterrein relevant en toepasbaar zijn. 
1. In de meta-analyse in Hoofdstuk 3 wordt het aantal voor onderzoek 
beschikbare waarnemingen verdubbeld door te focusseren op het ge-
rapporteerde minimale significantieniveau. Deze innovatie is relevant 
voor iedere meta-analyse voor een multidisciplinair onderzoeksveld 
met verschillende rapportagestandaarden. 
2. In de het onderzoek naar Rauch-geclassificeerde internationaal ver-
handelbare goederen soorten wordt een simpel toepasbare oplossing 
aangereikt voor goederensoorten die niet in de Rauch-classificatie (op 
het 4 digit SITC-niveau) voor komen. Door interpolatie wordt het 
aantal niet geclassificeerde goederensoorten terug gebracht van 10 
procent naar 3 procent. De methode van interpolatie is makkelijk 
toepasbaar in ander onderzoek  waarin Rauch-geclassificeerde goede-
rensoorten worden gebruikt. 
3. Door in Hoofdstuk 5 gebruik te maken van data op het aggregatieni-
veau van individuele groepen verhandelde goederen in plaats van de 
totale handel worden zorgen over causaliteit gereduceerd. Deze aan-
pak is ook relevant voor andere onderzoeksgebieden waar causaliteit 
een onderwerp van discussie. 

 1 
 
1 Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Economic diplomacy: background and definition 
The relation between international trade on the one hand and investment 
and politics on the other has been on the forefront of (international) 
economics for a long time (Bayne and Woolcock, 2007; Krasner, 1976; 
Coolsaet, 2000; Okano-Heijmans, 2011). Between 1500 and 1750 Mer-
cantilism1 was the dominant economic school of thought in Europe 
(Beer, 1885). Mercantilist authors introduced the idea of export promo-
tion (both via subsidizing exports and opening up new markets via bilat-
eral relations) because according to them, the key objective of trade 
should be to promote a favourable balance of trade (Ekelund and 
Hebert, 1997; Irwin, 2001; Lamond; 1893).  
The practice  of economics has much advanced since the Mercantil-
ists and so have the ideas regarding government intervention in (interna-
tional) markets. The requirements for government intervention are that 
1) the benefits of the intervention must outweigh the costs, and 2) the 
intervention must target the source of the inefficiency (Bergeijk et al., 
2011a). Economic diplomacy, the topic of this thesis, is one of the inter-
ventions governments can undertake in international markets. Notwith-
standing the advances made in international communication, transporta-
tion technology and strongly reduced formal trade barriers2, international 
markets still function far from efficient (Bergeijk; 2009b; Tharakan and 
Bulke, 1998). Informal trade barriers like cultural and institutional differ-
ences, political measures and modi operandi act as intangible barriers to 
trade (Banalieva and Dhanaraj, 2013; Disdier and Head, 2008; Guiso et 
al., 2009; Head and Mayer, 2010; Kano et al., 2013; Möhlman et al., 
2010). Furthermore, not all countries have made similar progress in re-
ducing formal trade barriers.  
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Economic diplomacy targets the inefficiencies that hinder interna-
tional trade and foreign direct investment (FDI). The aim of economic 
diplomacy is to influence decisions on cross-border economic activities 
(Bayne and Woolcock, 2007). Building on Bergeijk et al. (2011a) eco-
nomic diplomacy is characterised as follows: 
o Trade and investment promotion. This includes the promotion of 
exports as well as imports. It furthermore includes the promotion 
of cross border investments. This involves information gathering 
and supplying, nation branding and advisory tasks (Lee and Hud-
son, 2004; Saner and Yiu, 2003); 
o Securing property rights and the stability of economic relations. 
This involves negotiating bilateral investment treaties and bilateral 
trade agreements. It aims at strengthening the benefits of favoura-
ble political relations thereby reducing the risk of international 
flows; 
o Influencing foreign national policy making in favour of domestic 
multinational enterprises (Bergeijk et al., 2011a; Saner and Yiu, 
2003). These activities involve the use of bilateral contacts aimed 
at tackling specific barriers that hamper the commercial interest of 
internationally active domestic companies; 
o Maintain a favourable international policy environment. This in-
volves the governments’ multilateral efforts to preserve a function-
ing global governance system for trade and financial flows. 
In this thesis the main focus is the econometrically measurable effect 
of (instruments of) economic diplomacy deployed by state actors in their 
bilateral relations. Typically nations interact with other nations through a 
broad range of actions of semi-permanent international representations 
(embassies, consulates and other public sector business support facilities) 
and diplomatic bilateral activities (trade and state visits) (Moons and Ber-
geijk, 2016). Governments also interact with foreign and domestic com-
panies to stimulate trade and investment through domestic institutions 
(investment and export promotion offices) that stand under the auspices 
of economic diplomats, use information from the diplomatic network 
and in many countries form the home basis for trade and investment 
promotion activities in the diplomatic network (Moons and Bergeijk, 
 Introduction 3 
2016; Saner and Yiu, 2003)3. It are these networks, actions and institu-
tions that will be subject of analysis of Chapters 3-6 of this thesis. 
1.2 Motivation of the thesis  
Economic diplomacy never was a main stream topic in economics due to 
the originally skeptical view of neo-classical economists regarding the 
subject (Bergeijk et al., 2011a). Empirical research relating to the role of 
(instruments) of economic diplomacy and determinants of the effect of 
economic diplomacy as a result is still relatively scarce. This thesis con-
tributes to the economic literature by reducing this scarcity4. Understand-
ing the heterogeneity in economic diplomacy effects and the determi-
nants behind it is increasingly relevant now that economic diplomacy is 
attracting more attention both in academics and among policy makers in 
both developing and developed countries (see Figure 1.1 below). 
Figure 1.1 
Number of scientific searches addressing economic diplomacy (annual aver-
ages 1950-2016) 
 
Source: adapted from Bergeijk (2017) Figure 1, pp. 1 
 
The increasing attention for economic diplomacy is caused by both 
academic and policy reasons. In the 1980’s and 1990’s it was contested 
that economic diplomacy targets markets failures and that the benefits 
outweigh the costs (e.g. Gencturk and Kotabe, 2001; Hogan, 1991; Kees-
ing and Singer; 1991; Seringhaus and Botschen, 1991). The objections 
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were put forward by researchers and the Washington consensus institu-
tions5 that published critically about economic diplomacy (e.g. Hogan, 
1991; Keesing and Singer, 1991). Since the early 2000’s there is however 
an increasing acknowledgement of both the role and benefits of eco-
nomic diplomacy in international trade and investment (e.g. Lederman et 
al., 2006; Morriset, 2003; UNCTAD, 2001).  
The economic justification for economic diplomacy is based on a) the 
existence of asymmetric information in the internationalization process 
and b) externalities associated with the collection and sharing of infor-
mation about market conditions and business opportunities in interna-
tional markets (Hausmann and Rodrik, 2003). Asymmetric information is 
caused by local and competing firms who restrict the availability of in-
formation in order to prevent competitors from entering the market. 
This is especially problematic for developing countries because published 
statistics and other sources of information are scarcer for those markets.  
Externalities of collection and sharing of information about interna-
tional markets are a result of the high cost associated with identifying 
and assessing potential business partners and business opportunities 
(Rangan and Lawrence, 1999; Rauch, 1996). It is likely that this type of 
information is under-produced from a societal point of view because 
first movers cannot reap the full benefits due to free riding rivals that can 
easily copy the choices of the first mover (Hausmann and Rodrik, 2003). 
For developing countries additional externalities are observed. The ma-
jority of products are not traded in organized exchanges and therefore 
buyers and sellers need to find other ways to establish a match (Möh-
lman et al., 2010). The decision making process that determines who 
trades (but also who invests) with whom is not only driven by rational 
cost perspectives, but also by reputation and trust (Guiso et al., 2009; 
Rauch, 1996; 1999). Here developing countries have another disad-
vantage because they stand at a larger cultural distance from the main 
consumer markets and their products are perceived as less advanced than 
substitutes from developed countries (Hudson and Jones, 2003). To 
solve the information asymmetries and establish positive externalities 
governments may step in by providing “unique, reliable and impartial 
access to information such as through the global embassy network and 
other government channels and contact, which become available 
through the government’s very long term and non-commercial attach-
ment to overseas markets” (Harris and Li, 2005: 74).  
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The growing popularity of economic diplomacy also has four addi-
tional motivations. First, the share of the former centrally planned econ-
omies in world trade has increased (Kowalski et al., 2013). In these coun-
tries government is still regarded as a natural partner in the economy. 
Second, state enterprises may be the counterpart of a company operating 
in the international markets. This creates a demand from entrepreneurs 
in their home nation because these entrepreneurs seek cooperation with 
their national government in order to equalize the power balance and to 
level the playing field. Third, (political) uncertainty about international 
transactions must often be removed or reduced. Government involve-
ment may signal that a transaction will (not raise) political resistance 
(Bergeijk, 2009). This increases the trust needed for international ex-
change (Guiso et al., 2009). Fourth, some high-quality information need-
ed for international transactions sometimes requires the involvement of 
government officials. Summarizing, there are both academic and policy-
making motives why economic diplomacy is growing in popularity. But 
how much is actually known about the effect of economic diplomacy 
and the determinants of this effect? 
1.3 Summary of the empirical literature 
Econometric investigation of economic diplomacy is an emerging re-
search field. Following its emerging status the gaps in the literature are 
many6. This thesis aims to fill those gaps and provides insights into the 
determinants of the effect of economic diplomacy. However, first there 
must be established what is known thus far.  
1.3.1 Economic diplomacy effect  
The first empirical estimates of the effect of economic diplomacy on 
trade and FDI can be dated back to the mid 1980’s. The methodology 
used to measure the effect of economic diplomacy was rather crude in 
these early years of research. The papers published in the period between 
the mid 1980’s and about 2000 mostly analyzed frequencies of relevant 
diplomatic events (called event data) used to explain the development of 
bilateral trade (e.g. Bergeijk, 1990, 1992 and 1994; Polachek, 1997; Pol-
lins, 1989a and b) and FDI (Nigh, 1985)7. These studies find a signifi-
cantly positive relation between trade (investment) and cooperation be-
tween nation states. 
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The more recent research agenda that has evolved since the early 
2000’s focusses on establishing the effect of economic diplomacy by an 
investigation of the economic diplomacy instruments used by states in 
their bilateral exchange. Following the discussion in section 1.1 of this 
thesis, these instruments can be divided in a) the network of (semi) per-
manent diplomatic representations, b) activities developed within that 
network and c) domestic institutions (investment and export promotion 
offices) that stand under the auspices of economic diplomats.   
The network of (semi) permanent diplomatic representations was first 
analysed by Rose (2007). According to his seminal research the macroe-
conomic effect of the diplomatic network on bilateral trade was between 
6 to 10 percent (Rose, 2007). Following the methodology of Rose, others 
also analysed the effect (e.g. Gil Pareja et al., 2015; Kang, 2011; Volpe 
Martincus et al., 2010a; Yakop and Bergeijk, 2011) and started investigat-
ing the change in the network (Afman and Maurel, 2010). The effect of 
the diplomatic network on FDI was also tested. US investors is are more 
likely to make an investment in a foreign market when the US has a dip-
lomatic representation in that market (Du et al., 2008). Additionally, the 
heterogeneity in effects due to different forms of representation in the 
network was subject of research. Embassies have a larger impact on 
trade than consulates and honorary consulates on average do not in-
crease the value of bilateral trade (Bergeijk et al, 2011a; Veenstra et al., 
2011).  
The activities organized within the diplomatic network that were in-
vestigated are the various higher and lower ranked visits by officials and 
heads of state. The estimated trade stimulating effects due to these visits 
by Heads of State range from 8 per cent to 10 per cent (Nitsch, 2007), 4 
per cent to 14 per cent (Casey, 2015) to small negative and mainly insig-
nificant effects (Head and Ries, 2010). Creusen and Lejour (2013) report 
significant effects for missions lead by members of cabinet, but no sig-
nificant effects for missions lead by lower ranked civil servants or repre-
sentatives from the private sector. The opposite of trade stimulation is 
also observed due to official visits. If countries officially receive the Dalai 
Lama at the highest level the trade with China of the receiving nation 
seems to suffer (Fuchs and Klann, 2013). 
Domestic institutions that stand under the auspices of economic dip-
lomats and aim to stimulate trade and FDI have also been tested for 
their trade and FDI stimulating effects. According to Morriset (2003) 
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investment promotion agencies significantly contribute to FDI. On aver-
age a 10 per cent increase in the budget of investment promotion leads 
to a 7.5 per cent increase of FDI flows. This effectiveness of the invest-
ment promotion agency is largely determined by the type of activities the 
agency engages in, with policy advocacy being most effective. More re-
cently investment promotion in targeted sectors is reviewed as well as 
the connection between investment promotion and export upgrading 
(Hayakawa, 2014b; Harding and Javorcik, 2011; 2012a and b). Similarly 
positive and significant effects for export promotion agencies are pub-
lished: each additional dollar of export promotion increases exports by 
40 dollars for the median agency (Lederman et al., 2006; 2010). Investi-
gating the effect of export promotion for different countries and regions 
various authors find significant and positive results (e.g. Hayakawa et al., 
2014a; Gil et al, 2008; Gil-Pareja et al., 2015; Volpe Martincus et al., 
2010a).  
Although the preferred individual specifications of the papers men-
tioned above in general report significant coefficients, the total body of 
literature is not conclusive. Approximately half of the presented estima-
tions do not pass the threshold of significance (Chapter 3 of this thesis). 
Differences in the reported results may partially be explained by the pri-
mary studies characteristics. Analyses are often constrained because of 
limited data availability and that databases have to be built from scratch. 
This leads to differences in measurement of economic diplomacy and its 
instruments. Variations in the length of the research periods also makes 
comparison between studies challenging. The wider applicability of a 
number of studies is furthermore confined because they only relate to 
one country. Examples are the studies of Head and Ries (2010) on the 
effectiveness of Canadian trade missions, Creusen and Lejour, (2013) 
that investigate the effect of the Dutch foreign network and its activities 
and of Gil-Pareja et al. (2008) and (2015) which is limited to regional ex-
ports in Spain. Next to this, “export” dominates as the dependant varia-
ble of economic diplomacy studies. Estimates dealing with the effect of 
diplomacy on import are less available and point estimates for its effect 
on FDI are even rarer (see Figure 1.2). By and large the subject of (in-
struments of) economic diplomacy and its impact on FDI flows remains 
uncharted territory. 
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Figure 1.2 
Decomposition of independent variable in economic diplomacy studies 
(N=963) 
 
Note: Calculations by the author based on the meta-analysis database of chapter 3 of this thesis 
 
A complicating factor in understanding the effect of economic di-
plomacy is the substantial difference in statistical methods used. Most 
studies use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) at least as one of the reported 
estimation methods (Chapter 3 of this thesis; Moons and Bergeijk, 2016). 
Some however, use other methods like Generalized Least Squares (Pol-
lins, 1989a), Generalized Method of Moments (Yakop and Bergeijk, 
2011) and difference in difference estimations (Nitsch, 2007). Further-
more, a variety of fixed effects are included (and excluded). The different 
statistical methods used may cause some of the observed differences in 
effect size. Having these omissions in mind Chapter 3 of this thesis uses 
a meta-analysis in order to establish the ‘genuine’ economic diplomacy 
effect and to get an understanding of the drivers of heterogeneity due to 
the instrument of diplomacy used.  
1.3.2 Determinants  of heterogeneity  
From the literature there are three sources of heterogeneity that become 
apparent and that will be explored: a) the diplomatic representation, b) 
cultural and institutional distance between trading partners and c) charac-
teristics of the traded product. The sources of heterogeneity and the way 
they influence the reported estimates in the literature is graphically dis-
played in Figure 1.3 below. Notice that these effects are known for trade 
and not FDI because, as stated before, the number of studies dealing 
with the effects on FDI is limited. 
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Figure 1.3 
Graphic display heterogeneous economic diplomacy effects on trade 
 
 
The first source of heterogeneity is related to the diplomatic represen-
tation and its effect on trade. The higher ranked embassies seem to have 
a more pronounced effect on bilateral trade as compared to the lower 
ranked career or honorary consulates (Bergeijk et al., 2011; Veenstra et 
al., 2011). Diplomatic representations seem to generate a more substan-
tial effect on bilateral economic relations as compared to export promo-
tion offices (Chapter 3 of this thesis; Moons and Bergeijk, 2016; 
Veenstra et al., 2011). This heterogeneity is probably caused by the fact 
that an ambassador is the highest representative in a foreign country. As 
such an ambassador has better access to the government of its host 
country than lower ranked consular general or staff of the export promo-
tion office. On the other hand, it can also be claimed that consulates and 
branches of export promotion agencies are located in economic growth 
regions in a country. They may have more business knowledge and thus 
be better equipped to help companies (Volpe Martincus, 2010a). Ad-
dressing the potential differences between diplomatic representations is 
something that several chapters in this thesis contribute to, amongst oth-
ers by presenting the first multiple country based estimates on the effect 
of the diplomatic network on FDI (Chapter 6 of this thesis). 
The second determinant of heterogeneity is the cultural and institu-
tional difference between bilateral trade and investment partners. In eco-
nomic diplomacy research, the cultural and institutional difference be-
tween countries is most frequently modelled by grouping developed and 
developing countries separately. As the differences between countries 
grow so does the uncertainty associated with the bilateral exchange 
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(Guiso et al., 2009; Kraus et al., 2015; Yu et al., 2015). The effect of eco-
nomic diplomacy on trade uncertainty is theoretically motivated in chap-
ter 3 of Bergeijk (2009) and may help to reduce uncertainty. It is there-
fore expected that economic diplomacy has the most substantial effect 
when cultural and institutional differences are large and uncertainty in 
bilateral transactions is perceived as being high. The literature confirms 
the strongest economic diplomacy effects for trade originating from high 
income countries going to low and middle income countries and vice 
versa, substantial for South-South flows and small for the flows between 
developed countries  (e.g. Creusen and Lejour, 2013; Hayakawa et al., 
2014a; Yakop and Bergeijk, 2011).  This is of particular relevance in rela-
tion to the growing importance of South-South globalization (Murshed 
et al., 2009; Yakop and Bergeijk, 2011)8. Based on the economic diplo-
macy literature it is clear that good bilateral relations need to be estab-
lished to stimulate bilateral trade from and between (former) developing 
countries. With that in mind, the instruments of economic diplomacy of 
both developed and developing countries are reviewed for their effect on 
establishing new trade relations and increasing the volume of bilateral 
trade (Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis). Furthermore, the effect of eco-
nomic diplomacy on investments between regions is tested in Chapter 6. 
Both Chapter 5 and 6 report results based on samples that include many 
developed and developing countries, making the results additional to the 
existing literature that generally covers (a few) OECD countries. 
The third determinant of heterogeneous economic diplomacy effects 
is the characteristics of the traded product. Theory and econometric es-
timates show that trust is a significant determinant of international trade 
and investment. Due to characteristics of the traded product some trad-
ed products suffer more from a lack of trust than others (Guiso et al., 
2009; Lankhuizen et al., 2015). This is the case when trade involves more 
complex products that are not traded in organised exchange (Rauch, 
1999; Lankhuizen et al., 2015). These products demand more interaction 
and trust between the buyer and seller to establish the quality and relia-
bility of the product and therefore are an interesting unit of analysis on 
the effects of economic diplomacy (Rangan and Lawrence, 1999; Rauch, 
1999). Based on Rauch (1999) classification9 of  internationally traded 
goods, the literature shows that instruments of economic diplomacy re-
port a bigger effect on trade in the group of more complex products 
(Gil-Pareja et al., 2015; Volpe Martincus and Carballo, 2012; Volpe Mar-
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tincus et al., 2011). Publications are, however, limited to Latin American 
countries and Spain. An important contribution of Chapter 5 of the pre-
sented research is that it fills the gap in knowledge about economic di-
plomacy and the characteristics trade products by analysing this interac-
tion using a comprehensive sample of countries.   
1.4 The research questions 
Based on the observed increasing attention for economic diplomacy in 
the policy arena, the first research question of this thesis is: 
1) How can economic diplomacy contribute to bilateral relations between developed 
and developing countries?   
The second question that emerges from the preceding discussion is: 
2) What is the meta-effect of economic diplomacy on trade and FDI? 
From this question several sub questions can be derived aimed at better 
understanding the meta-effect of economic diplomacy: 
a) Which (methodological) factors can be found that influence observed economic 
diplomacy effects? 
b) What is the effect of instruments of economic diplomacy on observed economic 
diplomacy effects? 
c) Is there consensus about the effect of economic diplomacy between scientific dis-
ciplines? 
Building on the findings of the meta-analysis the following questions 
were selected for further research: 
3) How does economic diplomacy affect trade volumes (the intensive margin of trade) 
and the number of trading relations (the extensive margin of trade)?  
4) What is the effect of product characteristics on the observed economic diplomacy 
effect? 
The final questions addressed in this thesis relate to the underexplored 
relation between economic diplomacy and FDI: 
5) How does economic diplomacy affect FDI?  
6) What are sources of heterogeneity in the effect of economic diplomacy on FDI? 
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1.5 Structure of the thesis         
This thesis is organized in seven chapters and structured as follows (see 
Figure 1.4). Chapter 1 is the introductory chapter that provides the back-
ground for the thesis. Chapter 2 is based on an earlier published peer–
reviewed article in Human Welfare (Moons, 2015). It identifies economic 
diplomacy issues that are relevant for the bilateral relations in South-
South trade and South-North trade and vice versa. Chapter 3 is based on 
an earlier published peer reviewed article in the World Economy (Moons 
and Bergeijk, 2016). It empirically analyses the literature by means of a 
meta-analysis. Chapter 4 is based on a peer-reviewed article in the Interna-
tional Journal for Diplomacy and Economy (Moons, 2012). It scans the litera-
ture for the effects of economic diplomacy on the margins of trade. 
Chapters 5 and 6 zoom in to major unexplored areas of economic di-
plomacy research. Chapter 5 is in print in the Research Handbook of Eco-
nomic Diplomacy: Bilateral Relations in a Context of Geopolitical Change (Moons 
and Boer, 2017). It empirically tests for the effect of economic diploma-
cy on Rauch classified product groups. Chapter 6 empirically establishes 
the relation between economic diplomacy FDI and identifies sources 
heterogeneous FDI effects. Chapter 7 is the concluding chapter of the 
thesis, summarizes and discusses results and presents area for future re-
search. 
Figure 1.4 
Structure of the thesis 
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The Chapters 2-6 answer the six research questions and three sub-
questions as presented in section 1.4 of this thesis. In these chapters var-
ious research methodologies are used. Chapter 2 uses a review of litera-
ture, document analysis and a detailed case study for the Netherlands. 
Chapter 3 uses a meta-regression analysis for which a unique database 
was constructed of 32 economic diplomacy studies published between 
1985 and 2011. From the 32 studies, 963 economic diplomacy estimates 
were collected and meta-analyzed to establish the “genuine” economic 
diplomacy effect. Chapter 4 reviews 12 studies and 987 estimates, pub-
lished between 2000 and 2011, about the effect of economic diplomacy 
on the margins of trade. Chapter 5 and 6 econometrically investigate the 
effect of economic diplomacy using a gravity model. The model used in 
chapter 5 covers 63 countries for the year 2006. The dependent variables 
in chapter 5 result from classifying internationally traded goods in those 
products traded in organized exchange and those not traded in organized 
exchange. The model used in Chapter 6 covers 64 countries and the 
years 2006 and 2012. The economic diplomacy data for the year 2012 are 
manually collected from the sites of ministries of foreign affairs of the 64 
countries which resulted in a unique sample. Chapter 6 also is the first 
piece of economic diplomacy research to focus on the effect of econom-
ic diplomacy on FDI in a broad country setting. 
The major conclusion of this thesis is that heterogeneity is a key ele-
ment for understanding economic diplomacy. This is important because, 
as this thesis shows, the effect of economic diplomacy is determined by 
the way economic diplomacy is deployed. Neglecting the sources of het-
erogeneity makes economic diplomacy effects random at best and un-
questionably makes economic diplomacy less effective and efficient.   
      
Notes
 
1 Mercantilism puts the national economy first and can be considered as a form 
of economic nationalism. Mercantilism aims to empower the nation and state to 
the maximum degree.  Mercantilism involved prioritizing national production, 
especially of military goods. Mercantilist policies furthermore include export sub-
sidizing, opening up new markets for domestically produced goods and protect-
ing the domestic markets for foreign products. These policies also extended to 
the colonies. Colonies were prohibited to trade with other nations than the colo-
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nizer. Although Mercantilist thought was spread across Europe the majority of 
the literature is produced in the UK in the 17th century 
2 Formal trade barriers refer to barriers that result from government actions to 
formally restrict trade. Well known formal trade barriers are tariffs, trade embar-
goes and quota. 
3  Economic diplomacy has several elements: bilateral economic activities be-
tween nations, including the organisation of state and trade visits, use of invest-
ment and export promotion agencies and the export promotion activities of the 
diplomatic network. Note that some of these elements have been labelled “bilat-
eral economic diplomacy” or “commercial policy” (Bergeijk, 2009; Hudson, 2004; 
Saner and Yiu, 2003; Lee and Hudson, 2004). 
4 Compare for example the number of empirical economic diplomacy studies 
with the number of empirical studies dealing with FDI spillovers; the latter can be 
found in multifold.  
5 The Washington consensus is a set of policy prescriptions considered to consti-
tute the standard reform package for economies (in crisis). The cheerleaders for 
these reform packages were the Washington based International Monetary Fund, 
World Bank and US treasury 
6 A more elaborate discussion about the gaps in economic diplomacy literature 
can be found in Chapter 8 of Bergeijk (2009). 
7 A similar methodology was used to test the effect of cooperation on US in-
vestments by Biglaiser and DeRouwen Jr (2007). The study basically has its peers 
in the 1980’s and 1990’s studies but is published in 2007.  
8 South-South globalization is the phenomenon of emergence of major economic 
powers from within the developing world, who are often collectively labelled the 
global South, and who increasingly interact (Murshed et al., 2009).  
9 The Rauch (1999) classification divides internationally traded commodities into 
three groups: those traded on organized exchanges called homogeneous goods, 
those not traded on organized exchanges but nevertheless possessing a reference 
prices called reference priced goods, and all other commodities called differenti-
ated goods. 
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2 
Development cooperation, trade 
policies and issues for  economic 
diplomacy1  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction  
In recent decades development cooperation and trade have been consid-
ered to be conflicting by practitioners of both métiers. This can be illus-
trated best by a recent example of this conflict in Australia. On January 
14th 2014 the Australian minister of Foreign Affairs, used the metaphor 
that trade is “a rising tide that lifts all boats”. The development commu-
nity was quick to respond by saying that the poor do not have a boat and 
are thus drowning as the tide rises (Negin, 2014). One of the underlying 
causes of the divide between development cooperation and trade is the 
different preferences between those who advocate trade and those who 
advocate development cooperation. Development cooperation is primar-
ily the scope of government and non-governmental organizations while 
trade was (and is) dominated by the private sector. The development co-
operation literature judges both shocks and structural changes induced 
by trade less favorably than the mainstream literature on trade and eco-
1 This chapter is based on Moons (2015) published December 2015 
in Human Welfare, to which special acknowledgement is due. Com-
ments from two anonymous reviewers are gratefully acknowledged.  
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nomic growth and it puts more weight on short term and direct effects 
(Morressey, 2006; Page, 2007).  The divide between development coop-
eration and trade is also apparent in the architecture of the international 
community. Trade issues are dealt with by the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO), development issues are dealt with by the (regional) development 
banks and the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC). The 
UNCTAD covers trade and development but is historically not support-
ed in this mandate by the more developed countries that kept negotiating 
their trade agreements first within the GATT and later in the WTO. At 
the national level, however, since 2012 there is a tendency to integrate 
the two fields and the organizations responsible for the policy-making 
and implementation. Table 2.1 illustrates this development for members 
of the OECD development assistance committee; 15 out of 25 commit-
tee members have integrated the divisions for development cooperation 
and trade in 1 ministry. A few countries, among which the Netherlands 
have taken the integration even one step further and integrated the de-
velopment and trade portfolio at the political level2. This chapter dis-
cusses development theory, trends in development cooperation and 
trade policies and identifies issues for the interdisciplinary field of eco-
nomic diplomacy based on the aid and trade agenda. 
The chapter starts by tracing history and as did the 1949 inaugural 
speech of US president Truman argues that development cooperation 
and trade are two pillars of the same policy. Section 2.2 discusses the 
methodology and sources used in this chapter. Next, section 2.3 discuss-
es theoretical foundations in favor of combining development coopera-
tion and trade into one policy. Section 2.4 shows how development co-
operation and trade policies were separate pillars until recently. Section 
2.5 discusses challenges in development policy for which the develop-
ment cooperation and trade combination may provide an answer. Sec-
tion 2.6 discusses the new development cooperation and trade policy of 
the Netherlands as a special case. The Dutch have been the first large 
donor country to fully integrate development cooperation and trade with 
one Minister for Foreign Trade and Development and integration of the 
executive departments of Foreign Economic Relations and International 
Cooperation3. Section 2.7 identifies issues for economic diplomacy based 
on the new aid and development cooperation policies. Finally, section 8 
presents conclusions. 
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Table 2.1 
Division of Development Cooperation and Trade responsibilities (April 2014) 
 Trade and development cooperation 
in 1 ministry 
(But separate ministers) 
1 Minister for trade and de-
velopment cooperation 
Australia X  
Austria   
Belgium   
Canada X  
Czech Republic X  
Denmark X X 
Finland X  
France   
Germany   
Greece X  
Iceland X  
Ireland X X 
Italy X  
Japan   
Korea   
Luxembourg   
New Zealand X  
Netherlands X X 
Norway X X4 
Portugal   
Spain   
Sweden X  
Switzerland   
United Kingdom X  
United States * * 
* Formal situation. Practice is different (size and independence of USAID)  
Source: OECD Development cooperation peer reviews and was last updated the 1st of May 
2014. 
2.2 Methodology 
This paper uses a mixed method approach consisting of a review of liter-
ature, document analysis and a detailed case study for the Netherlands. 
The review of literature  focusses on the question why some countries 
integrated development cooperation and trade policies while the interna-
tional architecture of development cooperation and trade issues still re-
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mains to a large extent separated (although there are important links be-
tween the international organizations).  
 Scholarly and academic sources were used – both in the review of the 
literature and in the case study - whenever possible, but the width and 
depth of the research also require me to consider official documents and 
the so-called grey literature. Examples of academic sources that provide 
theoretical and empirical underpinnings of the relation between devel-
opment cooperation and trade are Chenery and Strout (1966), Edwards 
(1992) and Winters (2004). Academic sources also document the increas-
ing connectedness of trade and development policies (Mawdsley et al., 
2014).  
 Government reports, policy evaluations and publications by interna-
tional institutions were used to get a deeper understanding of (the organ-
ization of) development cooperation and trade policies (e.g. IOB, 2014; 
UNCTAD, 2013). Specific knowledge about the way OECD countries 
organize their development cooperation and trade ministries was mainly 
obtained by studying OECD development cooperation peer reviews. 
The 25 reviews can be found and accessed via the OECD website5, 6.  
 The information set is further complemented by expert comments 
published online in (policy) blogs and on websites to get a better under-
standing of informed perceptions regarding both development coopera-
tion and trade policies and integrating the two. Examples are the article 
of Negin (2014) which was published by the Australian Development 
Policy Centre and the op-ed article by Jasper van Dijk in Vice Versa 
(2013), a specialized and popular Dutch e-magazine about development 
cooperation and global issues.  
 Further to this I was able to make good use of the work of the Dutch 
Historical Society, cited as Dierickx (2005 and 2007), who bundled all the 
main policy documents in the fields of trade and development coopera-
tion for the 1949-1989 period. I also profited from the WTO project of 
Graig VanGrasstek (2013) who provides an overview of all multilateral 
trade agreements7 in his elaborate work on the history and future chal-
lenges of the WTO.  
 Relying on overview publications carries some risk of getting misin-
formed because the authors of the overview studies may have misinter-
preted the original sources or made a mistake when collecting the au-
thentic sources. That risk is, however, limited, because the publications 
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used are from high quality institutions that have proper (internal) review 
mechanisms. Importantly, the overview studies are never used as the sin-
gle source of information about the topic. The quality standards and use 
of multiple sources is also applicable to the entire presented review. In 
general reviews depend on the availability (and use) of high quality and 
credible sources (Oxman and Guyatt, 1988). The combined information 
used in this article attempts to achieve just that.   
2.3 Development cooperation and trade: interconnected in 
theory  
There is no blue print for development. However, combining develop-
ment cooperation and trade policies presents huge economic develop-
ment potential (Ismail, 2007; Morressey, 2006). The positive effects of 
trade as an engine for growth and development are documented (Berg 
and Krueger, 2003; Hallaert, 2006; Morressey, 2006; OECD, 2011 and 
2013; UNCTAD, 2013; Winters, 2004) and according to the OECD 
(2011:21): “Despite the econometric difficulties of establishing beyond 
doubt that engaging in international trade enhances growth, the weight 
of the evidence .… is clearly in that direction.”   
Trade can contribute to economic growth. Development cooperation 
can help to create a positive policy environment for trade. Concessional 
finance can support investments in the physical and human capital of 
developing countries which enable them to participate more successfully 
in international trade. Development cooperation can alleviate the costs 
of structural reform needed to create a private sector that is able to re-
spond to the opportunities the international trading system presents 
them (King et al., 2012). Development cooperation can be used to cover 
costs associated with trade agreements, for example via the provision of 
technical assistance for adjusting customs procedures.     
In development economics development cooperation and trade are 
also intertwined. The two gap model of development identifies the con-
ditions for economic growth. Building on Harrod (1939) and Domar 
(1946), who modeled the economy’s growth rate in terms of the level of 
saving and productivity of capital, Chenery and Strout (1966) modified 
this theory to apply to developing countries. In the two gap model eco-
nomic growth may be constrained in two ways. First, savings are not suf-
ficient to finance the investment needed (savings gap). Second, there is 
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insufficient foreign currency to pay for the imports needed (foreign cur-
rency gap). The largest of the two gaps is binding. In the two gap model 
of Chenery and Strout (1966) the binding gap can be bridged by devel-
opment cooperation or by net capital imports.  If domestic savings are 
insufficient for the target investment rate, development cooperation may 
serve as a supplement. If there is insufficient foreign exchange to pay for 
the imports needed for a target growth rate, development cooperation, 
(development) bank lending and foreign investment may bridge the gap 
between expected exports and necessary imports (Adam and O’Connell, 
2004; Bergeijk and Lensink, 1991). The interconnectedness of develop-
ment cooperation and trade in the latter case is evident. More exports 
from developing countries would lead to less need for development co-
operation. Thus trade policies where Western markets open their borders 
to products from low income countries are a powerful development tool. 
International trade allows for specialization where low-income countries 
earn through export and at the same time consume more imported 
goods based on productive efforts. Also, more foreign direct invest-
ments from companies from donor countries would lower development 
cooperation dependency. 
The debate at the start of development cooperation recognized that 
development cooperation and (preferential) trade are both crucial for 
development (but do not always deliver optimal development results, as 
discussed in the next section). US President Truman’s 1949 inaugural 
speech is widely seen as the starting point for this policy field (Truman, 
1949). In Truman’s inaugural, the first pillar of his program to assist 
poor countries consisted of financial and technical assistance, initially 
especially directed to war torn Europe.  The second pillar addressed fur-
ther liberalization of world trade in order to increase interconnectedness 
between countries as a base for peace and prosperity (Truman, 1949). 
Ever since many policy documents presented by the international com-
munity confirmed and reaffirmed the need to combine development co-
operation and trade in development policies (e.g. UN, 1961, 1970, 1979 
and 2000). In practice the two worlds have, however, remained divided. 
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2.4 Development cooperation and trade: theoretically united 
- divided in practice 
In theory development cooperation and trade could be part of the same 
policy aimed at stimulating development. In practice development coop-
eration and trade have been separate pillars of the international commu-
nity that have to, but do not necessarily, interact. The first pillar deals 
with financial assistance (ODA flows) and the second pillar deals with 
trade policies. This two-pillar approach did not result in coherent policies 
with an optimal impact for economic development (Morressey, 2006).   
Trade policies are designed within the multilateral WTO framework 
under auspices of Ministers of International Trade. Since the start of the 
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs in 1947, which later in 1994 
was transformed into the WTO, various multilateral trade deals have 
been reached. This has been a success in general, the tariffs on trade of 
industrialized goods have now been reduced to almost zero and the 
WTO provides countries with a neutral arbiter in case of trade conflicts 
(VanGrasstek, 2013). Liberalizing the markets for products mostly pro-
duced in developing countries has, however, evolved less (Charlton and 
Stiglitz, 2005; Dierikx, 2005; WTO, 2014). Especially barriers in the agri-
cultural sector, in which many developing countries have a natural com-
parative advantage, remain high. Even today it is difficult to make sub-
stantial progress (Van Grasstek, 2013). This had led to considerable 
criticism from development policy-makers (Charlton and Stiglitz, 2005; 
Ismail, 2007). Similarly, trade policies in numerous OECD countries al-
low exporting companies to operate in a cartel.8 These export cartels 
confront developing countries with anti-competitive behavior like pric-
ing strategies and dividing markets. Developing countries are particularly 
vulnerable for this behavior because they lack the institutions to counter 
these dynamics. It furthermore impacts developing countries indirectly 
through the higher trade barriers they face lobbied for by powerful car-
tels. Here also the trade community is being criticized (Bergeijk, 2010).  
There are also general concerns about the effect of trade negotiations 
on the development prospects of low and middle income countries. 
Some actually see these multilateral trade negotiations as instruments that 
are too (financially) demanding for low income countries and, relatedly, 
too much in favor of high income countries’ industries (Chang, 2003; 
Charlton and Stigltitz, 2005; McDonald et al., 2013; Vice Versa, 2013; 
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2014). Arguably, there is a risk that bilateral trade agreements reduce the 
commitment of the international community to negotiate new trade deals 
via the multilateral trading system in which low-income countries have as 
much to say as the high-income countries (Levy, 1997). This would put 
low-income countries at a comparative disadvantage because they lack 
the power and capacity to reach (a great number of) favorable trade deals 
on their own (Finger and Nogues, 2002) and lack the capacity to retaliate 
(Busch and Reinhart, 2003). Importantly, (bilateral) trade agreements 
reached by other countries will potentially have negative consequences 
for the outs, that is the developing countries. Bilateral trade agreements 
will have positive effects for members of the agreement because trade 
will increase. But this trade increase can be a “real increase” in trade of 
members within the trade block or an increase in trade of members in 
the trade block at the expense of trade diversion resulting in lower trade 
with non-members (Soalaga and Winters, 2001). In the latter case trade 
flows are potentially diverted away from low income countries that do 
not have an entire network of these agreements in place (Panagariya, 
2002).  
Finally, financial development cooperation has not met the UN target 
for official development cooperation of 0.7 per cent of Gross National 
Income.  The allocation often reflects donor country priorities, political 
motives and strategic concerns (Qian, 2014). OECD development coop-
eration statics show that close to 50 per cent of development coopera-
tion supplied in 2013 went to lower middle income and upper middle 
income countries while the Low Income Countries (LIC’s) only received 
one third. This distribution results partially from donor programs, such 
as investment subsidies for companies, which are driven by corporate 
demand which is more concentrated in the higher developed developing 
countries (Qian, 2014; WRR, 2010). Donor priorities are also reflected in 
the supply of tied aid, i.e. development cooperation that must be spend 
in the donor country. Tied development aid potentially increases project 
development costs and may displace trade flows not supported by devel-
opment cooperation (Morresey, 1993; OECD, 1991).  
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2.5 Development cooperation and trade: shifts in the 
international landscape  
Sound theoretical arguments exist for coherent development cooperation 
and trade policies like trade facilitation, but the interaction between the 
two policies in practice has been limited so far. The changing landscape 
for both the development and trade communities present challenges that 
strengthen the case for  integration of the two policy fields.  
 
Economic gravity 
As economic gravity is shifting towards (former) developing markets like 
China, India and Nigeria the need to recalibrate the governance of global 
issues emerges (Bergeijk, 2013; Quah, 2010; Sumner, 2010)9. Anno 2014 
combining development cooperation and trade into one policy field 
would recognize that many former low income countries are now to be 
viewed not only as donor recipient but also recognized as economic 
powers (Bergeijk, 2009; Mawdsley et al., 2014). If the relation between 
(former) donor countries and (former) recipient countries would evolve 
towards a more equal footing this would greatly improve the chances of 
finding solutions to pressing international problems, such as climate 
change, energy and food security, that demand the integrated attention 
of all countries.  
Economic developments also make the development cooperation and 
trade combination interesting for other reasons.  Due to their economic 
success, countries can and recently do “graduate” from the least devel-
oped countries category of the United Nations10. Over the last 40 years, 
only 4 countries have officially graduated (Botswana, Cape Verde, the 
Maldives and Samoa), but more are expected to graduate in the coming 
years (World Bank, 2015). In 2011 the international community commit-
ted to assisting the least developed countries so that at least half of them 
will become able to meet the graduation criteria by 2020 (Kawamura, 
2014). By combining development cooperation and trade policies a 
smooth transition from development cooperation flows towards trade 
and investment flows becomes subject of the bilateral relation/dialogue 
between low and high income countries. Something seriously needed for 
successful but more development cooperation dependent graduation 
countries (Fialho, 2015). In the current system LDC graduates lose their 
benefits which amongst others includes trade preferences, trade related 
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capacity building, ODA flows, a substantial discount on UN contribu-
tions and financial support by the UN for LDC representatives for the 
participation of UN meetings (Fialho, 2015). Combining the of the port-
folios of development cooperation and trade thus provides for a contin-
uum in the relation between (former) donor and (former) recipient.  
 
Development finance landscape 
In the slipstream of changing economic gravity the development finance 
landscape changes drastically. New sources of finance become available 
for low and middle income countries and new actors have entered de-
velopment finance (Mawdsley, 2012; Mawdsley et al., 2014; Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 2013; OECD, 2014). These new players include non-
DAC sovereign donors (like China), philanthropic organizations such as 
the Bill and Melinda Gates foundation, non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) (e.g. Corddevelopment  and Oxfam Novib) and special purpose 
funds (e.g. climate funds) (see Figure 2.1).  
Figure 2.1 
Development finance landscape  
 
Source: Adapted from OECD (2014), Figure 2, pp.6 
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In the new development finance landscape official development flows 
loses ground and private flows are increasingly important. FDI and re-
mittances already contributed 64 per cent to the financial flows to devel-
oping countries in 2000, in 2012 this has however increased to 75 per 
cent (OECD, 2014). 
The importance of private flows is increasingly reflected in the devel-
opment approach of many of the (re)emerging donors and development 
partners. They interweave trade, investment, concessional financing and 
technical assistance (Mawdsley et al., 2014). Combining development 
cooperation and trade policies by traditional DAC donors could be a 
necessary shift in paradigm on their side to bring private sector financial 
flows and export credit schemes, that traditionally are more in the do-
main of trade policy, in one hand with development cooperation.  It will 
bring the policies of DAC donors more in line with the polices of the 
emerging donors and it could contribute to the much needed private sec-
tor investments into developing countries. In business trade and invest-
ment are intertwined because production processes across countries are 
characterized by fragmentation (OECD, 2015b). The tradability of goods 
from a production location, i.e. a country, therefor determines a large 
part of corporate investment decisions. Combined aid and trade policies 
can effectively deal with trade barriers and improve the investment cli-
mate in developing countries and by doing so add to development 
through more trade and investment.   
 
Geography of inequality 
The changing geography of inequality also has implications for the de-
velopment cooperation and trade cooperation. Three quarters of the 
world’s poor are no longer living in low income countries (Sumner, 
2010). The majority of the world’s poor now actually live in middle in-
come countries like China, India, Indonesia and Nigeria which are no 
longer major recipients of official development cooperation.  The result 
is that it is increasingly difficult to reach these people with development 
cooperation programs. Cooperation with the trade community, especially 
the corporate sector, could lead to projects that contribute to inclusive 
growth via the creation of jobs (ITC, 2008). Thereby alleviating the 
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needs of the poor in those countries with whom the Development coop-
eration community no longer has a donor relationship.  
 
Policy coherence 
The international community has committed itself to policy coherence 
for development (King et al., 2012). Combining development coopera-
tion and trade can greatly improve the coherence and coordination be-
tween development and trade policies. Policies must be integrated and 
coordinated to maximize potential growth and development benefits and 
reduce inefficiencies and contradictions (Morressey, 2006).  One example 
is interaction between the Bali agreement on trade facilitation and aid. 
The Bali Trade Facilitation Agreement contains provisions for expediting 
the movement, release and clearance of goods. It amongst others sets 
out measures for effective cooperation between customs and other ap-
propriate authorities on trade facilitation. Here the private sector devel-
opment programs11 can actively be used to assist low income countries in 
the process of improving for example their custom procedures, one of 
the issues from the Bali deal (Hallaert, 2015). The same can be said for 
programs that assist developing countries with the transition needed if 
the new economic partnership agreements between the EU and various 
African regions are implemented (ECDPM, 2011). Also, increased trade-
related technical cooperation and capacity building are good examples of 
integrated development cooperation and trade policies because they 
guarantee proper participation of low and middle income countries in 
the multilateral trading system (Ismail, 2007). 
2.6 Integrating development cooperation and trade: the case 
of the new Aid and Trade Policy in the Netherlands. 
From the very beginning of the development cooperation policy field, 
The Netherlands followed Truman’s plea to join the United Nations 
program to “greatly increase the industrial activity in other nations and 
… raise substantially their standards of living”. The Netherlands was the 
first country in the world to commit to an aid target in 1966, four years 
before the UN adopted the 0.7 per cent target in October 1970 (Dier-
ickx, 2005). In the following years, the Netherlands (together with the 
Denmark and Norway) were among the first countries to meet the UN 
target for ODA (see Figure 2.2) 12. 
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Eventually, the Netherlands became one of the major players in de-
velopment cooperation (Qian, 2014). Some even judged the Netherlands 
as a front-runner and its development policy as a blueprint for others 
(Stokke, 1989). Amongst others due to the influence of the Nobel laure-
ate Jan Tinbergen and its apprentice Jan Pronk who held the position of 
Minister of Development Coorperation in four different administrations. 
In 2012, however, the Dutch government decided to change the devel-
opment policy framework drastically by merging the Ministry for Devel-
opment Cooperation with the part of the Ministry of Economic Affairs 
responsible for International Trade (Ministry of General Affairs, 2012). 
Following this institutional redesign the Netherlands presented its first 
integrated aid and trade agenda. What was the rationale behind this new 
aid and trade agenda from the perspective of improved development 
outcomes? This section addresses this question in light of the topics ear-
lier discussed in this article: the links between the new policy and (eco-
nomic) theory, how it addresses(consequences of the historical) divide 
between aid and trade and its responses the changing international aid 
and trade landscape. 
Figure 2.2 
ODA performance of the Netherlands as per cent of GNI 
 
Source: OECD Aid statistics 2015, computations by the author. 
Note: The figures for 2014 are preliminary. 
 
Development Cooperation and Trade in the Netherlands 
The Netherlands formally integrated development cooperation and trade 
with its report A World to Gain. A New Agenda for Aid, Trade and Investment 
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(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013). The report gives the rationale for the 
new policy, but does not provide detailed information about the institu-
tional changes within the Netherlands, i.e. the merger of the Ministry of 
Development Cooperation and the Directorate General responsible for 
International Trade and parts of the economic diplomacy agenda13. The 
report provides answers of the new Ministry for Trade and Development 
to major challenges for the trade and development communities.  
 
How does the new Development Cooperation and Trade policy in the Netherlands 
relate to (economic) theory?  
As discussed, theory suggests that development cooperation and export 
can help by partially filling the foreign exchange gap. In line with this 
thought the development cooperation and trade policy of the Nether-
lands offers the opportunity to aid recipients and development graduates 
to obtain a value chain analysis to see what products can be sold on the 
EU market. The value chain analysis is followed up by assisting busi-
nesses from developing countries with their exports towards the Euro-
pean market. Furthermore, the Netherlands try to improve the condi-
tions for exports from developing countries by pursuing a liberal stand 
within the EU on market access issues relating to low and middle income 
countries (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013). 
The new development cooperation and trade portfolio also relates to 
theory in other aspects. In line with economic development theory, the 
new aid and trade policy presents development as a continuum from aid 
relations to trade relations. More trade, in terms of more export oriented 
growth, leads to lower aid dependence. It also has an international rela-
tions component. Progressing on the ladder of development is a topic of 
mutual interest and bilateral relations. For the recipient phasing in trade 
can offer a solution to problems that arise when countries develop eco-
nomically. The role of financial aid in economic activity can, over time, 
be substituted by the role of trade and incoming foreign direct invest-
ment. For the donor it offers the opportunity to capitalize on their rela-
tions. Familiarity and cultural ties associated with a (former) donor rela-
tionship are a potential advantage for companies when they want to 
expand their business in the former aid recipient country (IOB14, 2014). 
Thus, integrating aid and trade gives the opportunity to shape the politi-
cal dialogue between countries on a continuous basis. Trade issues will 
remain even after aid is long phased out. 
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Bridging the gap: How does the new policy close the former divide between development 
cooperation and trade?  
We have seen that development cooperation and trade have been divid-
ed in practice. Policy coherence is one of the main potential benefits of a 
combined development cooperation and trade agenda and a way to deal 
with the divide between aid and trade. This is also a focus area in the aid 
and trade agenda of the Netherlands. The Dutch provide assistance to 
developing countries for the examples mentioned in section five of this 
paper, the implementation of the Bali agreement and capacity building 
for trade negotiators. Yet there are also other examples that show how 
the divide between the aid and trade community are solved.  
For example, in 2012, the early days of the new Trade and Develop-
ment Ministry, the language about the bilateral trade agreement between 
the EU and US primarily concerned national economic interests 
(TweedeKamer, 2013b).  Now that the merger between development 
cooperation and trade has been further completed, the Dutch pay atten-
tion to possible consequences of trade diversion for developing coun-
tries trying to ensure that low and middle income countries will also ben-
efit if the EU and US strike a trade deal (Oneworld, 2015). Here we see 
an obvious shift in the position of the Trade and Development Ministry 
towards a view that represents  both national economic interests and de-
velopment interest instead of only one of the two aspects.  
Another example where policy coherence bridges the development 
and trade gap is the Netherlands’ effort for domestic resource mobiliza-
tion. Before the merge of aid and trade portfolio’s the international trade 
policies dealt with attracting foreign investors to the Netherlands. Favor-
able tax treaties were a strong hold within that policy. Following the new 
institutional setting the Dutch government analyzed their tax treaties 
with developing countries and the potential negative consequences of 
these treaties for the tax base of developing countries. Now the Dutch 
government is renegotiating its tax treaties with 23 low-income countries 
and have committed to put an end to activities that erode the local tax 
base. It also offered developing country assistance in building their tax 
authority. In this way the new aid and trade approach tried to strike a 
better balance between development cooperation and trade issues, taking 
into account not only benefits of a competitive tax climate for the Dutch 
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economy but also the interests of developing countries (Tweede Kamer, 
2013a). 
 
How does the new development cooperation and trade policy address shifts in the in-
ternational development and trade landscape?  
The policy note formulates the ambition to interact with low and middle-
income countries in a way that reflects their growing importance in the 
world economy. The Netherlands aims to work in close partnership with 
low and middle income countries to discuss development and global 
governance issues. One way the latter materializes is by co-chairing the 
global partnership for effective development co-operation with Malawi 
and Mexico.  
The changing geography of inequality has consequences for the part-
ners the Dutch government cooperates with in the development cooper-
ation and trade policy. The Netherlands state that the leverage develop-
ment cooperation offers in middle income countries to deal with poverty 
and equity issues is decreasing (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013). There-
fore the Dutch Government reaches out to businesses and research insti-
tutions in seeking solutions for problems faced by the poor in these 
countries. In an effort to keep balance between private and public moti-
vations the incorporation of the private sector on the one hand is active-
ly combined with promoting social responsible entrepreneurship on the 
other. This is done by making corporate social responsibility mandatory 
in all government programs aimed at the private sector and by organizing 
countervailing power via the cooperation with NGO’s towards institu-
tion building in low and middle income countries (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 2014). 
In view of the changing development financing landscape new ways 
of financing development are sought. A new fund for development fi-
nancing, the Dutch Good Growth Fund, was introduced to boost fi-
nancing to small and medium sized enterprises within low and middle 
income countries to spur job growth (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013). 
The ministry also has the ambition to open the international debate 
about the criteria for ODA. Given the decreasing role of ODA and the 
increasing role of other financial flows in the financing of developing 
countries the Netherlands wants to broaden the scope of development 
assistance to instruments that catalyze private flows to developing coun-
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tries (e.g. guaranties and insurances). The discussion should be a first 
step to prepare public funded development cooperation to a world were 
trade and investment flows are the main financiers for most developing 
countries (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013).  
2.7 Development cooperation, Trade and Issues for Economic 
Diplomacy  
Trends in the external environment to the trade and development com-
munity necessitate better integration of development and trade policies.  
This paradigm shift also has consequences for the economic diplomacy 
agenda. As mentioned in chapter 1, economic diplomacy is a set of ac-
tions related to cross border activities by government and non-
governmental actors. These actions include trade and investment promo-
tion, interventions in policymaking in favour of international trade, the 
maintenance of a favourable international policy environment and secur-
ing property right and the stability of economic relations (Bergeijk, 
2009a; Bergeijk et al., 2011; Bayne and Woolcock, 2007). An integrated 
development cooperation and trade policy presents issues for all four 
elements of economic diplomacy. 
 
Trade and investment promotion  
Both from a developing and a developed country perspective it is im-
portant to identify economic diplomacy policies that successfully support 
companies that want to enter developing and emerging markets. These 
private sector investments are important for growth and productivity 
development in developing countries (Demena and Bergeijk, 2016). Fur-
thermore, it is important for both developed and developing countries to 
stimulate trade. Enhancing markets access for developing countries to 
developed markets will increase their exports and reduce their aid de-
pendency. But limited trade between developed and developing countries 
is not only a result from formal trade barriers but also other factors such 
as reputation. Economic diplomacy policies could be part of a solution 
for reputational disadvantages that some countries have in international 
trade. Here developing countries stand at a disadvantage because the 
more technologically advanced products coming from developing coun-
tries may be perceived as less advanced and of poorer quality than their 
substitutes from developed countries (Hudson and Jones, 2003). The 
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pricing mechanism fails in these circumstances because prices do not 
convey all the relevant information for international trade (Rauch, 1996 
and 1999). The question arises what role trade promotion actions by 
economic diplomats can play to solve these challenges for developing 
countries (and how trade and development policies can assist). 
 
Securing property rights and the stability of economic relations.  
Traditionally the largest multinational enterprises come from developed 
countries. We have however seen that economic gravity is changing. In 
2012 developing economies absorbed more FDI than developed coun-
tries (UNCTAD, 2013). In addition, they generated almost one third of 
global FDI outflows. This increases the need for economic diplomates 
from both FDI host and home countries to reduce and remove (politi-
cal) uncertainty about international transactions. Determining economic 
diplomacy policies that enhance the security of investment (both physical 
investments and intellectual property) is thus an increasingly important 
issue for both developed and developing countries.  
 
Influencing foreign national policy making in favour of domestic multinational enter-
prises  
State(s) (enterprises) may be the counterpart of a company operating in 
the international markets. This creates the necessity for entrepreneurs to 
seek cooperation with their national government to equalize the playing 
field. This argument was traditionally used for economic diplomacy from 
“global North” to “global South” transactions. It can however also be 
expected to be relevant for companies from developing an emerging 
markets that want to internationalise. This element of economic diplo-
macy becomes more important as trade and development cooperation 
policies should in the longer run lead to more bilateral economic ex-
change.  
 
Maintain a favourable international policy environment.  
Maintaining a favourable international policy environment involves mul-
tilateral efforts to preserve a functioning global governance system for 
trade and financial flows. The agendas for development cooperation and 
trade meet in the multilateral arena in various ways and have arguably 
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not been fully successful in aligning the interests of both developing and 
developed countries. With the changing weights in the international 
economy it is however in the long term interest of both the development 
and trade community to have and keep a properly functioning multilat-
eral trade and investment framework that addresses the needs and con-
cerns of developing and developed countries. Here the new development 
and trade paradigm sets the stage for economic diplomats involved in 
multilateral negotiations. 
2.8 Final remarks 
With the connection of the development cooperation agenda and the 
trade agenda, major themes of development can be addressed more ef-
fectively. Indeed, it appear that when the trade and development cooper-
ation portfolio are properly integrated, trade can finally play the role for 
economic development as hoped by the international community for the 
last decades (e.g. Dierikx, 2005 and 2007; Ismail, 2007; UN, 1961, 1970, 
1979 and 2000).  The “merger” requires modifications to both the trade 
and the development cooperation part of the portfolio. Neither alone is 
a guarantee for growth and development.   
The theoretical foundations for combining development cooperation 
and trade are sound, but at the same time it needs to be acknowledged 
that the track record is still short. Combined development cooperation 
and trade policies, like in the Netherlands, have only existed for a couple 
of years and no overall policy evaluations are available yet although inte-
grated trade and development policies are viewed increasingly favorable 
(Mawdsley et al., 2014). It is however important to keep in mind that in 
the past development cooperation and trade have been divided amongst 
others because interests between the development cooperation and trade 
community were not aligned. The dividing forces are still present and 
can influence policy design negatively. The effects of the combined poli-
cy should therefore be monitored closely.  
As integrated development cooperation and trade is becoming more 
mainstream it is important to view economic diplomacy through a de-
velopment and trade lens. The economic diplomacy research field should 
explicitly take into account the effect of its actions on both developed 
and developing countries. Especially for the latter a lot of knowledge still 
needs to be build.  
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Notes 
 
1 A preliminary version was presented at the Human Welfare Conference 2015 
(University of Oxford [Green Templeton College], Oxford, May 2015). 
2 Table 1 is based on information from the OECD development cooperation 
peer reviews. 60 per cent of the countries in table 1 have actually combined min-
istries of trade and development cooperation. Only 8 per cent of the countries 
listed combined responsibilities for trade and development cooperation in the 
person of one minister. 
3 The Finish government was earlier to experiment with the combination in 2003-
2006, but is a much smaller donor then the Netherlands. Finish official develop-
ment assistance amounted to $1030 million in 2006, the Dutch contributions in 
that year were $6261 million. Anno 2014 Finish development assistance amounts 
to $1614 million, the Dutch contributions then were $5522 million. 
4 In Norway the portfolio of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development are com-
bined under the responsibility of the minister of Foreign affairs since 2013. Un-
der the minister of Foreign Affiars the portfolio of Development Cooperation is 
covered by a (politically appointed) political advisers.  
5 http://www.oecd.org/dac/peer-reviews/bycountry/ last accessed 1st of May 
2014. 
6 The OECD DAC peer review website reports 29 DAC members. I have in-
cluded 25 in this chapter. I left out the EU because this chapter discusses devel-
opments in bilateral aid and trade policies. Furthermore Slovenia, the Slovak Re-
public, and Poland are (new) DAC members and their first peer review was not 
yet available at the time of writing. 
7 VanGrasstek (2013) discusses all GATT and WTO trade agreements. But his 
work goes much further he also explains many of the more technical details of 
trade negotiations. 
8 According to Bergeijk (2009b) countries that allow export cartels include: Cana-
da, Germany, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States. The 
disadvantages of these cartels are of course not only limited to developing coun-
tries. 
9 A detailed overview of expected shifts in economic activity and global wealth is 
provided by the OECD in: Perspectives on Global Development 2010: Shifting Wealth,  
http://www.oecd.org/development/pgd/shiftingwealth.htm  
10 A discussion of the LDC categorization is given in Fialho (2012). The UN 
LDC classification comes with LDC support measures. Graduating from the UN 
LDC status is based on a more complex analysis than GDP figures only, which is 
what the Worldbank (2015) figures refer to. 
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11 Aid for trade programs are part of the private sector development agenda. 
12 The case of France is a-typical. Because of major flows to (former) colonies the 
French also met the 0.7 per cent norm in early years of development cooperation. 
French ODA expenditures however only went down, from 1.3 per cent of GNI 
in 1960 to below 0.5 per cent GNI in 1970. Ever since it has been fluctuating 
between 0.4 per cent - 0.6 per cent GNI. 
13 Before the “merger” of the Development Cooperation and Trade portfolio the 
Directorate-general for Foreign Economic  Relations was part of the ministry of 
Economic Affairs. 
14 The Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) is the independent 
evaluator of aid and trade policies and operations in the Netherlands. 
 36 
 37 
 
3 
Does Economic Diplomacy Work? A 
Meta-analysis of Its Impact on Trade 
and Investment1  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The academic attention and the popularity of economic diplomacy 
among policy makers increases the importance of knowledge about the 
(size) effect and significance of economic diplomacy. 
Since the empirical work in the field of economic diplomacy is still 
evolving, research results are not yet conclusive. This chapter takes stock 
of this literature by providing a meta-analysis of 32 empirical studies 
published in the period 1985-2011. These studies basically provide us 
with two samples. Sample 1 contains 627 t-values. Sample 2 is an exten-
sion of the first sample and consists of 963 reported significance levels2. 
By using reported significance levels instead of absolute reported t-values 
additional observations can be included.  Both samples regard the impact 
of economic diplomacy on international economic flows; see Figure 3.1. 
Importantly, in the larger sample the number of insignificant and nega-
tive coefficients exceeds the number of significantly positive coefficients 
(for sample 1 the share of negative and insignificant t-values is 34%). We 
1 This chapter is based on Moons and Bergeijk (2016) first pub-
lished March 2016 in the World Economy, to which special acknowl-
edgement is due. Comments from two anonymous reviewers are 
gratefully acknowledged.  
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scrutinize the mixed evidence that is provided by these studies, control-
ling for differences in research design, methodology, time frame and 
manner of data deployed in the 32 studies by doing a meta-regression 
analysis. This is a research method that enables researchers to synthesize 
and summarize previously obtained empirical findings for a similar re-
search question in a quantitative and statistically rigorous fashion. Meta-
analysis basically is a statistical approach in which the reported results are 
controlled for the characteristics of the identified primary studies. It 
therefore both includes and goes beyond a traditional systematic review.  
Figure 3.1 
Sample 1 (based on reported and calculated t values) versus Sample 2 
(based on reported significance levels)  
 
The use of a meta-analysis adds value to a traditional review of the lit-
erature: a meta-analysis is less prone to subjective bias and more trans-
parent than a traditional literature review because it systematically anal-
yses sources of (quantitative) variation of earlier primary studies (Bergeijk 
and Lazzaroni, 2015). A meta-analysis enables us to combine the results 
from the different (sub)disciplines where economic diplomacy is gaining 
ground like international relations, international marketing, international 
economics, development studies and international political economy.  
This is particularly relevant if only because the topic of economic diplo-
macy should be studied from a multidisciplinary point of view while em-
pirical studies so far have by and large been mono-disciplinary in focus. 
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One contribution of this paper is that this is the first meta-analysis of 
the effects of instruments of economic diplomacy on international eco-
nomic flows. Our findings are to some extent comparable to other meta-
analyses from the field of economics in the sense that we also find that 
research design is an important determinant for significance (and magni-
tude) of the particular instrument(s) under econometric investigation 
(compare, Havránek and Iršova, 2010; Bergeijk and Lazzaroni, 2015; 
Ljungvall and Tingvall, 2008; Mebratie and Bergeijk, 2013; Sinani and 
Meyer, 2009). The second contribution is that we identify important 
methodological issues that can be taken into account in future research 
not only in the field of economic diplomacy, but also in any emerging 
field of international economic relationships. The third contribution is 
that we develop a logit model of significance levels that allows us to con-
sider 50% more observations. This innovation is relevant for research 
fields where establishing the meta-sign and its meta-significance already 
constitutes relevant findings and where reporting in the primary studies 
frequently is incomplete or inexact3. The fourth contribution is that we 
show the importance of conducting sensitivity analysis in meta-analysis 
for cross disciplinary subjects like economic diplomacy.  
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 re-
views empirical research that addresses the relation between economic 
diplomacy and trade and investment flows. We discuss the problems en-
countered in these studies. Section 3.3 discusses the construction of our 
sample and provides descriptive statistics. Section 3.4 sets out the design 
of the meta-analysis and section 3.5 presents and discusses the empirical 
results and conducts a meta-regression sensitivity analysis. Section 3.6 
concludes and offers suggestions for future research. 
3.2 Review of literature 
Most studies in our sample use the gravity model that has a longstanding 
history in analysing the international pattern of bilateral trade and in-
vestment flows (Bergeijk and Brakman, 2010). The primary studies in 
our sample use economic diplomacy as one of the determinants of inter-
national trade and investment. The parameter estimate of economic di-
plomacy can be interpreted as the partial derivative of international trade 
(or investment) with respect to the particular diplomatic instrument(s) 
that is (are) investigated in the primary study.  
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Until the mid-1990s, the methodology used for analysis still was ra-
ther crude from today’s perspective due to limited computing power and 
data availability. The studies predominantly pertained to cross section 
analysis of bilateral political events-data-based indicators to explain the 
development of bilateral trade (Bergeijk, 1992 and 1994; Polachek, 1997; 
Pollins, 1989a and b) and Foreign Direct Investment (Nigh, 1985). The 
empirical works uncovered a positive correlation between, on the one 
hand, trade and investment and, on the other hand, (net) diplomatic co-
operation. Differences in the significance, strength and sometimes the 
sign of the correlations, occurred for single year studies (Bergeijk, 1992 
and 1994) versus pooled cross sections (Nigh, 1985; Pollins, 1989a and b) 
and for developing versus developed countries (Nigh, 1985). Also the ex-
tent to which countries were integrated in the world economy appeared 
to be relevant (Pollins, 1989a) as well as the socio-political system (cen-
trally planned versus market economies; Bergeijk 1992 and 1994).  
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the breakdown of the Iron Cur-
tain for some time reduced research interest in the topic, but in the mid-
2000s economic diplomacy returned on the research agenda. Improving 
on the earlier literature, researchers deployed panel data, different econ-
ometric methods and used more specific tools of economic diplomacy as 
explanatory variables. The focal point became the international network 
of countries (consisting of embassies, consulates, the national, local, and 
regional export and investment promotion offices), and the use of that 
network (trade missions at various levels of diplomatic representation 
organized within this network).  
Researchers at the World Bank published studies on the effectiveness 
of investment promotion agencies (IPAs) (Harding and Javorcik, 2007; 
Morisset, 2003) and EPAs (Lederman et al., 2006 and 2010). According 
to these studies, investment promotion and export promotion agencies 
have a strong and statistically significant effect. The studies claimed that 
on average a 10 per cent increase in the budget of investment promotion 
leads to a 7.5 per cent increase of FDI flows (Morriset, 2003), that each 
additional dollar of export promotion, increases exports by 40 dollars for 
the median agency (Lederman et al., 2006) and that a 10 per cent increase 
in the budget of export promotion agencies increases exports by 0.6 per 
cent to 1 per cent (Lederman et al., 2010). The World Bank publications 
were followed by other studies on the topic of export promotion and 
investment promotion, often producing positively significant effects of 
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much smaller size (Bobonis and Shatz, 2007; Veenstra et al., 2011). The 
empirical work that followed the World Bank publications had a some-
what different and wider scope as these studies dealt with the regional 
effect of export promotion and embassies (Gil et al., 2008 and 2011; 
Volpe Martincus et al., 2010a), the effect of the level of development on 
the impact of the international network of countries  (Veenstra et al., 
2011) and the effect of export promotion on the extensive and intensive 
margin of trade (Gil et al., 2011; Segura-Cayuela et al., 2008; Volpe Mar-
tincus et al., 2010a and b; Volpe and Carballo, 2012)4,5.   
Others investigated economic diplomacy by focussing on the contri-
bution of the diplomatic service to trade and investment flows. Rose 
(2007) was the first to publish on the macroeconomic level effects of the 
network of embassies and consulates-general (Rose, 2007). The effect of 
the changes in the international diplomatic network are studied by Afman 
and Maurel (2010) and the heterogeneity in effects due to different forms 
of representation in this network are analysed by Bergeijk et al. (2011). 
The effects of export promotion units within the embassies are investi-
gated by Kang (2011), Hayakawa et al. (2011), Gil et al. (2008) and (2011) 
and Creusen and Lejour, (2011). Furthermore, research has emerged on 
the use of the international network via organizing trade missions includ-
ing state visits (Creusen and Lejour, 2011, 2013; Head and Ries, 2006; 
Nitsch, 2007).  
The recent studies report positive and significant coefficients. Rose 
(2007) finds that the opening of an additional embassy or consulate is 
associated with 6 to 10 per cent higher exports. Kang (2011) reports that 
a 10% increase in the budget of export promotion units in embassies 
increases exports by 2 per cent to 6 per cent. Similarly, according to 
Hayakawa et al. (2011) this effect is 5 per cent to 6 per cent. Afman and 
Maurel (2010) calculate that the opening of an embassy has a similar im-
pact as a 2 to 12 percentage points reduction in ad valorem tariff. Con-
trolling for the level of development, Veenstra et al., (2011), however, 
find a smaller effect of only 0.5 per cent to 0.9 per cent additional ex-
ports when increasing the number of embassies and consulates by 10 per 
cent. The use of the diplomatic network via trade missions also shows 
mixed results varying from an export stimulating effect of 6 per cent to 
10 per cent for the US, France and Germany (Nitsch, 2007) to insignifi-
cant econometric outcomes for Canada (Head and Ries, 2006). Explor-
ing micro data for the Netherlands, Creusen and Lejour (2011) find a 
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significant export promoting effect of trade missions of 5 per cent to 20 
per cent for low-income countries and OECD countries, respectively. 
Their estimates for missions to high income countries are insignificant 
(so that economic diplomacy hardly would seem to be effective in intra 
OECD trade).  
Additionally, the interaction between measures of economic diploma-
cy is explored and shows that the type of diplomatic representation 
seems to matter. Embassies have a larger impact on trade than consu-
lates, while honorary consulates on average do not add value to trade 
(Bergeijk et al., 2011). Again the effectiveness of both embassies and 
consulates, as well as export promotion agencies, depends on the levels 
of development of the trade partners. The impact of economic diploma-
cy seems to be significant in North-South, South-South and South-
North trade and weak (if at all present) for the flows between rich 
(OECD) countries (Creusen and Lejour, 2011 and 2013; Veenstra et al., 
2011). 
The role of economic diplomacy and its relation to FDI flows has re-
ceived less attention (this is also true for the more recent literature). Next 
to the earlier mentioned publications of Morriset (2003), Harding and 
Jovorick (2007) and Bobonis and Shatz (2007) on the role of investment 
promotion, some work has been done on the impact of the bilateral poli-
tic/diplomatic relation on FDI flows. The studies show a positive and 
significant impact of cooperation between countries, similar to the rela-
tion found for trade (Keshk et al., 2004; Polachek et al., 2007). Policies 
that increase economic security, such as similarity in foreign policy, en-
hance U.S. FDI (Biglaiser and DeRouwen, 2007). 
It is difficult to draw general conclusions based on the reviewed litera-
ture because the studies are rather heterogeneous. The heterogeneity of 
the reported results may partially be explained by differences in the char-
acteristics of the primary studies. A general observation is that analyses 
are often constrained because of limited data availability and that fre-
quently data sets had to be built from scratch by the researchers by col-
lecting primary data through surveys, by inspecting a great many number 
of national websites (in a great many languages) and/or coding of quali-
tative historical information. As a consequence the metrics of economic 
diplomacy vary. Also, some studies only relate to the trade and/or in-
vestment activities of one source country. Examples are Head and Ries 
(2006) on the effectiveness of Canadian trade missions, Creusen and 
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Lejour, (2011 and 2013) on Dutch foreign network and its activities, 
Kang (2011) who reports on the effect of export promotion units for 
South Korea and of Gil et al. (2008) and Gil et al. (2011) that study ex-
ports by Spanish regions. The samples of these studies are county-
specific and general conclusions cannot be drawn on such a narrow ba-
sis. The same may hold true for analyses done for only a limited group of 
source countries such as the work of Hayakawa et al. (2011) that is lim-
ited to only two countries and many cross sections that only cover one 
year. Finally, most studies relate to the more developed source countries.  
Since higher cultural and institutional barriers typically exist at lower lev-
els of development the sample should ideally cover source and destina-
tion countries at different stages of economic development (Yakop and 
Bergeijk, 2011). In order to deal with these and related issues our meta-
analysis combines the information of the individual studies in order to 
distil the general pattern hidden in the individual studies.  
3.3 The data 
We constructed a database with the characteristics of studies that empiri-
cally investigate the impact of economic diplomacy on international eco-
nomic flows. As a starting point we followed up on the references made 
in the primary studies that were surveyed by Bergeijk (2009), checked 
studies that cited these studies and, importantly, extended the list of 
studies by searching the EconLit electronic database and the internet, 
especially using Google Scholar6. In our search we used broad keyword 
listings with the following terminologies: economic diplomacy, diploma-
cy and (international) trade, diplomacy and FDI, information barriers 
and diplomacy, embassies, trade missions, consulates, export promotion 
institutions, export promotion, investment promotion agencies and in-
vestment promotion institutions. This provided us with a list of pub-
lished articles, books, working papers and conference papers that inves-
tigate the effect of economic diplomacy on trade and FDI flows. 
Not all uncovered studies could be included in our sample. Qualita-
tive papers, mostly from the field of international relations, were not in-
cluded since we were searching for empirical research. Our initial search 
also delivered a number of effectiveness studies published in the 1990s 
(Seringhaus and Botschen, 1991; Seringhaus and Rosson, 1998), but 
these studies do not deal with the impact of economic diplomacy on 
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trade and investment flows. Also excluded were studies based on surveys 
about successful export strategies at the company level (Bernard and Jen-
sen, 2004; Francis and Collins-Dodd, 2004; Genctürk and Kotabe, 2001). 
The search, moreover, provided a limited number of micro data studies 
dealing with the effect of economic diplomacy on the margins of trade 
(Biesenbroeck et al., 2011; Volpe Martincus et al., 2010a and b; Volpe 
and Carballo, 2012). These studies, mostly conducted by Inter-American 
Development Bank researchers, primarily focus on the effects of trade 
promotion for Latin American countries (Biesenbroeck et al., 2011 ana-
lyse the effect of trade promotion in Canada). The margin of trade pa-
pers look into the development of trade patterns of firms that are treated 
with economic diplomacy but the studies cannot be included in our 
sample because they provide information on how overall trade is being 
influenced by trade promotion detailing the extensive and intensive mar-
gin but leaving the question of its impact on the level of total trade unan-
swered (the margins of trade literature will be reviewed in chapter 4 of 
this thesis). The studies, moreover, report results which are specific to 
the groups of assisted companies and do not answer the question what 
the overall (macroeconomic) impact of economic diplomacy is. Our ini-
tial search also provided us with a number of studies that used a logit or 
probit model to estimate the relationship between economic diplomacy 
and trade/FDI. In these models the dependent variable is usually a bina-
ry variable, i.e. the analysis is concerned with estimating the change in 
the probability to trade or invest abroad (see, e.g., Alvarez, 2004).  As 
such the results from these models do not provide information on the 
size of the change in the level of trade or FDI by the use of economic 
diplomacy as is the case in the results of the rest of the included studies.  
 
Studies used in the meta-analysis and summary statistics for reported t val-
ues 
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Table 3.1 
We did not use all observations from the studies included in our ini-
tial sample. We only took on board observations that relate to our search 
for the impact of economic diplomacy on international economic flows. 
By implication we use the observations that relate to the effect on all in-
dustries and all products and exclude numerous results relating to sub-
samples of goods and industries. From the following studies we used the 
overall or macro findings but not the product, industry or sector specific 
results: Harding and Jovorick (2007), Gil et al. (2011), Reuveny and Kang 
(1998), Hayakawa et al. (2011), Lederman et al. (2010) and Volpe Martin-
cus et al. (2010a).  
Our final meta-analysis database consists of 32 studies investigating 
the relationship between economic diplomacy and the macro impact on 
international flows (see Table 3.1). All primary studies investigate the 
impact of one or more instruments of economic diplomacy, controlling 
for a wide range of potentially relevant variables including distance be-
tween trading partners, markets size, common borders, common lan-
guage and preferential trade agreements. In the database 963 coefficients 
on the effect of diplomacy and 627 t-values are reported. Furthermore 
we registered the dependent variable of the primary study, i.e. export, 
import, total trade or FDI, and the different instruments of diplomacy 
studied in the primary studies. In order to be able to control for meth-
odological differences we also included other study characteristics such 
as the number of observations used for the primary regressions, the year 
of publication, the period under investigation and the econometric 
method that was used.  
The metrics for economic diplomacy differ, i.e. economic diplomacy 
has been reported based on diplomatic event data, the geography of the 
foreign network of countries (embassies, consulates and foreign branch-
es of export and investment promotion offices), the activities deployed 
by the foreign network of countries (trade missions and state visits) and 
finally activities headquartered in the source economy (export promo-
tion) and destination economy (investment promotion). Also substantial 
heterogeneity exists with respect to research methods and dependent 
variables. We therefore created three categories of moderator variables 
for further analysis: empirical design factors, dependent variable charac-
teristics and instruments of economic diplomacy. Table 3.2 provides an 
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overview of the various primary study characteristics included in our 
sample (key statistics are provided in Appendix A of this thesis). 
Table 3.2 
Moderator variables meta-regression analysis 
Categories of moderator 
variables 
Moderator  
variable name Description 
Empirical design factors NOTOLS Dummy, 1 if other than OLS estimate; 0 if OLS 
 COUNTRYSPECIFIC  
Dummy, 1 if primary sample is country specific; 0 
otherwise 
 ENDOGENEITY 
Dummy, 1 if primary analysis corrects for endoge-
neity; 0 otherwise 
 GRAVITY 
Dummy, 1 if primary regression is gravity model; 0 
otherwise 
 PRE2000 
Dummy, 1 if primary study is published before 
2000; 0 otherwise 
 OBSERVATION 
Number of observations in the dataset of primary 
study 
Dependent variable EXPORT  
Dummy, 1 if exports is dependent variable primary 
study; 0 otherwise 
 IMPORT  
Dummy, 1 if imports is dependent variable primary 
study; 0 otherwise 
 FDI  
Dummy, 1 if foreign direct investment is dependent 
variable primary study; 0 otherwise 
 TOTALTRADE 
Dummy, 1 if total trade is dependent variable pri-
mary study; 0 otherwise  
Instrument of diplomacy EMBASSIES  
Dummy, 1 if embassies is included in primary study 
regression; 0 otherwise 
 CONSULATES  
Dummy, 1 if consulates is included in primary study 
regression; 0 otherwise 
 EMBASSIESANDCONSULATES 
Dummy, 1 if embassies and consulates is included 
as 1 group in primary study regression; 0 otherwise 
 FOREIGN EPA OFFICE 
Dummy, 1 if foreign export promotion office is 
included in primary study regression; 0 otherwise 
 
EXPORT PROMOTION 
AGENCY  
Dummy, 1 if export promotion agency is included in 
primary study regression; 0 otherwise 
 
INVESTMENT PROMOTION 
AGENCY 
Dummy, 1 if investment promotion agency is in-
cluded in primary study regression; 0 otherwise 
 STATEVISITS  
Dummy, 1 if visits by head of state is included in 
primary study regression; 0 otherwise 
 TRADEMISSION  
Dummy, 1 if visits by minister of other representa-
tive is included in primary study regression; 0 oth-
erwise 
 DIPLOMATIC RELATION  
Dummy, 1 if diplomatic relation is included in pri-
mary study regression; 0 otherwise 
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While collecting our data we were confronted with substantial hetero-
geneity in functional forms yielding a mix of linear and non-linear coeffi-
cients that, for consistent analysis, should be transformed into elasticities 
in order to estimate the size effect of economic diplomacy. In order to 
calculate the elasticity on average from linear models we need to know 
average values of the dependent and explanatory variables, but a number 
of studies do not report this basic and essential information. We repeat-
edly but unsuccessfully contacted the authors of the primary studies in 
order to get the missing data7. Moreover, those studies in our sample that 
fully report basic and essential information do so for the full sample 
while regression results are often based on subsamples (for example, 
subsamples for OECD and non-OECD countries). We do not want to 
only use those regression results that are based on full samples in order 
to avoid the loss of information regarding the effect of different sample 
characteristics. As pointed out by Disdier and Head (2008:43): “different 
estimates often differ in terms of sample period, method, etc., and there-
fore within-study variation (…) can be used to assess the importance of 
such variables.” Since we are interested in the impact of research design 
and subsamples, the missing information problem needs to be solved.  
Confronted with these issues we  initially decided to work with the 
reported or calculated t-values, because a t-statistic (the estimated coeffi-
cient divided by its standard deviation) has no dimension and often is 
reported or can be calculated from the usually reported statistics. Our 
method thus solves the difficulties posed by differing units of measure-
ment, specifications and incomplete reporting that makes a traditional 
meta-analysis of the size effect impossible. By implication we cannot an-
swer the question of how much economic diplomacy contributes, but we 
are able to answer whether it contributes significantly and we can also in-
vestigate the sensitivity of this conclusion with respect to the methodo-
logical characteristics of the primary studies. This more modest goal is 
appropriate in view of the state of affairs in this field. 
In a later stage it became clear that while 963 coefficients are reported 
in the 32 primary studies only 627 t-statistics could be calculated. Again 
we tried to contact the authors of the primary studies with little recourse. 
To solve this second missing information problem we enriched our da-
taset by manually counting “other ways” in which some authors com-
municated about significance levels. Many authors, e.g., use symbols like 
*, ** and *** to report the level of significance of their empirical estimate 
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at the 10, 5 or 1 per cent level, respectively. Importantly the levels of sig-
nificance are also dimensionless. By incorporating these results (where 
we know the minimal significance level and the sign but not the actual t-
statistic) we can include an additional 335 extra regressions in our sam-
ple, categorized by their significance level and using binary dummy vari-
ables (not significant or significant at the 5 or 1 per cent level, respective-
ly). After this extra effort only one study that fitted our meta-search 
criteria dropped out completely. Because of missing t-values, or infor-
mation that would allow us to calculate t values (and also information 
that would allow us to calculated elasticities) for the effect of economic 
diplomacy for trade of all industries we had to drop the Reuveny and 
Kang (1998)8 study all together (otherwise the sample could have cov-
ered 33 studies). 
The reported t-statistics (Table 3.1) vary considerably between studies. 
A number of studies have insignificant mean and/or median t-values 
(Polachek, 1997; Head and Ries, 2006; Biglaiser and DeRouen, 2007; 
Bobonis and Shatz, 2007; Nitsch, 2007; Segura-Cayuela and Villarubia, 
2008; Fergusson and Forslid, 2011; Veenstra et al., 2011 and Bergeijk et 
al., 2011). Others such as Volpe Martincus et al. (2011), Hayakawa et al. 
(2011) and Gil et al. (2008), however, report very large t-statistics (both 
positive and negative). These differences could be due to country specif-
ic factors, data characteristics, differences in time period, differences in 
the dependent variable, and alternative measures of research design. We 
will explore these sources of heterogeneity in more detail in the next sec-
tion by means of a multifactor regression in our meta-analysis, but be-
fore we do so we provide a first picture of the potential impact of some 
of the study characteristics. Following other meta-analyses (Havranek 
and Irsova, 2010; Mebratie and Bergeijk, 2013; Meyer and Sinani, 2009) 
we first compute composite bivariate t-statistics for a number of varia-
bles that we will later use as moderator variables in our meta-regression. 
The advantage of working with larger (sub)samples of t-statistics com-
pared to looking at individual results is that factors with low significance 
in small samples could be significant in the aggregate even if they are not 
significant in the primary study because for a combined sample, the large 
sample’s standard deviation is a more precise estimator of the popula-
tion’s standard deviation (Newbold, 1995). The uncertainty caused by the 
sample estimator as compared to the population’s standard deviation is 
reduced as the sample size increases and the t-distribution more and 
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more fits the Standard Normal Distribution. Tests on the mean of ag-
gregate t-statistics are thus more powerful than looking into individual t-
statistics. We therefore computed the combined t-statistics by dividing 
the sum of t-statistics over the square root of the number of observa-
tions in the full sample. Let ti  denote the t-statistic corresponding to the 
specific characteristic of interest. N denotes the number of observations. 
Then the combined t-statistic tc becomes: 
 
ݐ௖ =  
∑ ݐ௜
√ܰ
 ~ ܰ(0,1) … … … … 3.1 
 
 This straight forward calculation of the combined t-statistic may, 
however, be influenced by some studies that contribute particularly large 
numbers of t-statistics, for example, because a lot of sensitivity analyses 
are reported. Examples of such studies in our sample are Gil et al. 
(2008), Gil-Pareha et al. (2007), Nitsch (2007) and Rose (2007). To deal 
with the over representation of parameters from such studies we intro-
duce weights per observation.  Following Djankov and Murrell (2002) 
and Wooster and Diebel (2010), normally distributed test statistics are 
obtained as follows:  
 
∑ ݓ௞ݐ௞௠௞ୀଵ
ඥ∑ ݓ௞ଶ௠௞ୀଵ
 ~ ܰ(0,1) … … … … 3.2 
 
Here wk represents the weight assigned to the k-th observation. The 
weight depends on the total number of observations taken from a par-
ticular study; smaller weights are assigned to studies that have larger 
numbers of reported t-values. For example, the study of Gil et al. (2008) 
contributes 64 observations. The weight assigned to each t-statistic is 
1/64= 0.015625. If a study contributes only one t-statistic, as in our 
sample Polachek (1997), the weight deployed to this observation is 1.  
Results for aggregated and weighted aggregated t-statistics are pre-
sented in Table 3.3. We did calculations on the full sample of studies as 
well as on a sub sample excluding outliers to check robustness. For the 
sample excluding outliers we dropped the 5 per cent smallest and largest 
observations, leaving a total number of 565 t-statistics included in the 
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analysis. Table 3.3 shows that the median t-statistics for all the tested 
characteristics is always statistically significant except for State Visits. 
This is basically caused by the median t-value of Ferguson and Forslid 
(2011)9, but note that Head and Ries (2006) also have report insignificant 
and negative t-values (including in their ‘preferred equation’). The State 
Visits t-statistic based on the full sample excluding outliers always shows 
significant aggregate t-values. The weighted t-statistic is, however, nega-
tive.   
Table 3.3 
Aggregate t-statistics for the 32 studies 
Using median t-stat 
from each study All obervations 
Excluding 
Outliers 
Weighted all 
observations 
Weighted ex-
cluding outliers 
tc N tc N tc N tw N tw N 
Full data set 16.31 32 80.94 627 72.70 565 40.85 627 35.64 565 
Fixed effects 9.17 18 55.92 297 48.89 275 20.34 297 18.14 275 
Country specific 8.27 14 52.15 290 47.56 259 28.97 290 24.11 259 
OLS 15.17 18 54.80 276 50.03 248 39.69 276 34.00 248 
Endogeneity 9.93 22 69.75 505 62.04 452 26.37 505 23.93 452 
Gravity 13.95 20 78.10 524 69.86 467 40.09 524 36.85 467 
Dependent variables 
Imports 5.39 7 30.16 115 30.99 112 16.90 115 17.29 112 
Exports 12.91 22 73.19 455 64.35 399 36.92 455 33.67 399 
Total Trade 3.29 2 3.71 3 3.71 3 3.80 3 3.80 3 
FDI 8.57 6 18.43 54 15.16 51 18.73 54 11.80 51 
Economic Diplomacy Characteristics 
Embassies & consula-
tes 9.46 10 51.0 176 47.70 168 20.70 176 19.18 168 
Embassies 15.91 4 44.39 38 26.53 28 43.12 38 19.41 28 
Consulates 5.45 5 16.19 72 17.61 67 19.19 72 19.73 67 
Foreign EPA 4.83 5 34.37 106 27.28 87 13.05 106 9.97 87 
Export Promotion 
Agency 3.64 4 13.78 33 12.53 29 15.32 33 11.36 29 
Investment Promoti-
on Agency 3.46 3 13.7 44 15.70 44 10.22 44 10.22 44 
Trade Missions 3.08 2 5.26 20 6.96 17 7.25 20 8.03 17 
State Visits -0.81 3 12.29 72 15.70 62 -0.17 72 13.70 62 
Diplomatic relation 15.12 6 34.16 54 31.35 51 25.71 54 18.21 51 
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Across studies, the use of export as a dependent variable is associated 
with more significant effects of economic diplomacy than studies that 
use imports, total trade or FDI as dependent variable. The number of 
observations related to FDI flows is remarkably lower than the number 
of observations for exports and imports.  
As to the economic diplomacy characteristics, i.e. the instrument used 
to explain the effect of economic diplomacy, studies that analyse embas-
sies and consulates on average tend to generate more significant out-
comes than state visits, trade missions, export promotion offices and the 
more general diplomatic relation measure. The weighted aggregate t-
statistic suggests that, corrected for the weight of individual studies, stud-
ies that only use embassies (as compared to embassies and consulates 
combined into one dummy) as characteristic for economic diplomacy 
will be more likely to report significant results.   
Using a bivariate approach, Table 3.3 illustrates the extent of hetero-
geneity, both regarding empirical design, the definition of the dependent 
variable and the economic diplomacy characteristics. The next step is to 
investigate this in a multivariate setting. We do so by doing a meta-
analysis on our collected sample of t-statistics and significance levels. 
3.4 Design of the meta-analysis  
3.4.1 Methodology 
A meta-analysis combines several studies that address a particular re-
search question with a similar design and investigates consistencies and 
discrepancies of the results of the primary studies. Each primary study is 
treated equally in meta-analysis, even when they do not use best practice 
methodology. Actually, alternative weighting schemes are regarded as 
prone to bias (Rose and Stanley, 2005; Stanley, 2001). Accordingly, all 
primary studies provide data points in the knowledge-generating mecha-
nism towards the true relationship between economic diplomacy and 
international economic flows. The analysis investigates the sensitivity of 
the reported estimates to variations in the assumptions of the primary 
studies. The essence of meta-analysis is to obtain a single estimate of the 
effect of interest from statistics reported in each of several primary stud-
ies (Bradburn et al., 1998). This methodology is well established in medi-
cine and psychology and increasingly also economics. The technique 
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provides revised interpretations of earlier research and is often useful to 
help indicate priorities for future research (Meyer and Sinani, 2009).  
We focus on the t-statistic of the coefficient that represents the im-
pact of economic diplomacy on international economic flows and the 
influence of study characteristics (method, research design) on this statis-
tic. Our approach helps to uncover the effects of study characteristics on 
the sign and significance of the estimated effect of economic diplomacy 
on international flows. We start with a sample of 627 reported and 
(re)calculated t-statistics. Following Havranek and Irsova (2010), 
Ljungwall and Tingvall (2008), Meyer and Sinani (2009) and Gorg and 
Strobl (2001) we estimate the following meta-regression model:  
 
Yij = α0+β1OBSERVATIONSij+β2NOTOLSij+ 
β3COUNTRYSPECIFICj+β4GRAVITYEQUATIONj+β5PRE2000j+ 
β6ENDOGENEITYj +β7,…,10 [primary dependent variableij]+β11,…,18 [instru-
ments of diplomacyij]+εij  …………..    (3.3) 
 
In equation (3.3) we estimate how primary study characteristics influ-
ence the reported t-statistics of economic diplomacy on international 
flows. In our case Yij is the value of the t-statistic of the economic di-
plomacy coefficient derived from the jth regression in the ith article, α0 
represents the (random) effect that controls for the commonality and 
dependency of estimates within and across studies and εij is the error 
term (Meyer and Sinani, 2009; Disdier and Head, 2008). The explanatory 
variables in equation (3.3) include empirical design and quality factors, 
primary dependent variables from the primary study and instruments of 
diplomacy used in the primary study (see Table 3.2 for classification and 
description). The explanatory variables are elaborated in section 4.2 - 4.4. 
We present OLS, weighted OLS and random effects estimates of 
equation (3.3) for the sake of comparison. In the weighted OLS model 
we used probability weights to correct for the structure of our sample10. 
Because we have a few studies that contribute a large number of obser-
vations to our sample, each observation will be weighted by the inverse 
of its probability of being part of our sample (Dupraz, 2013).  
The random effects model is our preferred estimation. The random 
effects model uses more realistic assumptions about the effect size, in 
this case the t-statistic, as compared to a fixed effects model. Under fixed 
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effects the t-statistic of a given variable is assumed to be homogenous 
across studies, i.e. the fixed effect model assumes that there is one true 
effect for all the studies in our sample (Hedges and Vevea, 1998). All ob-
served differences would in that case be attributed to sampling error. 
Given the diversity in the investigated instruments of economic diplo-
macy, the differences in geographical coverage of the primary studies and 
the substantial variety of time periods investigated, it is vital to allow the 
t-statistic of economic diplomacy to vary from study to study. Random 
effects allows for different t-statistics per study which we find more real-
istic given the diversity of the studies under review. 
Next to the influence of study characteristics on the magnitude of the 
t-statistic we also investigate the probability of finding a significant coef-
ficient. We can now use our more extensive sample with 963 observa-
tions. We conduct a second meta-regression analysis with the following 
regression model:  
 
Pr(yij=1)=α0+β1OBSERVATIONSij+β2NOTOLSij+ 
β3COUNTRYSPECIFICj+β4GRAVITYEQUATIONj+β5PRE2000j+ 
β6ENDOGENEITYj +β7,…,10 [primary dependent variableij]+β11,…,18 [instru-
ments of diplomacyij]+εij   …………….   (3.4) 
 
Where yij is a binary variable that serves as the dependent variable. yij 
takes the value of 1, if the coefficient of the i-th regression in article j is 
significantly positive (we use different specifications of the dependent 
variable that distinguish between the 5 per cent or 1 per cent level, re-
spectively). And, yij=0 if not. The relation between the dependent and 
the explanatory variables will be estimated with a logistic regression. 
Logit-analysis makes it possible to calculate the probability Pr that a 
specified use or availability of economic diplomacy yields a significant t-
stat. If this probability exceeds 0.5, a significantly positive t-value is ‘pre-
dicted’. We distinguish between the same three sets of explanatory varia-
bles as used in equation (3.3). Again we use weighted regressions and 
random effects to check for the robustness of our findings.  
3.4.2 Empirical design  
We use the same set of explanatory variables in equations 3.3 and 3.4. 
The dependent variable of course differs: in equation 3.3 it is a t-value as 
Does Economic Diplomacy Work? A Meta-analysis   55 
reported in the primary study and in equation 3.4 it is a dummy variable 
that assumes the value 1 if the coefficient in the primary study is signifi-
cantly positive (either as reported in the primary study or by implication) 
and else 0. 
3.4.2.1 Primary dependent variable 
We classify the explanatory variable in the primary studies with mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive dummy variables for EXPORT, IMPORT, FDI 
and TOTALTRADE in order to indicate what explanatory variable was 
used in the primary study regression.  
3.4.2.2 Instruments of economic diplomacy 
The economic diplomacy characteristics in equation (3.3) include mutual-
ly exclusive and exhaustive dummies for the instrument of economic di-
plomacy used in the given studies. The economic diplomacy dummies 
are EMBASSIES, CONSULATES, 
EMBASSIESANDCONSULATES, FOREIGNEPA, 
TRADEMINISTERS, PMORROYAL, EXPORT PROMOTION 
AGENCY, INVESTMENT PROMOTION AGENCY and 
DIPLOMACY. These variables respectively capture whether the eco-
nomic diplomacy coefficient pertains to embassies, consulates, embassies 
and consulates (as one combined explanatory variable), export promo-
tion offices abroad, trade mission, state visits, export (respectively, in-
vestment) promotion agencies or events data scores for the diplomatic 
relation. 
3.4.2.3 Primary study characteristics 
The empirical design factors included in equation 3.3 are 
COUNTRYSPECIFIC, NOTOLS, PRE2000, GRAVITYEQUATION, 
ENDOGENEITY and OBSERVATIONS. These variables capture the 
fact that a study deals with one source country only, the effect of the es-
timation method, the period of publication, whether or not the equation 
in the primary study was a gravity model, whether the author of the pri-
mary study corrected for endogeneity and the number of available ob-
servations, respectively.  
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3.5 Empirical results      
3.5.1 Determinants of magnitude t-statistic economic diplomacy: 
Random effects model 
Table 3.4 presents the results for the ordinary least squares (with and 
without probability weighing) and random effects estimation of equation 
(3.3). For model 7 and 8 the sample without the 5 per cent most extreme 
observations is used.  
The baseline uses exports as the reference for the dependent variable 
and embassies and consulates as the reference for the instrument of di-
plomacy under investigation in the primary study. Both these reference 
variables are the mode for their specific group of factors included in our 
econometric analysis11. The references for the empirical design factors 
are based on studies using standard OLS regression models based on 
multiple country databases published after 2000. The constant term can 
be interpreted as the baseline meta-significance level; it is positive and 
highly significant in all but one model. 
Figure 3.2 
Funnel plot economic diplomacy coefficients 
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Model 1, 3 and 5 are based on the full sample of studies and observa-
tions. Model 2, 4 and 6 are based on a smaller sample of 29 studies and 
454 observations. The difference is due to the fact that some of the pri-
mary studies do not report the number of observations used for each 
reported regression. Three studies, Ciuriak and Kinjo (2006), Volpe Mar-
tincus et al. (2010a) and Polacheck (1997), drop out entirely because the 
number of observations used for the regressions in their papers is not 
provided. Likewise, observations of Rose’s (2007) extensive sensitivity 
analyses can no longer be included when accounting for the number of 
observations12.  Studies that use a larger number of observations are a 
priori expected to find higher t-statistics: as the number of observations 
increases the uncertainty caused by the sample estimator as compared to 
the population standard deviation is reduced. This is reflected in the di-
rection and significance of OBSERVATIONS. This finding (in accord-
ance with the indicative funnel plot in Figure 3.2) implies that no strong 
indications exist for publication and/or sample size bias in the primary 
studies. 
Focussing attention on our preferred Random Effects models, we 
find that empirical design factors play an important role in the reported 
results of the primary studies that investigate the effect of economic di-
plomacy. Primary studies conducted on a single country basis 
(COUNTRYSPECIFIC=1) that correct for endogeneity 
(ENDOGENEITY=1) are associated with lower t-values13. Gravity trade 
studies (GRAVITY=1) report more significant results. Alternatives to 
OLS (NOTOLS=1) are not structurally associated with more significant 
coefficients. The measure of the dependent variable does not seem to be 
associated with the magnitude of the t-statistic indicating that studies on 
FDI, imports, exports and total trade can be meaningfully combined in 
our meta-analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
58 CHAPTER 3 
Table 3.4 
The effect of economic diplomacy study characteristics on the magnitude of the t-value 
 OLS  WOLS  RE  RE without outliers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
OBSERVATIONS (10^-5)  7.08**   0.69*    1.74***  0.73**  
  (2.19)     (1.73)     (3.25)     (2.19)    
NOTOLS 0.67*** 0.403    0.293    0.104    0.779*** 0.339    0.749*** 0.394    
 (2.63)    (1.39)    (1.00)    (0.33)    (2.78)    (0.99)    (3.63)    (1.50)    
COUNTRYSPECIFIC -0.81*** -1.14*** -1.10**  -1.29*** -0.97**  -1.36**  -1.23*** -0.60    
 (-2.74)    (-3.18)    (-2.56)    (-3.10)    (-2.39)    (-2.13)    (-4.16)    (-1.50)    
ENDOGENEITY 0.00    -0.27    -0.81**  -0.84**  -1.36*** -0.83    -0.91**  -0.24    
 (0.01)    (-0.65)    (-2.17)    (-2.02)    (-2.82)    (-1.58)    (-2.54)    (-0.63)    
GRAVITY 1.64*** 1.04*   0.51    -0.01    2.03*  1.27 1.67**  1.61*** 
 (3.32)    (1.96)    (0.85)    (-0.03)    (2.28)    (1.25)    (2.52)    (2.70)    
PRE2000 1.72*   2.14**  1.05 1.37 -0.55    1.65 0.95    1.91**  
 (1.88)    (2.45)    (1.17)    (1.47)    (-0.39)    (1.09)    (0.89)    (2.12)    
IMPORT -0.94*** -0.46    -0.72**  -0.55    -0.25    -0.19    -0.42    -0.53**  
 (-2.61)    (-1.39)    (-2.05)    (-1.64)    (-0.67)    (-0.53)    (-1.55)    (-2.00)    
TOT TRADE -2.59*   -2.83**  -1.61**  -1.97*** -2.38 -2.97 -1.96 -2.28**  
 (-1.70)    (-2.06)    (-2.18)    (-2.80)    (-1.26)    (-1.64)    (-1.46)    (-2.01)    
FDI 1.39 1.96*   1.53 1.52 1.60 2.53 0.27    -0.02    
 (1.26)    (1.96)    (1.40)    (1.45)    (0.93)    (1.44)    (0.20)    (-0.01)    
EMBASSIES 2.80*** 0.14    1.85*** 0.81    4.43*** 0.69    1.35*** 0.75    
 (5.47)    (0.23)    (2.70)    (1.08)    (7.41)    (0.56)    (2.69)    (1.11)    
CONSULATES -2.44*** -4.01*** -2.95*** -3.46*** -0.40    -3.55*** -1.39*** -2.79*** 
 (-5.77)    (-8.58)    (-8.27)    (-7.79)    (-0.69)    (-3.08)    (-3.27)    (-4.79)    
FOREIGN EPA OFFICE -0.36    -0.59    -0.09    0.40    -1.24**  -1.82*** -0.58    -0.61    
 (-1.11)    (-1.54)    (-0.22)    (0.72)    (-2.16)    (-3.21)    (-1.31)    (-1.48)    
EXPORT PROMOTION 
AGENCY 
-1.02*  
(-1.66)     
-2.35*** 
(-3.18)    
-1.71** 
(-2.01)    
-2.51*** 
(-3.39)    
0.22  
(0.28)     
-1.65 
(-1.48)    
-0.064   
(-0.10)    
-0.34   
(-0.45)     
INVESTMENT PROMOTION 
AGENCY 
-1.76  
(-1.44)    
-3.69*** 
(-3.11)    
-3.05*** 
(-2.65)    
-3.83*** 
(-3.32)    
-1.32 
(-0.68)    
-3.65*   
(-1.81)    
-0.10  
(-0.07)    
-0.23    
(-0.19)    
TRADE MISSION -2.11*** -3.76*** -0.48    -1.46*   -1.62*   -3.03*** -0.81    -2.13*** 
 (-3.35)    (-4.95)    (-0.77)    (-1.76)    (-1.67)    (-3.15)    (-1.11)    (-3.16)    
STATE VISIT -2.66*** -3.70*** -2.37*** -2.85*** -1.49 -2.84*** -0.29    -1.83*** 
 (-6.24)    (-7.65)    (-5.61)    (-5.54)    (-1.59)    (-3.00)    (-0.39)    (-2.94)    
DIPLOMACY -0.21    -1.99**  -0.70    -1.31 1.04 -1.43 0.05    -0.55    
 (-0.21)    (-2.09)    (-0.77)    (-1.46)    (0.67)    (-0.85)    (0.04)    (-0.57)    
CONSTANT 2.48*** 4.12*** 4.42*** 5.29*** 2.74*** 3.96*** 2.64*** 2.50*** 
 (3.51)    (5.12)    (5.59)    (6.71)    (2.66)    (3.29)    (3.44)    (3.16)    
Number of estimates 627 454 627 454 627 454 565 409 
Number of studies 32 29 32 29 32 29 31 28 
Adj R2 0.25 0.29 0.24 0.32     
t-statistics in parenthesis * p<0.10, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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The instrument of diplomacy that is investigated in the primary study 
influences the significance of the coefficient in the primary study. If the 
primary study uses EMBASSIES as a proxy for economic diplomacy, 
higher t-values are reported. The EMBASSIES dummy is positive, but 
not always significant. The insignificant results are caused by sampling 
effects. Model 2, 4 and 6 leave out estimates if the number of observa-
tions used in the primary studies are not reported. It is this loss of esti-
mates that is driving the change from significant to insignificant for our 
EMBASSIES dummy and not the inclusion of the OBSERVATIONS 
variable itself14.  It may therefore be concluded that primary studies using 
EMBASSIES report higher t-statistics. If in contrast ‘lower’ forms of 
foreign representation are subject of the study, the significance of the 
coefficient in the primary study will be significantly lower. The results 
give an indication that studies taking embassies and consulates as one 
explanatory variable may lead to a problematic generalisation about the 
effectiveness of the diplomatic network. Our regression analyses show 
that regressions using embassies will give more significant coefficients 
than the embassies and consulates benchmark. Consulates on the other 
hand are systematically associated with lower levels of significance. 
Grouping the two (embassies versus consulates) into one (embassies and 
consulates) thus leads to an average significance that is too high for con-
sulates and too low for embassies.  
STATE VISITS and TRADE MISSIONS stand out negatively in all 8 
models. Primary studies reporting coefficients for these instruments tend 
to find a significantly lower t-statistic as compared to our established 
benchmark (see also Table 3.3). The remaining proxies for economic di-
plomacy, i.e. export and investment promotion offices, export promotion 
units within embassies (our FOREIGN EPA OFFICE dummy) and the 
diplomatic relation are weakly related to a lower magnitude of the t-
statistic. The sign is always negative but many of our specifications are 
not significant.  
3.5.2  Logit estimates of factors explaining economic diplomacy 
significance 
In order to broaden our sample we resort to an analysis that does not 
focus on the actual t-value but on the minimal significance level as re-
ported in the primary studies. The cost of this procedure is the loss of 
information on the actual size of the t-values. The gain is that we can 
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increase our sample by 54 per cent. As before our logit meta-regressions 
show the relationship between, on the one hand, the empirical design, 
the dependent variable under investigation and the characteristics of 
economic diplomacy and, on the other hand, the likelihood of finding 
statistically significant coefficients for economic diplomacy.  
Table 3.5 presents the logit estimates of equation (3.4). We investigate 
two variants: in the first variant we require that the primary study reports 
significance at the 5 per cent level and better (model 1, 2 and 3) and in 
the second variant the dependent variable is assigned value 1 if the re-
ported significance in the primary study is at the 1 per cent level and bet-
ter (model 4, 5 and 6).The reference case is similar to the one deployed 
earlier: a primary study that measures the impact of foreign representa-
tion (embassies and consulates) on exports using a standard OLS regres-
sion model based on a multiple country database. The models perform 
well in terms of correct predictions. Model 1, predicts reported signifi-
cance at the 5 per cent level and better correctly in 76 per cent of the 
cases. Models 4 and 5 that predict significance at the 1 per cent and bet-
ter level show similar, but more pronounced, dynamics as the share of 
correctly in sample predictions increases from 73 per cent to 82 per cent. 
Table 5 offers a breakdown of the predictions and reports Sensitivity and 
Specificity of the four logit models). Sensitivity, the true positive rate, 
measures the correctly identified proportion of actual positives. In this 
case true positives are the predicted significant coefficients for economic 
diplomacy. Specificity measures the proportion of true negatives, i.e. in-
significant coefficients of economic diplomacy, which are correctly iden-
tified as such. As expected the models that include OBSERVATIONS 
generally perform better on both sensitivity and specificity.  
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Table 3.5 
Logit estimates on the significance of economic diplomacy 
logit 5% 
Weighted 
logit5% Logit1% 
weighted 
logit1% 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
OBSERVATIONS (10^-5) 1.75*** 1.51*** 1.90*** 1.33**  
(4.70)    (2.69)    (4.99)    (2.34)    
NOTOLS 0.95*** 0.617**  0.60    0.58*** 0.57*   0.29    
(4.13)    (1.99)    (1.59)    (2.64)    (1.79)    (0.74)    
COUNTRYSPECIFIC -2.10*** -3.388*** -3.04*** -2.03*** -3.38*** -2.94*** 
(-8.15)    (-8.65)    (-8.15)    (-8.27)    (-9.32)    (-7.05)    
ENDOGENEITY 0.51    0.932**  0.52    0.43    1.13**  0.38    
(1.51)    (2.00)    (1.11)    (1.27)    (2.20)    (0.73)    
GRAVITY -0.68    -1.750*** -1.81**  -0.06    -0.56    -0.73    
(-1.64)    (-3.24)    (-2.40)    (-0.15)    (-0.96)    (-1.09)    
PRE2000 3.60*** 5.811*** 4.84***  2.73***  5.33***  3.89*** 
(4.35)    (5.91)    (5.04)    (3.28)    (5.10)    (3.52)    
IMPORT -0.18    -0.139    -0.17    -0.42*   -0.25    -0.20    
(-0.89)    (-0.63)    (-0.75)    (-1.88)    (-0.98)    (-0.75)    
TOT TRADE -3.49**  -4.673*** -0.74    -2.50*   -4.27*** -0.15    
(-2.42)    (-3.12)    (-0.22)    (-1.76)    (-2.91)    (-0.05)    
FDI 2.18**  2.755**  2.45*   2.94*** 4.02*** 3.77*** 
(2.01)    (2.12)    (1.79)    (2.84)    (3.09)    (3.03)    
EMBASSIES -1.18**  -3.075*** -1.55*   -0.24    -2.58*** -0.73    
(-2.08)    (-4.24)    (-1.90)    (-0.45)    (-3.70)    (-0.93)    
CONSULATES -3.27*** -5.362*** -3.83*** -2.70*** -5.30*** -3.48*** 
(-8.46)    (-8.99)    (-5.43)    (-7.50)    (-9.19)    (-5.22)    
FOREIGN EPA OFFICE -0.44    -0.677    1.11*   -0.28    -0.84**  0.87    
(-1.51)    (-1.57)    (1.83)    (-1.06)    (-2.08)    (1.42)    
EXPORT PROMOTION AGENCY -2.94*** -5.37*** -3.50*** -2.27*** -4.61*** -2.82*** 
(-5.45)    (-6.40)    (-3.06)    (-4.42)    (-5.82)    (-3.17)    
INVESTMENT PROMOTION AGENCY -4.62*** -7.53*** -5.83*** -5.64*** -8.87*** -7.07*** 
(-4.09)    (-5.30)    (-3.89)    (-5.19)    (-6.32)    (-5.23)    
TRADE MISSION -2.06*** -5.05*** -2.50*   -1.38**  -5.22*** -0.96    
(-3.90)    (-5.95)    (-1.92)    (-2.47)    (-5.72)    (-0.82)    
STATE VISIT -3.09*** -4.89*** -3.22*** -2.59*** -5.04*** -2.87*** 
(-7.97)    (-8.17)    (-4.56)    (-6.99)    (-8.78)    (-4.24)    
DIPLOMACY -4.85*** -7.03*** -5.279*** -3.86*** -6.56*** -4.62*** 
(-6.20)    (-7.57)    (-4.90)    (-4.91)    (-6.77)    (-4.15)    
CONSTANT 2.69*** 4.82*** 3.732*** 1.51**  3.06*** 2.21**  
(4.32)    (5.21)    (2.91)    (2.45)    (3.26)    (2.08)    
Number of estimates 963 774 774 963 774 774 
Number of studies 32 29 29 32 29 29 
Pseudo Rsq 0.23 0.27 0.28 0.22 0.30 0.27 
Correct predictions 76% 79% 73% 82% 
Sensitivity 77% 73% 52% 60% 
Specificity 75% 83% 87% 92% 
False positives 25% 17% 13% 8% 
False negatives 23% 27% 48% 39% 
t-statistics in parenthesis * p<0.10, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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The performance of model (1), (2), (4) and (5) in classifying economic 
diplomacy coefficients as significant or insignificant can also be illustrat-
ed by plotting the fraction of true positives out of the positives versus 
the fraction of false positives out of the negatives (the ROC curve in 
Figure 3.3). The greater the area under the ROC curve, the better the 
global performance of the diagnostic test. A perfect diagnostic test 
would yield an area under the ROC curve of 1, representing 100 per cent 
sensitivity (no false negatives) and 100 per cent specificity (no false posi-
tives). All models perform relatively well with area’s between 81 per cent 
and 86 per cent. 
Figure 3.3 
ROC curves  
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The logit analysis of significance levels in Table 3.5 agrees with the 
Random Effects analysis of t-values in Table 3.4 regarding 
OBSERVATIONS (primary studies with more observations are more 
likely to report significant coefficients of economic diplomacy), 
COUNTRYSPECIFIC (it is less likely that studies with one source coun-
try report significant coefficients),  IMPORT (insignificant), TOTAL 
TRADE (the primary study is less likely to report significant coefficients 
when it investigates total trade), CONSULATES (studies that specifical-
ly study consulates as opposed to a summary measure for consulates and 
embassies are less likely to report significant coefficients), TRADE 
MISSION and STATE VISIT (all are associated with a lower probability 
of reporting significant coefficients)15. These findings are robust with 
respect to sample, estimation technique and significance variant.  
In contrast to the results in Table 3.4, the logit analysis find that stud-
ies published before the year 2000 (PRE2000=1) are significantly more 
likely to report positive results at both the 5 per cent and 1 per cent sig-
nificance levels.16 We also see this for studies that correct for endogenei-
ty problems (ENDOGENEITY=1) when model (2) and (6) are used.  
Primary studies that use FDI as dependent variable are more likely to 
find significant results. For EXPORT PROMOTION AGENCY and 
INVESTMENT PROMOTION AGENCY we now have highly signifi-
cant negative coefficients; a result that is also supported by the OLS and 
WOLS estimates in Table 3.4. Primary studies that use EMBASSIES 
alone are less likely to report significant coefficients.  
All in all, harvesting more binary information from primary studies is 
rewarding. The analyses confirm our hypothesis of the diverging effects 
within the economic diplomacy network17. Also the negative influence of 
source country specific datasets on the significance of economic diplo-
macy coefficients is further confirmed. These are important results that 
should be taken into account in the design of future studies. 
3.5.3 Economic diplomacy meta-regression sensitivity analysis  
Given the emerging and interdisciplinary nature of the economic diplo-
macy research field we test our findings for various possible sample and 
definition effects. Thus far we have used a broad definition of economic 
diplomacy based on Bayne and Woolcock (2007), Lee and Hudson 
(2004) and Sanner and Yu (2003). We now use a different definition of 
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diplomacy that does not include the elements of the paper of Sanner and 
Yu (2003), i.e. domestic investment and export promotion institutions. 
What remains is a more homogeneous set of economic diplomacy varia-
bles that mainly concentrate on the actions of diplomats within the for-
eign network.  
We also investigate the sensitivity of our meta-regression analysis for 
a sub-sample of papers published in peer reviewed (international) eco-
nomics journals and for another sub sample where working papers and 
papers that do not correct for endogeneity are left out. We test the same 
baseline as presented earlier. Models (1)-(6) report random effects esti-
mates, the absolute t-value is the dependant variable. Models (7)-(12) re-
port logit estimates, and predict the likelihood of finding significant pri-
mary study results at the 5 per cent level or better.   
Generally, the results of the sensitivity analysis are comparable with 
the earlier reported meta-regression analyses. Study characteristics influ-
ence the empirical results of primary studies across all samples and esti-
mation techniques. Studies that focus on a single source country 
(COUNTRYSPECIFIC=1) are associated with lower t-values. Studies 
that use OLS do not significantly generate higher t-values than studies 
using more advanced econometric techniques. Regarding the instruments 
of economic diplomacy both the random effects and logit estimates indi-
cate lower significance levels for studies that use CONSULATES and 
STATE VISITS18. The earlier identified differences between the random 
effects and logit estimates concerning our EMBASSY, DIPLOMACY 
and ENDOGENEITY dummy are consistent across all sensitivity anal-
yses. Compared to the random effect regressions we again see that the 
logit analysis is more likely to predict positive and significant deviations 
from the baseline model for studies published before 2000 (PRE2000=1) 
and a lower likelihood of finding significance for EXPORT 
PROMOTION AGENCY’s. 
Across the tested samples in table 3.6 FDI is no longer associated 
with higher t-values, but this mainly reflect the small number of studies 
of varying quality, something not uncommon in an emerging research 
field. Here our conclusion is simply that the effect of economic diploma-
cy on FDI should be subject to further investigation to reduce the vari-
ance between study results.  
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Table 3.6 
Meta-regression sensitivity analysis 
 
 
As to the differences that are analytically relevant, we note the lower 
and less significant t-values for the base line using the subsample of pri-
mary papers published in a peer reviewed economics journals. In this 
multidisciplinary field the implication is that the economic profession is 
less convinced on the significance of economic diplomacy. This is also 
reflected in the results for the subsample without working papers (eco-
nomics tends to focus on published peer reviewed articles) and papers 
that do not address causality (correction for causality is a common re-
quirement in economics). The earlier reported higher meta-significance is 
thus partly driven by working paper publications and publications in 
other research fields than economics (predominantly international rela-
tions). From this same analysis on sub samples we learn that the eco-
nomics papers are more likely to produce positive and significant t-
statistics when a gravity model (GRAVITY=1) is used.  
This sensitivity analysis shows that it is rewarding to take into account 
several subsamples in a meta-analysis, especially when the research topic 
is interdisciplinary. Although it is common practise in meta-analysis to 
analyse all available papers that address the same research question if 
metrics are comparable (or can be made comparable as a group), it did in 
this case proves to be rewarding to also investigate sub-samples of pri-
mary studies because best practices differ between the different scientific 
disciplines. 
3.6 Concluding remarks 
This chapter investigated whether economic diplomacy has a significant 
effect on trade and investment flows and what the sign of that relation-
ship is. Due to the heterogeneity of specifications and the occurrence of 
substandard reporting in the primary studies we resort to the analysis of 
t-statistics. Analysing 627 t-statistics of 32 primary studies in the aggre-
gate we conclude that the bivariate evidence supports a positive and sig-
nificant effect of economic diplomacy with the exception of state visits 
(Table 3.3). Our meta-regression analysis (Table 3.4) points towards 
more heterogeneity in the significance of economic diplomacy coeffi-
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cients and highlights the importance of research design and other charac-
teristics of the primary studies. In particular we find that primary studies 
that study only one source country are less likely to report significant 
positive effects and that studies that use a variable that lumps embassies 
and consulates(-general) into one indicator miss that these instruments 
differ significantly and should thus be included as separate instruments 
in future research.  
We also perform an analysis of reported discrete significance levels 
(not, 10%, 5% and 1%) increasing our sample to 963 observations on 95 
per cent significance in a logit analysis (Table 3.5) that by and large sup-
ports the findings on the smaller sample demonstrating robustness with 
respect to sample, methodology and significance variant. The logit analy-
sis differs in two respects: studies published before the year 2000 are 
more likely to report significant coefficients and significant results and 
studies that use FDI are more likely to report positive and significant 
impact of economic diplomacy (research on the influence of economic 
diplomacy of FDI is scarce: only 54 out of 963 regressions deal with the 
effect of economic diplomacy on FDI flows, providing a clear indication 
that future research should deal with this issue). This approach loses in-
formation on the magnitude of the t-value, but it does enlarges sample 
and thus also gains information. Our econometric analyses show that 
reported effects of economic diplomacy on trade and investment in indi-
vidual studies are sensitive to model specification and that this is true in 
the large and the small sample and independent of the specific estimation 
technique. This analysis also reveals that there is a difference in the re-
ported significance of economic diplomacy coefficients between research 
fields and published versus working papers, even after correcting for 
study characteristics. 
The fact that we see statistically significant and economically mean-
ingful positive coefficients for economic diplomacy does not mean that 
the instrument is efficient. This would demand more in depth knowledge 
of its benefits and costs. Also from this perspective there is a clear need 
for improving the availability of data, for increasing the country coverage 
of the data and for better and more comprehensive reporting of findings 
and basic statistics. Furthermore, methodological improvements in the 
empirical literature can be made. Main-stream economics is still quite 
skeptical about economic diplomacy. Economic diplomacy, a tax-funded 
activity, in neoclassical thought merely is a disruptive income transfer 
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when markets are functioning properly. It is therefore important that 
economic diplomacy research addresses causality issues even when sam-
ples are restricted to for example cross sections. In chapter 5 I will pro-
vide a building-block for the causality debate by discussing the use prod-
uct group data instead of macro level trade flows.  
 
Notes 
 
1 Preliminary versions were presented at: the 4th International Biennale On 
Commercial Negotiations (Negocia, Paris, August 2010), the ETSG 2011 confer-
ence (Copenhagen Business School, Copenhagen, September 2011),  The Hague 
Conference on Economic Diplomacy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Nether-
lands and ISS, The Hague, August 2012), The Inter-American Development 
Bank conference on the effects of trade and export promotion, (IDB, Washing-
ton, October 2012) and the 2013 MEAR-NET colloquium (Greenwich Universi-
ty, London, September 2013). 
2 We started with the ambition to establish the meta-effect for economic diplo-
macy on international trade and investment. We quickly discovered that this 
could not be established because many papers did not provide sufficient infor-
mation to calculate elasticities. A discussion of the various data issues we were 
confronted with can be found in the third section of this chapter. 
3 One third of the regression coefficients in our sample are reported without t-
values or standard errors, but only with insignificance and significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
4 The number of papers that deal with intensive and extensive margin, while 
growing, is not yet sufficient to enable a meaningful meta-analysis. See, however, 
Moons (2012) for a review of the literature. 
5 Volpe Martincus and Carballo (2012) was included in both Chapters 3 and 4. 
The paper was first released online in 2011 and was therefore included in the 
search conducted in 2011 for our meta-analysis (Chapter 3) and literature review 
(Chapter 4). The referencing year (2012) may mis lead the reader in this context. 
6 In constructing a sample for a meta-analysis, it is best practice to use multiple 
search engines, check repositories such as RepEc, SSRN and IMF, WTO and 
World Bank working papers, and to follow up on qualitative reviews of literature. 
7 We thank Arjan Lejour and Harold Creusen for providing us with the necessary 
information about their 2011 publication. 
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8 Table 6, p. 59 in Reuveny and Kang (1998) only reports the number of signifi-
cant coefficients, but it is unclear which of these coefficients relate to total trade. 
Contact with the authors did not solve this problem.  
9 Relatively heavy weights are assigned to the negative t-values from the Ferguson 
and Forslid study because it only has 4 observations. 
10 We also checked our regression using analytic weights. Here Yij varies 
at the individual level, but moderator and control variables are at the study level. 
Using analytic weights does not change the sign and pattern of significant explan-
atory variables.  
11 Export is used in 455 of 627 cases and embassies and consulates in 176 cases.  
12 Rose (2007) provides the number of observations for his main regression re-
sults, but not for his sensitivity analyses. 
13 The OLS models provide some evidence that studies published before the 
2000s Report higher t-values. 
14 Control regressions are available upon request. 
15 Appendix B provides marginal effects for our logit estimates. The marginal 
effects show the discrete change in probability when the predictor or independ-
ent variable increases by one unit for my categorical variables. The marginal effect 
calculations reveal the extent to which study characteristics actually increase or 
decrease the probability of finding significant economic diplomacy coefficients. 
16 The former is in line with the results for OLS and WOLS in Table 3.4; the lat-
ter finding probably is a spurious finding as GRAVITY has become negative (it 
was positive and significant) while corrections for endogeneity by and large occur 
in the gravity models. 
17 In Moons (2017) I also explored the coefficients and marginal effects in a mul-
tinomial setting. The multinomial regressions confirm the established pattern in 
this chapter but add that country specific studies, export and investment promo-
tion offices, state visits and trade missions are not only less likely to deliver signif-
icant coefficients. They are also more associated with negative (insignificant) co-
efficients. 
18 Lower significance levels compared to the baseline instrument of economic 
diplomacy: EMBASSIESANDCONSULATES.  
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4 The effects of economic diplomacy on the margins of trade1  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter follows up on the meta-analysis presented in Chapter 3. It 
was established that the number of economic diplomacy coefficients re-
lating to the effect of economic diplomacy was not sufficient to meta-
analyze. The effect of economic diplomacy on the margins of trade is 
however an important area of empirical research. At the intensive mar-
gin, an established bilateral trading relationship changes in intensity i.e. 
the trade volume of previously traded goods changes (product intensive 
margin) and/or the volume between existing trade partners2 changes 
(country intensive margin). At the extensive margin the number of trad-
ing relationships changes, i.e. new markets are entered (country extensive 
margin) or new products are traded (product extensive margin). 
Understanding the relation between economic diplomacy and the 
margins of trade is relevant for several reasons. It is at the margins of 
trade where several theoretical concepts about the way economic diplo-
macy works come together. Economic diplomacy can reduce uncertainty 
and increase trust. The effect of economic diplomacy on trade uncertain-
ty is theoretically motivated by Bergeijk (2009)3. The general effect of 
1 This chapter is based on Moons (2012) published in the Interna-
tional Journal of Diplomacy and Economy to which special acknowl-
edgement is due.   
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trust in international exchange is extensively tested by for example Guiso 
et al., (2009) and more recently Kraus et al., (2015) and Yu et al., (2015). 
Both the theoretical framework and econometric tests indicate that rela-
tive levels of trust towards a country is a very significant determinant of 
international trade and investment. Furthermore, some investments and 
groups of traded products suffer more from a lack of trust, specifically 
more complex goods that demand more interaction between the buyer 
and seller to establish the quality and reliability of the product (Guiso et 
al., 2009; Rangan and Lawrence, 1999). If economic diplomacy is effec-
tive in reducing uncertainty economic diplomacy should have visible ef-
fects at both the extensive and intensive trade margin. Furthermore, 
economic diplomacy should have a relatively bigger effect on more 
complex/ trust intensive products and more complex markets.  
The effect of economic diplomacy on the margins of trade is not only 
based on the macro-economic literature. From (models with) micro 
foundations follows that for the individual firm, trade barriers will be 
higher when a firm enters a new destination market or tries to introduce 
a new product on a foreign market4. On the other hand, the barriers to 
trade will be lower to the individual firm when it tries to sell more prod-
ucts with which it has previous international experience or if it goes to 
markets it is already familiar with. Ceteris paribus, this means that eco-
nomic diplomacy has dissimilar effects on newly traded product versus 
previously traded products. And has different effects on firms thinking 
about trading with new foreign markets versus firms that want to trade 
in markets they are familiar with.  
Furthermore, barriers to international trade are a potentially bigger 
problem for firms from lower income countries. Reputation effects 
hamper the export of technologically more advanced products from low 
income countries because the products coming from those countries 
may be perceived as less advanced and of poorer quality than their sub-
stitutes from developed countries (Hudson and Jones, 2003). Firms from 
countries not integrated in the global value chain that want to enter the 
world markets with highly differentiated products have the particular 
problem that prices alone do not convey all the relevant information for 
international trade (Rauch, 1996 and 1999). The heterogeneity along the 
dimensions of both characteristics interferes with the ability of their 
prices to signal relative scarcity. This is normally solved in the trading 
network where additional information about a product is communicated. 
The effects of economic diplomacy on the margins of trade  73 
Not all countries are however integrated into these networks. And firms 
originating from countries outside the distribution networks have diffi-
culty getting in because the search process between buyers and sellers is 
strongly conditioned by proximity and pre-existing `ties'. The buyers’ 
search for trade partners does not proceed until the best match is 
achieved because of search costs (Rauch, 1999). Economic diplomacy 
can play a role when countries are not yet well integrated into global 
production networks (Veenstra et al., 2011).  
Understanding the effect of economic diplomacy on the margins of 
trade is not only relevant for theorists but also for policy making purpos-
es. Policy makers may have the economically sensible ambition to diver-
sify exports, i.e. increase the extensive margin (Amurgo- Pacheco and 
Pierola, 2008; Easterly and Kraay, 2000; Jansen, 2004). Highly concen-
trated exports associated with an increased vulnerability to changes of 
the economic tide. Examples are plentiful among the developing coun-
tries where many are reliant on the export of a few traded goods (see 
Table 4.1). Take for example a country such as Mali  whose exports are 
dominated by two products: gold (79%) and cotton (7%)5. Or Venezuela 
where one product (oil) is responsible for 93 per cent of total exports.  
Table 4.1 
Top 10 countries highest export concentration 2010 
Ranking Country  Largest export sector Share in 
exports 
1 Algeria Oil or other mineral fuels 98.3% 
2 Azerbaijan Oil or other mineral fuels 94.5% 
3 Venezuela Oil or other mineral fuels 93.4% 
4 Sao Tomé and Principe Cacao 88.1% 
5 Nigeria Oil or other mineral fuels 87.7% 
6 Maldives Fish 87.2% 
7 Saudi-Arabia Oil or other mineral fuels 85.7% 
8 Surinam Natural resources 80.4% 
9 Mali Metals and jewellery 79.1% 
10 Samoa Electrical machinery and aequipment 76.6% 
Source: Calculations by the author based on UN Comtrade database, accessed December 2011 
 
The consequence of concentrated exports is that a country’s terms of 
trade are influenced heavily by the price developments of a limited num-
ber of  products. Terms of trade volatility is one of the determinants of 
income volatility which is bad for economic growth (Easterly and Kraay, 
2000; Jansen, 2004; Lutz and Singer, 1994; Rodrik, 1997). Diversified 
exports on the other hand make a country less vulnerable to economic 
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shocks (Camanho da Costa Neto and Romeu, 2010). Many governments 
thus have a target to diversify their exports, increase their extensive mar-
gin (Amurgo-Pacheco and Pierola, 2008; Volpe Martincus et al., 2007). 
For policy makers in these countries it is important to know which in-
strument of economic diplomacy is most effective in stimulating the ex-
tensive margin and to what extent measures already taken are effective. 
Knowledge about the margins of trade is equally important for the pri-
vate sector. Firms that want to develop their business internationally by 
entering new markets (increase the extensive margin) or by increasing 
their trade volumes (increase the intensive margin) may have to tap into 
different government support services. Looking into the effect of eco-
nomic diplomacy on the margins of trade thus seems a useful additional 
way of analysing the effect of economic diplomacy. Evidence of the ef-
fect of economic diplomacy on the margins of trade is, however, scat-
tered6.  
This chapter aims to contribute to a more systematic approach. I will 
do so by providing qualitative and quantitative literature review of a 
sample of 12 papers which in total have 987 economic diplomacy coeffi-
cients. Section 4.2 gives an overview of what is known so far about the 
effect of economic diplomacy on the margin of trade. We will discuss the 
literature per instrument of economic diplomacy and enhance the discus-
sion by analysing the coefficients, trying to disentangle differences in ef-
fect between low and middle income Latin American and high income 
(OECD) countries. Section 4.3 discusses limitations of the literature dis-
cussed. Section 4.4 gives conclusions and recommendations for further 
research. 
4.2 4.2 The effect of economic diplomacy on the intensive 
and extensive margin of trade 
4.2.1 Reviewing the literature 
So far this article has illustrated that it is relevant to know how the mar-
gins of trade are affected by economic diplomacy. A Google Scholar and 
EconLit database search on terms7 related to economic diplomacy and 
its influence on the margin of trade, and a check of references of various 
articles delivered 12 papers that provide more insight into these dynam-
ics8. A review of the main papers on the relationship between activities 
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of economic diplomacy and the intensive and extensive margin follows. 
An overview of the  literature is found in Table 4.2.  
Table 4.2 
Studies on economic diplomacy and the margins of trade 
Study Instrument of diplomacy investigated 
Latin American Countries (non OECD)  
Volpe Martincus et al. (2010a) Export promotion agency, embassies and consulates 
Volpe Martincus et al. (2010b) Export promotion agency 
Volpe Martincus and Carballo (2008) Export promotion agency 
Volpe Martincus and Carballo (2010a) Export promotion agency 
Volpe Martincus and Carballo (2010b) Export promotion agency 
Volpe Martincus and Carballo (2012) Export promotion agency 
OECD countries  
Alvarez and Crespi (2000) Export promotion agency 
Biesebroeck et al. (2011) Export promotion agency (local and abroad) 
Gil- Pareja et al. (2011) Export promotion agency (local and abroad) 
Volpe Martincus and Carballo (2010c) Export promotion agency 
Creusen and Lejour (2011) Foreign representation, trade missions 
Segura-Cayuela and Vilarrubia (2008) Embassies and consulates 
 
Export promotion agencies   
Researchers trying to establish the significance and size of the impact of 
economic diplomacy on trade (intensive margin) have mainly focussed 
on the effect of embassies (see for example Gil-Pareja et al., 2008; Af-
man and Maurel, 2010; Veenstra et al., 2011; Yakop and Bergeijk, 2011). 
Unlike the intensive margin literature, export promotion agencies (EPAs) 
are the dominant topic of research in publications about economic di-
plomacy and the margins of trade. There are a number of empirical stud-
ies dealing with the effectiveness of export promotion agencies. The ma-
jority of studies concentrate on EPAs in Latin American countries.  
Alvarez and Crespi (2000) report the effectiveness of the Chilean ex-
port promotion agency (PROCHILE) for the period 1992-1996. They 
use survey data obtained from 365 firms. They find no direct positive 
impact on Chilean exports. However, “promotion instruments increase 
the number of firm export markets and, after a period of four years, they 
generate more exports and a higher diversification by markets and prod-
ucts” (Alvarez and Crespi, 2000:240). For the period 2002-2006 the ef-
fect of PROCHILE is also estimated. For these years a more substantial 
contribution of PROCHILE to the export of Chilean exporters is found 
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(Volpe Martincus and Carballo, 2010c). The impact of PROCHILE in 
this study is however at the lower end of the scale compared to other 
Latin American export promotion agencies. Volpe Martincus and Car-
ballo (2008) assess the effects of export promotion on Peruvian firms 
over the period 2001-2005. The analysis shows that export promotion 
activities by Peru’s national export promotion agency (PROMEX) help 
firms in their internationalization efforts. PROMEX assistance led to an 
expansion of exports along the country and product extensive margins, 
i.e. PROMEX led to an expansion of the number of trade relations and 
number of traded products.  Volpe Martincus and Carballo (2010a) es-
tablish the effect of the Uruguayan export promotion agency on the 
margins of trade. For this analysis they use a dataset of firms already ac-
tive in international trade for the 2000-2007 period. The findings suggest 
that EPAs help firms reach new destination countries and in introducing 
new differentiated products. The effect of Uruguayan trade assistance 
seems to be especially effective for entering Latin American and Carib-
bean markets. Volpe Martincus and Carballo (2010b), using the entire 
population of Columbian exporters over the period 2003-2006, deliver 
insight into actions of economic diplomacy by the Columbian EPA 
(PROEXPORT) at a very micro level. Not only do they analyse the ef-
fect of export promotion activities on the margins of trade, they also 
look at which particular actions or combination of actions are most ef-
fective. They find that PROEXPORT actions facilitate the access of 
firms to new destination countries as well as the introduction of new dif-
ferentiated products. The analysis shows that a combination of services 
is associated with better export outcomes along the country extensive 
margin. Firms which simultaneously receive counselling, participate in 
international trade missions and fairs, and get support in setting up an 
agenda of commercial meetings exhibit higher growth of total exports. 
These firms also export to a larger number of countries than comparable 
firms which only joined in one of these activities. It thus seems that ser-
vices show significant complementarities.  
The impact of Argentina’s EPA is analysed in Volpe Martincus et al. 
(2010b). They investigate the effect of export promotion in Argentina 
for the 2002-2006 period. As in other publications on Latin American 
EPAs, they find that export promotion specifically influences the coun-
try extensive margin of trade. Additionally the question is answered 
whether EPA activities show heterogeneous effects depending on firm 
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sizes. Their findings suggest that positive effects are mainly associated 
with small and medium sized firms. The final paper in this part of the 
literature review on Latin American countries shows that PROCOMER, 
the Costa Rican export promotion agency, positively affects the exten-
sive margin of trade for Costa Rican exporters (Volpe Martincus and 
Carballo, 2012). The improvement in the extensive margin is however 
limited to the country extensive margin, meaning that exporters assisted 
by PROCOMER exporters enter new markets but do not diversify their 
product range. The results furthermore show that the impact of Costa 
Rican export promotion activities is limited to traders of heterogeneous 
products and has no impact on exporters of homogeneous goods. This is 
consistent with earlier publications on the effectiveness of Latin Ameri-
can EPAs (see for example Volpe Martincus and Carballo, 2010a and 
2010b and Volpe Martincus et al., 2010a). 
 Two studies analyse EPAs in countries outside Latin America. 
Biesebroeck et al. (2011) analyse the effectiveness of the Canadian Trade 
Commissioner Service (TCS). They find positive and significant effects 
for TCS activities on exports at the intensive margin of trade. This sug-
gests that Canadian firms facilitated by the TCS are concentrating on 
fewer but more successful products and markets. The study shows het-
erogeneous effects along a number of dimensions. The TCS has a bigger 
effect on first time clients and effects are bigger for location specific as-
sistance, which means that the services provided by foreign branches of 
the Canadian EPA stimulate trade more profoundly. Gil-Parreja et al. 
(2011) find that Spanish Regional Export Promotion Offices (REPOs) 
have a larger impact in stimulating an increase in trade margins of ex-
ports in differentiated goods. Using Spanish transaction data per product 
over the period 1993-2008, they show that total impact of REPOs on 
exports into three product margins9 takes place mainly through an in-
crease in both the number of products and the average number of firm 
transactions per product. An interesting observation in the paper is relat-
ed to the export enhancing effect which is differentiated by region. The 
results show a large dispersion in the effectiveness. Of the 13 regions 
that have REPOs only four seem to have an appreciable trade stimulat-
ing effect. For the others the results are insignificant or even negative. 
According to the authors, the regions with the longest tradition in trade 
promotion show the best results. Allowing for the finding that lack of 
experience with export promotion of some regions is the cause of the 
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dispersion, the analysis makes it very clear that trade promotion practises 
matter a lot for the final outcome. 
 
Diplomatic representations 
The activities of diplomatic representations on the margins of trade have 
been subject of empirical work in three studies. Analysing a large cross 
sectional dataset with bilateral trade data for 21 exporter and 163 im-
porter countries Segura-Cayuela and Villarrubia (2008) find that the 
presence of a foreign service office10 in a given country increases the like-
lihood of trading with that partner between 11 per cent and 18 per cent. 
Economic diplomacy thus reduces uncertainty when a trading relation-
ship is not yet established. Once a trading relationship is established they 
find no effect of economic diplomacy for the intensive margin of trade. 
Looking into the dynamics of the extensive margin they find that eco-
nomic diplomacy matters most for sectors producing heterogeneous 
goods.  
Creusen and Lejour (2011) look into the effect of several instruments 
of diplomacy, among which several forms of diplomatic representation 
and trade missions for the Netherlands. Their findings show that eco-
nomic diplomacy is effective in increasing the country extensive margin. 
The probability that a Dutch firm enters new markets is somewhat larger 
in countries with bilateral chambers of commerce, Netherlands Business 
Support Offices (NBSO’s) and embassies. High level trade missions also 
contribute significantly to chances of successful market entry by Dutch 
firms. Economic diplomacy is more effective when market entry barriers 
are higher, often related to the level of development of countries.  
Creusen and Lejour (2011) find evidence for an increase in the intensive 
margin of trade due to diplomatic representations and high-level trade 
missions, but have difficulty establishing the causality.  
Finally, Volpe Martincus et al. (2010a) find heterogeneity in trade ef-
fects between EPAs and diplomatic representations. While agencies 
stimulate the increase in the number of differentiated goods that are ex-
ported, diplomatic representations improve exports of homogeneous 
goods (Volpe Martincus et al., 2010a). The study analyses the effects for 
a sample of 26 Latin American and Caribbean countries for the 1995-
2004 period.  
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4.2.2 Bringing results together 
It is not easy to draw general conclusions from all separate papers with 
results for individual countries or a specific group of countries. We can 
however bring together the presented empirical work to work towards 
some broad conclusions. In order to integrate findings Table 4.3 pre-
sents material of the 12 papers discussed earlier. In these 12 papers 987 
coefficients are delivered on either the (country/product) intensive mar-
gin or the (country/ product) extensive margin. In the table the band-
widths of significant coefficients per margin are reported, next to the 
country or region for which the analysis was made, the instrument of 
diplomacy investigated and the way the effect of diplomacy is presented.  
Table 4.3 
Economic Diplomacy and the effect on the margin of trade 
 
 
Country/ Region 
 
Instrument 
 
Effect 
Intensive margin Extensive margin 
Country Product  Country  Product  
Latin American Countries (non OECD) 
Volpe Martincus 
et al. (2010a) 
26 Latin American 
and Caribbean 
EPA, embassy 
and consulates 
Higher value n/a n/a 4.0%-
205.3% 
n/a 
Volpe Martincus 
and Carballo 
(2008) 
Peru EPA Higher 
growth 
2.8%-27.8% 3.1%-18.9% 4.8%-26.5% 2.8%-20.0% 
Volpe Martincus 
and Carballo 
(2010a) 
Uruguay EPA services Higher 
growth 
n/a n/a 9.6%-17.1% not 
significant 
Volpe Martincus 
and Carballo 
(2010b) 
Columbia EPA services Higher 
growth 
7.8%-22.4% 9.4%-20.0% 6.6%-19.6% 4.9%-14.5% 
Volpe Martincus 
and Carballo 
(2012) 
Costa Rica EPA Higher 
growth 
38.1%-39.5% 6.2%-23.0% 5.1%-14.2% 4.1%-22.8% 
Volpe Martincus 
et al. (2010b) 
Argentina EPA Higher 
growth 
5.8%-24.2% 8.1%-42.6% 0%-33.9% 2.4%-19.7% 
OECD countries 
Alvarez and 
Crespi (2000) 
Chile EPA Absolute increase 
in number of 
products/ markets 
not 
significant 
not 
significant 
1.03-
1.45 
not 
significant 
Biesebroeck et 
al (2011) 
Canada EPA, foreign 
EPA office 
Higher growth n/a n/a 15.5%-
20.8% 
35.7%-
55.6% 
Gil- Pareja et 
al. (2011) 
Spain EPA Higher value -19.1%-22.2% -12.1%- 44.9% 
Volpe Martincus 
and Carballo 
(2010c) 
Chile EPA Higher growth 2.8%- 
23.7% 
4,5%- 26,0% 2.3%-
20.0% 
3.1%-12.5% 
Creusen and 
Lejour (2011)11 
The Netherlands Foreign 
representation, 
trade missions 
Increased chance 
of trade and 
higher value 
2.4%-5.9% n/a 2.1%-
5.9% 
n/a 
Segura-Cayuela 
and Vilarrubia 
(2008) 
21 mainly OECD 
exporters  
Embassies and 
consulates 
Increased chance 
of trade 
not 
significant 
n/a 4.3%-
180.3% 
n/a 
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Table 4.3 shows that the reported results have a concentration on 
Latin American countries and we see that the influence on the margin of 
trade is measured in different ways. The basic question whether econom-
ic diplomacy is a useful tool to influence the margin of trade may how-
ever be answered affirmatively. No matter how the influence of econom-
ic diplomacy is measured, as higher export growth compared to peers, as 
higher value of exports or as an increased chance of entering a new ex-
port market, the studies deliver positive results. All studies find positive 
effects of economic diplomacy on market diversification, i.e. the exten-
sive margin of trade. Within the extensive margin, the diversification 
along the number of countries served seems more pronounced than the 
number of products exported. 
The parameters found for the intensive margin of trade are less con-
vincing, especially for the richer OECD countries in the reported sam-
ples. Here the observed effects vary from small (and even negative) to 
quite substantial, but the parameters are always smaller in comparison to 
the Latin American countries in the sample. Furthermore, we see quite a 
number of results which are not significant on the intensive margin. This 
observation is further validated by checking the number of significant 
coefficients in all the presented papers (see Figure 4.1). 
Figure 4.1 
Significant and insignificant coefficients per margin of trade 
 
Notes: data collected from the studies reported in Table 2. Figure reports percentages of 
significant (10%, 5% and 1% level) and insignificant coefficients from primary studies. 
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In Figure 4.1 a coefficient is labelled significant when in the original 
paper the coefficient is significant at the 1, 5 or 10 per cent level. For the 
figure the total number of coefficients used is 919. All significant coeffi-
cients are positive. The coefficients of Gil-Pareja et al. (2011) were ex-
cluded because the paper only presented the results for intensive and 
extensive margins, without specifying country or product dimensions. 
The pattern of significance over the margins of trade in Gil-Pareja et al. 
(2011), however, does not differ from the picture presented in Figure 
4.1, in which the margin effects are further disentangled. 
Figure 4.1 clearly shows that the country extensive margin is the most 
affected by instruments of diplomacy. In the full sample some 55 per 
cent of the observations are significant. Of the reported effect of eco-
nomic diplomacy on the country extensive margin 83 per cent of obser-
vations are significant. This further strengthens the presumption that 
economic diplomacy may serve as an effective way to lower country en-
try barriers. The results for the intensive margin, the increase in volume 
within existing relations, are mixed at best. Here insignificant results 
dominate. 
Figure 4.2 
Geographic division of significant and insignificant coefficients per margin of trade  
 
Notes: data collected from the studies reported in table 2. Figure reports percentages of 
significant (10%, 5% and 1% level) and insignificant coefficients from primary studies. 
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It is useful the see if the above observed pattern is consistent between 
the richer and poorer countries in the sample. As observed earlier, coun-
tries with concentrated exports often have an ambition to diversify their 
exports. And firms from poorer countries often have more difficult in 
entering the worlds’ markets because their domestic market is not inte-
grated in production chains. Figure 4.2 shows a comparison of results 
for the extensive and intensive margin for non OECD Latin American 
countries (LAC) compared to the results for the OECD countries in the 
sample. Keeping in mind the reported margins in Table 4.3 Figure 4.2 
confirms comparable positive effects on the extensive margin, for coun-
tries from either group. On the intensive margin we however see quite a 
substantial difference between the ratio of positive12 and significant coef-
ficients and insignificant coefficients between LAC and OECD coun-
tries. For the latter the contribution of economic diplomacy to an in-
crease in the intensive margin of trade is much more significant. This is 
an important difference from the picture which emerges if one would 
only look at reported bandwidths in Table 4.3.  
4.3 Limitations of the literature 
A couple of general notes are warranted before drawing conclusions 
about the effect of economic diplomacy on the margins of trade. Firstly, 
one has to take into account that economic diplomacy is not a one size 
fits all. If the target is to increase the intensive margin of trade, to make 
the terms of trade more stable, the current structure of the country’s 
trade matters. If firms from a particular country export a lot of different 
products to only a limited number of markets, trade costs may prove to 
be a problem and economic diplomacy may be part of the solution to 
this problem. If firms from a particular country export only a limited 
number of products, production costs13 in different sectors may be part 
of the problem (next to impediments for firms to enter in world mar-
kets). In that case economic diplomacy will not prove to be panacea 
sought. Firms need to gain competitiveness first. 
Second, having a concentrated export package is mainly a problem of 
small economies and developing countries (Jansen, 2004). An under-
standing of the problem, next to looking at the exporting country, will 
have to involve looking at the importing countries. Literature on multi-
national enterprises (MNEs) suggests that MNEs create highly integrated 
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regional production networks (UNCTAD, 1999). Evidence further sug-
gests that retailers’ decisions are important in determining who is includ-
ed and who is not in cross border supply chains (Cadot et al., 2009). 
Thus, opportunities for exporters from small and developing countries 
are at least partially driven by the purchasing policies of large buyers, i.e. 
MNEs. If large buyers decide to concentrate on a few suppliers, for ex-
ample to simplify the production process or because of government in-
centives, this limits the opportunity of those trying to diversify their 
trade. Understanding these policies is an important part of understanding 
the concentrated exports problem.  
Third, the papers reviewed show important geographical limitations. 
Only two analyses were not country specific (Segura-Cayuela and Vilar-
rubia, 2008 and Volpe Martincus et al., 2010). Of the other papers al-
most three quarters of them have a focus on economic diplomacy activi-
ties for Latin American countries and a majority only focuses of the 
effect of export promotion agencies. None of the papers analyse the ef-
fect of economic diplomacy on the margins of trade for African coun-
tries and only the paper of Segura-Cayuela and Vilarrubia has Asian 
countries in its exporter sample. This makes it hard to draw general con-
clusions about the effect of economic diplomacy on the margins of 
trade. Results are potentially country or region specific and only include a 
limited number of activities of economic diplomacy. 
Fourth, little is known about the interaction between instruments of 
economic diplomacy and their effects on the margins of trade. Some pa-
pers take into account several activities of EPAs, thereby reflecting the 
heterogeneity of export promotion programs (Alvarez and Crespi, 2000; 
Biesenbroeck et al., 2011; Volpe Martincus and Carballo, 2010b). 
Creusen and Lejour (2011) simultaneously address the effect of diplo-
matic representations and some of their activities. Most papers are how-
ever focussed on one instrument of diplomacy and do not take into ac-
count the risk that some of the companies may actually use other, not 
observed, instruments of diplomacy. The reported results in the single 
instrument studies may thus present some over estimation of the effect 
on the margin of trade. 
Fifth, the data used have some problems. Studies that use the total 
number of bilateral traded products as a proxy for the extensive margin 
of trade and the value per traded product to proxy for the intensive mar-
gin have a disadvantage (Gil-Parreja et al., 2011). It potentially overesti-
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mates the effect of economic diplomacy on the intensive margin. New 
trading relationships on the firm level can lead to an increase in the 
number of transactions per product. In the bilateral trade data this may 
only show up as an increase in the country intensive margin even though 
at the micro level the firm extensive margin increases. It is thus better to 
work with micro data when available to fully disentangle the channels 
through which economic diplomacy influences trade, as is done in most 
of the 2010 and 2011 publications. Working with micro data would bring 
the additional advantage that one could further gain understanding of 
important firm level dynamics. Currently, when looking into the margins 
of trade the literature focuses on the effects on a macro (country) of me-
so (sectors) level. That is, the analysis looks at the number of countries 
traded with and the number of products traded from a country or sec-
toral perspective. The reported margins of trade however miss the firm 
perspective which is important to understand. For example, diversifica-
tion from a firm perspective may involve selling the same total quantity, 
of the same product in the same country to a different number of buy-
ers. This makes sense from a producer’s perspective because it makes the 
producer less dependent on one buyer leading to lower risks of non 
payment and a better price negotiating position. This is however not 
measured, nor mentioned in the margins of trade literature.  
4.4 Conclusions  
The vast majority of the empirical literature confirms the economic rea-
soning by stating the effectiveness of economic diplomacy as a tool to 
increase the extensive margin of trade. This relationship holds for 
OECD and non OECD Latin American countries. From our 987 eco-
nomic diplomacy coefficients the empirical judgement on the effective-
ness of EPAs as a suitable instrument to diversify exports, i.e. to tackle 
market entry barriers, is very favourable. Individual studies point to the 
fact that this effectiveness is highest for differentiated products (Gil-
Pareja et al., 2011; Martincus and Carballo; 2012; Segura Cayuela, 2008; 
Volpe Martincus et al., 2010a) and to lower the obstacles to international 
trade for small and medium sized firms (Volpe Martincus et al., 2010b). 
This is more nuanced than the Moons and Bergeijk (2016) meta-analysis 
that indicates that significance on aggregate exports may be lacking. 
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The effect of economic diplomacy on the intensive margin of trade 
seems to be different when comparing OECD to non OECD Latin 
American countries. The positive relationship between economic diplo-
macy and the volume of trade is stronger for OECD countries. Howev-
er, studies dealing with OECD countries in the sample more often use 
embassies and consulates as an explanatory variable. These are better at 
stimulating the intensive margin, a conclusion carefully drawn by Volpe 
Martincus et al. (2010a). The results may also be driven by differences in 
market entry barriers that OECD diplomats are confronted with. Or it is 
possible that the target of some of the economic diplomats in the 
OECD markets is focussed on higher volumes instead of diversification, 
which is a way to interpret the earlier presented results for Canada 
(Biesenbroeck et al., 2011).  
Based on what is known to date, it seems that embassies and consu-
lates in particular enhance existing trade relations (intensive margin). 
This may relate to the depth of the knowledge of the staff at embassies 
and consulates versus the depth of knowledge available at export promo-
tion agencies. Embassy employees usually have a broad general 
knowledge which helps to solve more easier, problems which mainly im-
pact (the already large) existing trade flows (Volpe Martincus, 2010). 
Employees of export promotion agencies on the other hand have more 
specific knowledge, aimed at promoting exports. These employees pro-
vide more specific solutions to problems for small niche players, result-
ing in a greater diversity in products traded (but not having a large im-
pact on the total volume). 
Literature furthermore suggests that next to the institution used for 
economic diplomacy the type of services offered by these institutions 
matters. Country results differ in size and even in the trade margin af-
fected. Services offered by trade promotion agencies seem to have com-
plementarities (Volpe-Martincus and Carballo, 2010b) and the trade 
promotion policy of regions with a longer tradition in trade promotion 
outperform those with lesser experience (Gil-Pareja et al., 2011).  
4.5 Research agenda  
The sample used for this paper was constructed between January and 
December 2011. Since new empirical work has been published that looks 
into the effect of economic diplomacy on the extensive margin and the inten-
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sive margin of trade (e.g. Crespi and Alvarez, 2016; Gil- Pareja et al., 2015; 
Cadot et al., 2015; Lederman et al., 2016; Xu et al., 2014; Volpe-
Martincus and Carballo, 2012) (see Figure 4.3 below). Given the im-
portance of economic diplomacy in the link to the margins of trade I 
highly advise to try and conduct a meta-analysis on this topic.  
Figure 4.3 
Studies investigating the effect of economic diplomacy on the margins of trade 
 
Notes: additional to the studies of the presented literature review I collected the new studies 
on the topic of economic diplomacy and the margins of trade on March 6th 2017. I used the 
same search strategy as described in section 4.2.1 of this chapter. This delivered 16 new 
studies which are marked with * in the references of this thesis.  
 
Important issues for future research still remain. The geographical 
coverage of the literature of the effect of economic diplomacy on the 
margins of trade is still limited. Studies still by and large focus on OECD 
countries and Latin American countries (e.g. Cruz, 2014; Casey, 2015; 
Lederman et al., 2016; Schminke and Biesenbroeck, 2013). Conclusions 
drawn for OECD and Latin American countries may not prove to be a 
blueprint for others. So far limited analysis is available that includes Sub 
Saharan African countries and of the North African countries only Tuni-
sia was topic of investigation (Cadot et al., 2015). This is an area of atten-
tion because economic diplomacy could be of help the efforts of African 
countries to diversify their exports. I will follow up on this particular 
point in the next chapter and investigate the effect of economic diplo-
macy on a large sample that included numerous African countries.  
More generally, there is a need for data samples and studies that in-
volve multiple countries because the majority of the literature reviewed 
for this article has a single country/region focus, making results coun-
try/region specific (e.g. Biesenbroeck et al., 2016; Casey, 2015; Hayakawa 
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et al., 2014a; Xu and Zang, 2014). It also limits the comparability be-
tween countries which is an important drawback because the effective-
ness of economic diplomacy is likely to vary between countries (Bergeijk 
et al., 2011a; Lederman et al., 2009).  
Another aspect of research should be on the interaction between in-
struments of diplomacy and their joint effect on the margins of trade. 
Current literature is too narrowly focussed on one instrument of diplo-
macy or a few instruments at best. It is important to have a deeper un-
derstanding how instruments of diplomacy interact. Volpe Martincus and 
Carballo (2010b) show that the combined use of different EPA services 
is associated with better export performance. Literature illustrating the 
impact of economic diplomacy on trade flows already shows quite strong 
heterogeneous effects when several instruments of diplomacy are tested 
simultaneously (Veenstra et al., 2011). A better understanding of the in-
teraction between instruments and heterogeneity in effects will provide 
valuable policy insights.   
A point of consideration should also be that effective export promo-
tion policies could also involve imports (Beltramello et al., 2012). This is 
not a particularly popular topic under politicians but may become more 
popular if development cooperation and trade get combined in more 
countries (Chapter 2 of this thesis; Moons, 2015). Effective export pro-
motion agency may have to play a role in facilitating linkages for domes-
tic producers to find better imports as an input in their production pro-
cess. This may in turn lead to a better position in the international 
economy. The role of imported goods in the position of exporting firms 
is an area that should be part of future micro data analysis on the deter-
minants of the margins of trade.  
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Notes 
 
1I would like to thank two anonymous reviewers and Roelof van der Kraan and 
Richard Shirley for their useful comments on earlier drafts. 
2 Trade partners in this case refers to the trade between countries. 
3 See Chapter 3 in Bergeijk (2009), pp. 47-65 
4 This is in line with the thought of the Melitz (2003) model. 
55 Figures based on UN Comtrade database for 2010. 
6 An overview of the general economic effects of economic diplomacy on trade 
may be found in Moons and Bergeijk (2016) 
7 Terms associated with economic diplomacy, like trade promotion, embassies, 
consulates, export promotion where also used for the search 
8 The first papers were found because of the Moons and Bergeijk (2016) meta-
analysis search. They concluded that the margins of trade literature could not be 
included in the meta-analysis.  
9 Different from other papers in this section on the effect of EPAs Gil-Parreja et 
al. (2011) do not use a database with contains firm specific information provided 
by the EPA. Gil-Parreja et al. (2011) instead use transaction level data on the ex-
ports of various Spanish regions and estimate the REPOs impact with a gravity 
model. This analysis ‘only’ allows them to disentangle 3 type of margins of trade; 
the extensive margin, the intensive margin and the mixed margin. 
10 In this study a foreign service office can be an embassy or consulate. 
11 I would like to kindly thank the authors for providing me with additional in-
formation about the margins of trade as observed in their paper. 
12 See Table 3 for bandwidth. Vast majority of reported coefficients have a posi-
tive sign. 
13 Production costs involve the cost of labour and the cost of capital. Especially 
for less developed countries the access to and cost of capital can be a serious im-
pediment. 
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5 
Economic diplomacy and product 
characteristics.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction  
Leading publications in the field of economic diplomacy work under the 
assumption that economic diplomacy has a homogeneous effect on trade 
(e.g. Nitsch, 2007; Rose, 2007)2. It is however increasingly recognized 
that the effect of economic diplomacy is more heterogeneous (e.g. Gil-
Pareja et al., 2015; Moons and Bergeijk, 2016; Moons, 2017; Volpe Mar-
tincus et al., 2011).  
Empirical research provides indications that this heterogeneity can be 
expected in relation to the level of economic development of the trading 
partner.  Economic diplomacy will have a more pronounced effect on 
trade from and to low income countries (e.g. Creusen and Lejour, 2013; 
Hayakawa et al., 2014a; Gil-Pareja et al., 2015; Yakop and Bergeijk, 2011; 
1 This chapter is based on Moons and Boer (2017) which is accepted 
for publication in the Research Handbook of Economic Diplomacy: Bilateral 
Relations in a Context of Geopolitical Change to which acknowledgement is 
due.  
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Veenstra et al., 2011). Furthermore, the effect of diplomacy may be dif-
ferent for the number of traded products/ trading relations (extensive mar-
gin of trade) as compared to its effect on the traded volume (intensive margin 
of trade) (Crespi and Alvarez, 2016; Gil- Pareja et al., 2015; Lederman et 
al., 2016; Volpe-Martincus and Carballo, 2012). Next to this, the instru-
ment of economic diplomacy deployed in bilateral economic relations 
matters. For instance, higher ranked embassies seem to have a more 
pronounced effect on bilateral trade as compared to the lower ranked 
career or honorary consulates (Bergeijk et al., 2011a; Veenstra et al., 
2011). Diplomatic representations seem to generate a more substantial 
effect on bilateral economic relations as compared to export promotion 
offices (Moons and Bergeijk, 2016; Veenstra et al., 2011). 
An underexplored source of heterogeneity is the effect of economic 
diplomacy on internationally traded Rauch classified product groups. 
Thus far this has only been explored in a regional or country specific set-
ting (e.g. Gil-Pareja et al., 2015; Volpe Martincus et al., 2011; Volpe Mar-
tincus and Carballo, 2012)3. The Rauch classification groups tradable 
products according to their complexity to trade. Product complexity in-
creases the need for deliberation between buyer and seller because the 
reliability, trustworthiness, timeliness, and capabilities of the product 
need to be assessed (Rangan and Lawrence, 1999). Trade in the most 
sophisticated goods as a consequence depend most on trust between the 
buyer and seller (Guiso et al., 2009; Möhlman et al., 2010). Economic 
diplomacy can reduce costs and increase trust by, for example, providing 
information and matchmaking and reducing matching frictions. We test 
the relation between product group characteristics and economic diplo-
macy in this chapter and add to the literature by providing the first com-
prehensive analysis that takes into account 1) the different forms of dip-
lomatic representation, 2) the complexity of the traded product and 3) 
the effect of diplomatic representations on the formation of bilateral 
trade (country extensive margin of trade). Different from earlier studies which 
are specific to Latin America, Costa Rica and Spain this chapter uses a 
sample of countries that includes countries from all continents (the list 
of countries is presented in Appendix C) . 
This chapter also has two methodological contributions to the litera-
ture. First, it presents a way to deal with missing Rauch 4 digit SITC clas-
sifications. By interpolating missing 4 digit SITC codes we reduce the 
value of unclassified trade from 10 per cent to less than 3 per cent of our 
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sample. This is important because bilateral trade data of developing 
countries have high percentages of unclassified trade that would other-
wise not be taken into account. Second, the chapter adds to the under-
standing of the causal relation between diplomacy and trade. In the dis-
cussion on whether trade causes economic diplomacy or economic 
diplomacy causes trade we grew more confident of the latter. This is due 
to two reasons, the first being that we use product group data. Countries 
may decide to open diplomatic offices because of a high level of aggre-
gate exports. It is however unclear that they will do so for the exports of 
a particular group of traded goods. We therefore interpret the heteroge-
neity in product group trade effects of economic diplomacy as an addi-
tional argument that the causal effect between economic diplomacy and 
trade works in the sense that diplomacy leads to trade. Second of all, we 
(extensively) test our empirical findings using an instrumental variables 
(IV) approach. This approach confirms the robustness of the estimated 
coefficients and indicates that the causal relationship goes from diploma-
cy leading to trade. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. First, we dis-
cuss the rationale for economic diplomacy in relation to the traded 
product group. Second, we classify the bilateral trade of a broad set of 63 
countries in three goods categories based upon their four digit SITC 
numbers: homogeneous goods, reference priced goods and differentiated 
goods using the Rauch categorization. Third, we discuss our empirical 
design. Fourth, we determine the effect of economic diplomacy on the 
value of bilateral trade across different product categories. Fifth, we test 
the effect of economic diplomacy on the formation of trade relations 
and present sample and selection bias corrected estimates for the associ-
ated increase in bilateral trade. Sixth, we test for the causality of the pre-
sented relations. The final section concludes and presents potential fu-
ture areas of research. 
5.2 Economic diplomacy: its rationale and the heterogeneous 
effects due to product characteristics 
5.2.1. The rationale of economic diplomacy 
The necessary requirements for government intervention to have a posi-
tive welfare effect are that the intervention targets market failures and 
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that the benefits outweigh the costs of intervention. The rationale for 
economic diplomacy is the existence of asymmetric information and ex-
ternalities associated with the collection and sharing of information 
about market opportunities in international markets (Bergeijk, 2009; Le-
derman et al., 2016)4.  
 Information asymmetry is a problem that arises particularly for coun-
tries that are less connected to global trading networks. Retailers’ deci-
sions are important in determining who is and who is not included in 
trading networks (Cadot et al., 2011; Rauch, 1999). This decision making 
process is not only driven by rational cost perspectives, but also by repu-
tation and trust (Guiso et al., 2009; Möhlman et al., 2010).  Here the 
problem arises that prices do not convey all the relevant information for 
international trade (Rauch, 1996 and 1999). Additional information 
about the product is shared within the trading network. However, not all 
countries are part of the trading network for the product they want to 
sell. Governments may, as a result, need to signal that their producers 
meet the highest product and environmental standards and that firms 
originating from their country are reliable partners (Yakop and Bergeijk, 
2011). This is critically important for developing countries that stand at a 
disadvantage because the more technologically advanced products com-
ing from these countries may be perceived as less advanced and of poor-
er quality than their substitutes from developed countries (Hudson and 
Jones, 2003).  
 The externalities of collecting and sharing information about interna-
tional markets are particularly relevant in the situation of market entry. 
The search for information by the first mover and the associated invest-
ments reveal information that may be used by followers, saving them 
these initial costs (see Gil-Pareja et al., 2015; Moons, 2012; Rauch, 1996). 
The potential gains of being a first mover and investing in the produc-
tion of new knowledge about entering new foreign markets is thus re-
duced. The private returns from developing market entry/ markets op-
portunities information could be lower than the corresponding social 
returns, leading to a sub-optimally lower production about how to pur-
sue cross border economic activities (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1986; 
Westphal, 1990). Markets then fail to deliver a socially optimal return. 
Economic diplomacy counters this market failure by reducing private 
costs for information gathering via the provision of public information 
and the reduction of barriers to international trade.  
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5.2.2 Interaction between economic diplomacy and characteristics 
of the trade product 
The core contribution of this chapter is the test for potential heteroge-
neous effects of economic diplomacy in relation to characteristics of the 
traded good. Several different classification schemes exist that allow us 
to arrange trade flows into detailed product groups (e.g.  Hummels and 
Schaur, 2013; Lankhuizen et al., 2015).  We use the Rauch (1999) classifi-
cation scheme because it has several virtues in the context of this chap-
ter. The Rauch classification is suitable to test for the effects of econom-
ic diplomacy on exported products with clearly differentiated levels of 
product-sophistication. The scheme is intuitively logical since it can be 
related to information asymmetries and matching frictions between buy-
er and seller (the more complex the traded product, the higher the trans-
action cost) and via that route to the role of economic diplomats. The 
scheme has been used by others to test the effects of economic diploma-
cy, making the use of the Rauch classification a prerequisite to compare 
our results with other empirical economic diplomacy literature.   
“Rauch (1999) develops a model of international trade within a search 
theoretical framework” (Lankhuizen et al., 2015:139). Trade is classified 
accordingly by its four-digit Standard International Trade Classification 
(SITC) product group into i) homogeneous, ii) reference priced and iii) 
differentiated goods.  Rauch classified homogeneous goods are easiest to 
trade. Homogeneous goods are relatively straightforward and can be 
bought at organized exchanges; i.e. confectionary sugar (SITC 0620). No 
matter which factory produced the confectionary sugar the buyer will 
have a good idea of what he will get. Furthermore, the characteristics of 
the product and the price of homogenous goods are sufficient for buyers 
to identify a match to their needs. Based on these product characteristics 
there is no a priori rationale for economic diplomacy in transactions in-
volving homogeneous goods.  
 Reference priced goods are goods that are not listed on an interna-
tional exchange but prices can be found in specialized magazines/ web-
sites and buyers can get quotes for specialized traders. An example is 
natural honey (SITC0616) for which US prices are gathered by the Na-
tional Honey Board. The matching from sellers and buyers is more diffi-
cult than for homogenous goods. Based on the characteristics of refer-
ence priced goods we expect that economic diplomacy may have a role 
to play to lower information asymmetries. 
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Finally, differentiated goods vary in terms characteristics and quality 
and are not traded on organized exchanges. We take for example photo-
graphic camera’s (SITC 8811). These cameras may vary in different ways 
(i.e. optical vs digital zoom, big vs small internal processor). The price is 
determined by many factors, for example trademark and the (origin of 
the) maker. This makes it difficult to sell these goods in organized ex-
changes, to establish a “correct price” thereby complicating trade 
(Rauch, 1999). Hence, economic diplomacy may have a stronger impact 
on the trade of these differentiated goods (Gil-Pareja et al., 2015). This 
because there are many possibilities for economic diplomats to supply 
information and to build trust (about the quality of products coming 
from his home nation). 
5.3 Empirical design 
Turning to the empirical design our goals are twofold. First, our aim is to 
test our predictions, in particular what factors determine whether trade 
takes place at all. Second, we wish to see to how much trade is created 
(“the treatment stage”) and how to establish differences between prod-
uct groups. Because collecting economic diplomacy data is labor inten-
sive we use the sample of the Yakop and Bergeijk (2011) paper which 
was made available by the researchers. We start with a modification of 
their gravity model to show known heterogeneity inherent to different 
forms of diplomatic representation (Moons and Bergeijk, 2016). We 
therefore separately report the effects of embassies and consulates on 
trade instead of grouping the two into one variable as done in Yakop and 
Bergeijk (2011). This leads to the following estimated equation: 
 
Ln(Xij) = β0 + β1ln(Dij ) + β2 ln(Yi) + β3 ln (Yj) + β4 ln(Popi) + β5 ln(Popj) + 
β6 Lang + β7 Contij + β8 Landlij + β9 Islandij + β10 ln(Areai*Areaj) + β11 Colij 
+ β12 CUij + β13 FTAij+ β14 Embassyij + β15 Consulatesij  +  εij   …….    (5.1) 
 
Equation (5.1) statistically explains the (volume of) exports between 
country pairs based on a number of explanatory variables. Ln denotes 
the natural logarithm operator.  In our equation Xij  is the bilateral export 
from county i to country j. We expect countries that are more distant to 
each other to trade less and countries that are larger to export more. 
Therefore, Dij is included, which covers geographic distance between 
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country i and j. Three measures are furthermore included to correct for 
markets size. Y stands for the national income of the trading country, 
Pop gives the size of the population and Areai* Areaj is the area of the 
trading countries in squared kilometers.  
In equation (5.1) several dummies control for country characteristics 
that are known to influence bilateral trade. These dummies include past 
and current colonial relations (Col=1), if trading partners have a bilateral 
trade agreement (FTA=1), if they are part of a single currency union 
(CU=1) and the number of landlocked countries and island states in the 
country pair (value between 0 and 2). Embassyij and Consulatesij are includ-
ed to account for the effect of economic diplomacy. The Embassy and 
Consulates variables give the number of embassies and consulates that 
country i has in country j. Finally, εij represents the error term.  
We transform equation (5.1) to the theoretically founded Anderson 
and Wincoop (2003) model which is known to deliver more precise 
specifications than the traditional gravity model (Anderson and Win-
coop, 2003, 2004; Head and Mayer, 2013). This model is specified as:  
 
Ln(Xij/Yi*Yj)= β0 + β1lnDij + β2 Lang + β3 Contij + β4 Landlij + β5 Islandij + 
β6 ln(Areai*Areaj) + β7 (Colij) + β8 CUij + β9 FTAij+ β10 Embassyij + β11 
Consulatesij + λi + λj +  εij  …………………….  (5.2) 
 
Here the dependent variable is ln(Xij/Yi*Yj) which scales bilateral 
exports (Xij) to the incomes (Y) of countries i and j. This avoids an en-
dogeneity bias from trade flows to GDP (Baier and Bergstrand, 2010). 
Furthermore, λI  and λj represent importer and exporter fixed effects. 
These fixed effects are included to capture the bilateral and multilateral 
resistance to trade (Head and Mayer, 2013; Redding and Venables, 2004). 
The estimation of the effect of economic diplomacy on bilateral trade is 
thereby corrected for the push factor of differences in trade cost in two 
ways. First, the estimation is correct for the fact that trade between two 
countries will be more intense if the trade with other countries is more 
resistant. Second, the estimation is corrected for the fact that it will be 
more attractive to trade internationally rather than internally when world 
trade resistance is reduced. Additionally clustered robust standard errors 
are used to take into account the potential problem of correlation of the 
error terms across country pairs5. The cost of this procedure is that we 
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lose the ability to estimate country specific variables reflecting sums and 
averages like our Population variable (Head and Mayer, 2013). 
A drawback of estimating equations (5.1) and (5.2) is that they don’t 
give information about the effect of economic diplomacy on the propen-
sity to trade at a country level (i.e. the country extensive margin of trade). This 
information is valuable because one of the effects of economic diploma-
cy potentially is that it enhances trust/ reduces cultural biases and can 
thereby stimulate market entry that would not otherwise occur.  Fur-
thermore, not taking potential sample selection effects into account will 
produce biased estimates (for a thorough discussion see Linders and 
Groot, 2006).  We therefore use a two stage selection model to gather 
additional information and correct the economic diplomacy estimates for 
sample selection effects. The first estimation stage in essence presents 
the likelihood of bilateral trade between two countries determined by the 
factors included in the first stage regression.  Econometric reasoning 
suggests that the first stage selection equation should at least contain the 
same independent variables as the second regression stage (Linders and 
Groot, 2006; Möhlman et al., 2010). We include Common Religion as an 
additional regressor in the selection equation to conform to the empirical 
practice in trade modeling (e.g. Helpman et al., 2008; Möhlman et al., 
2010)6. If the first stage is positive the second stage regression deter-
mines the potential size of bilateral trade. The corresponding first stage 
selection equation is: 
 
ߨ෤௜௝ =  ߛ଴ +  ߛଵܮ݊(ܦ௜௝) + ߛଶܮܽ݊݃௜௝ + ߛଷܥ݋݊ݐ௜௝ + ߛସܮ݈ܽ݊݀௜௝ +
ߛହܫݏ݈ܽ݊݀௜௝ +  ߛ଺ܮ݊(ܣݎ݁ܽ௜ ∗ ܣݎ݁ ௝ܽ) + ߛ଻ܥ݋݈௜௝ + ߛ଼ܥ ௜ܷ௝ +
ߛଽܨܶܣ௜௝ + ߛଵ଴ܧܾ݉ܽݏݏݕ௜௝ + ߛଵଵܥ݋݊ݏݑ݈ܽݐ݁ݏ௜௝ +
ߛଵଶܥ݋݉݉݋݊ ܴ݈݁݅݃݅݋݊௜௝ +  ߝ௜௝   ………………….. (5.3) 
 
Where ߨ෤௜௝ =  1 if ܺ௜௝ >  0 and zero otherwise. The independent var-
iables are similar to those described earlier. The second stage of the pro-
cedure assesses the determinants of the volume of bilateral exports. The 
assessment using only positive bilateral export flows is based on the fol-
lowing regression equation: 
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ܮ݊( ௑೔ೕ௒೔∗௒ೕ) =  ߚ଴ +  ߚଵܮ݊(ܦ௜௝) + ߚଶܮܽ݊݃௜௝ +  ߚଷܥ݋݊ݐ௜௝ +
ߚସܮ݈ܽ݊݀௜௝ + ߚହܫݏ݈ܽ݊݀௜௝ + ߚ଺ܮ݊(ܣݎ݁ܽ௜ ∗ ܣݎ݁ ௝ܽ) + ߚ଻ܥ݋݈௜௝ +
ߚ଼ܥ ௜ܷ௝ + ߚଽܨܶܣ௜௝ + ߚଵ଴ܧܾ݉ܽݏݏݕ௜௝ + ߚଵଵܥ݋݊ݏݑ݈ܽݐ݁ݏ௜௝ +  ߝ௜௝   
   ……………………….                    (5.4) 
ܮ݊൫ܺ௜௝൯ = ܮ݊(ܺపఫ෪ ) if ܺ௜௝ =  1 
ܮ݊൫ܺ௜௝൯ = not observed if ܺ௜௝ =  0 
൫ߤ௜௝, ߝ௜௝൯ ~ bivariate normalൣ0,0,1, ߪఌଶ, ߩఌఓ൧. 
 
Where ෨ܺ௜௝ is the selected sample of positive export flows and other 
variables are similar to equation (5.1). Both the selection and regression 
stage are estimated using a maximum likelihood approach (Möhlman et 
al., 2010; Puhani, 2000). Because we are interested in the effect of eco-
nomic diplomacy on the trade in homogeneous, reference prices and dif-
ferentiated products we consequently replace Xij from the left hand side 
variable of equation (5.2) and (5.3) by HOMij, REFij and DIFij and repeat 
the estimations. Here HOMij represents the exports of al homogeneous 
goods of country i to country j, DIFij represents the exports of al differ-
entiated goods from country i to country j and REFij stands for the ex-
port of reference priced goods of country i to country j. This allows us to 
get an understanding of the economic diplomacy effect on the probabil-
ity to trade and the traded volume of the three Rauch classified product 
groups.  
Finally, in the sensitivity section we test the direction of the causal re-
lation. To establish the direction of causality we analyze and discuss the 
correlation of the Rauch categorized product groups with macro level 
trade flows, which is where the direction of causality is a potential issue. 
We also present two stage least squares (2SLS) Instrumental Variables 
(IV) regressions to control for reversed causality. 
5.4 The Data 
5.4.1 Classifying exports 
Our export data is extracted from the UN Comtrade database for 63 ex-
porting countries, which represent about 80 per cent of world trade. 
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Based on their 4 digit SITC export flows we categorize exports into ho-
mogeneous goods, reference priced goods and differentiated goods using 
the classification proposed by Rauch (1999)7. What resulted was a sub-
stantial loss of data. Some countries report more than 99 per cent of 
their total trade on the 4-digit level (e.g. New Zealand, Israel, China, Ja-
pan), but others report less than 75 per cent of their total trade at the 4-
digit level (Belarus, Russian Federation, Egypt)8. Furthermore, numerous 
4-digit codes are not included in the Rauch classification. The original 
Rauch classification was made based on 1990 trade data. In the 16 years 
between the creation of the Rauch classification and the year of our 
sample a variety of new products was introduced that lack Rauch classifi-
cation. In total 10% of our sample remains unclassified (with large cross 
country variation). The empirical literature does not offer any guidance 
how to resolve this issue, nor to what extent other authors faced this 
problem (see for example Gil-Pareja et al., 2015; Volpe and Carballo, 
2008; Volpe Martincus et al., 2010b). Rauch himself states at his website: 
“When my classification is not available at the 4-digit SITC level, the 
corresponding 3-digit SITC classification can be used” 9. 
We followed Rauch’s approach but ran into some 3 digit SITC cate-
gories that have a mix of different classifications on the 4 digit level. We 
therefore developed a system to solve the data problems. If a 4-digit 
SITC category has no Rauch classification, but the two directly adjacent 
4-digit categories (within the same 3-digit group) have an identical Rauch 
classification, the unclassified category takes on the same classification as 
its two adjacent neighbors. If the two adjacent categories have a different 
Rauch classification, the SITC category remains unclassified. For exam-
ple, the 4-digit category 4214 (groundnut/peanut oil) does not have a 
Rauch classification, but the adjacent categories 4213 (cotton seed oil) 
and 4215 olive oil are classified as homogeneous goods, we can assume 
that 4214 is also a homogeneous good. But if category 4213 and 4215 
would have had different classifications, we cannot make this assump-
tion. Furthermore, if the missing category has no directly adjacent cate-
gories, but all other 4-digit categories within the same 3-digit group have 
the same Rauch classification, the unclassified category also uses that 
Rauch classification. If the other 4-digit categories within the same 3-
digit group have different Rauch classifications, the unclassified category 
remains unclassified. Again an example: if category 5324 (tanning ex-
tracts of natural origin) has no classification, and there are no directly 
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adjacent categories, but all other 4-digit categories within the 532 group 
are differentiated goods, we assume 5324 is also a differentiated good. If 
the other categories within the 532 group have different classifications, 
we cannot make this assumption. This methodology reduces the value of 
unclassified trade to about 3 per cent. 
Of all 3906 possible pairs 200 zero trade flows are reported, of which 
124 concern Sudan. The rest of these “zero value” observations stem 
from different countries, but it should be noted that Algeria, Nigeria, 
Kuwait and Venezuela also have an above average concentration. For 
the Rauch categorized product categories the number of zero’s increase. 
Differentiated goods has 251 zero’s, reference priced goods 338 and 
homogeneous goods 528. 
5.4.2 Other data 
Distance, GDP per Capita, Population and Land Area of country i and j, the 
number of embassies and  consulates  of country i in j are retrieved from the 
Yakop and Bergeijk (2011) sample. Similarly, the dummy variables re-
flecting a common language (Common Language=1), having a common 
border (Common Border=1), the number of landlocked countries in the 
trading pair (Landlocked=0,..,2), the number of island states in the trading 
pair (Island= 0,..,2) , past and current colonial relations (Colonial rela-
tion=1), and membership of the same currency area of free trade zone 
(Currency Area=1, FTA=1) are from the Yakop and Bergeijk (2011) sam-
ple. The primary sources for the variables in the Yakop and Bergeijk 
(2011) sample are well-known and frequently used sources like the IMF 
World Economic Outlook database, the CEPII GeoDist database and 
the WTO website.   
 To this sample we added 4 digit SITC exports, as described before. 
Furthermore, we included a common religion dummy. This dummy 
takes a value of one if the dominant religion in the bilateral trading pair is 
the same. We retrieved the common religion data from the Sala-I-Martin 
(1997) database on common religion and colonial ties10. When religion 
data were missing we supplemented the sample using the CIA world fact 
book. Summary statistics of the data are provided in Table 5.1.  
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Table 5.1 
Summary statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Total exports (USD)* (10^9) 3706 2.49 1.95 10.9 0 297 
Exports homogeneous goods (USD)* (10^9) 3378 0.377 0.0163 1.94 0 58.8 
Exports reference priced goods (USD)* (10^9) 3598 0.478 0.0328 2.13 0 69.9 
Exports differentiated goods (USD)*(10^9) 3655 1.51 0.071 7.53 0 182 
Ln (Xij/Yi*Yj) 3706 -40.63 -40.42 2.13 -54.51 -33.96 
Ln (HOMij/Yi*Yj) 3378 -43.21 -43.04 2.75 -58.04 -58.04 
Ln (REFij/Yi*Yj) 3598 -42.44 -42.30 2.19 -56.41 -34.82 
Ln (DIFij/Yi*Yj) 3655 -41.70 -41.35 2.48 -54.51 -34.77 
Xij/Yi*Yj  (10^-14) 3706 1.16 0.279 5.46 0 178 
HOMij/Yi*Yj (10^-15) 3378 2.37 0.199 10.4 0 327 
REFij/Yi*Yj (10^-15) 3598 2.79 0.423 19.6 0 757 
DIFij/Yi*Yj (10^-15) 3655 5.55 1.09 25.6 0 798 
Income (USD) (10^11) 3906 7.31 2.11 17.8 0.094 132 
Distance (km) 3906 7353.8 7282.0 4738.5 173.0 19747.4 
Income p/c (USD) 3906 17240.1 6856.1 17738.71 316.3 72305.5 
Population (mln) 3906 87.0 30.4 212.8 3.1 1314.1 
Common Religion** (dummy) 3906 0.474 0 0.499 0 1 
Common language (dummy) 3906 0.098 0 0.298 0 1 
Common border (dummy) 3906 0.035 0 0.183 0 1 
Landlocked (dummy) 3906 0.079 0 0.270 0 1 
Island (dummy) 3906 0.127 0 0.333 0 1 
Land area (sq km) 3906 1565251 336593 3106020 646 17100000 
Colonial relation (dummy) 3906 0.026 0 0.158 0 1 
Currency union (dummy) 3906 0.029 0 0.167 0 1 
Trade agreement (dummy) 3906 0.398 0 0.490 0 1 
Embassy 3906 0.794 1 0.404 0 1 
Consulate 3906 0.492 0 1.476 0 45 
Source: variables denoted with a * are retrieved from the UN Comtrade database using the 
WITS system on the 14th of January 2014.  ** Sala-I-Martin (1997) sample retrieved 28th of Jan-
uary 2016.  The other variable come from the Yakop and Bergeijk (2011) sample provided by 
the authors January 5th 2014.  
5.5 Empirical results: economic diplomacy, the diplomatic 
network and product groups 
5.5.1 Effect heterogeneity due to different representations 
Table 5.2 presents the results of our first regression analysis. Empirical 
model (1) reports the coefficients adopted from Yakop and Bergeijk 
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(2011). Model (2), replicates the analysis of Yakop and Bergeijk (2011) 
using our different source of the trade data11. Minimal differences are 
found and we therefore conclude that the signs and significance of the 
coefficients are comparable.  
In model (3) we differentiate for the possibly different effect of em-
bassies and consulates, as presented in equation (5.2) of this chapter. We 
replace the Number of foreign missions variable from model (2) with two var-
iables: Embassies and Consulates. This modification does not significantly 
affect the control variables, with exception of the currency union dummy. 
The coefficient of Embassies does differ significantly from the coefficient 
found for Consulates12,13. This is in line with the empirical literature where 
generally embassies have a much more pronounced effect on exports as 
compared to consulates (e.g. Bergeijk et al., 2011a; Rose, 2007).  
Model (4) presents our preferred empirical specification. It presents 
the Anderson and Wincoop (2003) theoretically founded gravity model. 
Following the empirical literature we use importer and exporter fixed 
effects to correct for bilateral and multilateral trade resistance. Model (4) 
shows that the pattern found in the seminal work of Rose (2007) still 
holds: i.e. diplomatic representations contribute significantly to trade. 
Rose (2007) reports that establishing an embassy is associated with an 
increase of exports between 118 per cent and 180 per cent while the ef-
fect of consulates on exports lies between 5 per cent and 11 per cent. 
Our estimates are somewhat similar, with an increase in exports of be-
tween 92 per cent (exp(0.65)-1) and 161 per cent (exp(0.96)-1) associated 
with opening an embassy and an increase of between 3 per cent 
(exp(0,03)-1) and 8 per cent (exp(0,08)-1) associated with opening a con-
sulate. 
Because equation (5.4) uses fixed effects and our sample only has 
cross sectional data, we can only identify bilateral variables in this regres-
sion which comes with the cost that country or region specific variables 
drop out of the equation (Head and Mayer, 2013). In Appendix D we 
present an alternative approach to incorporate multilateral trade costs 
that allows to also report country specific variables.  
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Table 5.2 
The effect of economic diplomacy on exports  
 Yakop & 
Bergeijk 
(2011) 
Base 
model 
Separate E 
& CG 
A&vW estimation 
Including country 
fixed effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log distance 
  -0.74*** 
(0.04) 
  -0.76*** 
(0.04) 
  -0.68*** 
(0.04) 
  -1.14*** 
(0.05) 
Log GDP p.c. of exporter 
 1.23*** 
(0.02) 
 1.28*** 
(0.03) 
 1.21*** 
(0.03) 
 
Log GDP p.c. of importer 
  0.99*** 
(0.02) 
  0.97*** 
(0.03) 
  0.91*** 
(0.03) 
 
Log population exporter 
  1.28*** 
(0.03) 
1.29*** 
(0.03) 
1.22*** 
(0.03) 
 
Log population importer 
 1.12*** 
(0.03) 
 1.12*** 
(0.03) 
 1.05*** 
(0.03) 
 
Common language 
 0.71*** 
(0.10) 
 0.79*** 
(0.11) 
 0.71*** 
(0.11) 
 0.71*** 
(0.10) 
Common border 
 0.90*** 
(0.17) 
 0.86*** 
(0.19) 
 1.04*** 
(0.18) 
0.28* 
(0.14) 
Landlocked 
 -0.23*** 
(0.08) 
 -0.26*** 
(0.08) 
 -0.29*** 
(0.08) 
 -24.59 
(73.39) 
Island 
-0.07 
(0.06) 
-0.06 
(0.07) 
-0.01 
(0.07) 
-28.25 
(87.38) 
Land area 
 -0.20*** 
(0.02) 
 -0.17*** 
(0.02) 
 -0.18*** 
(0.02) 
-7.11 
(21.64) 
Colonial relation 
0.04 
(0.18) 
-0.06 
(0.20) 
-0.04 
(0.20) 
0.33*** 
(0.12) 
Currency union 
-0.34* 
(0.18) 
-0.38** 
(0.19) 
-0.27 
(0.19) 
-0.58*** 
(0.12) 
Free trade agreement 
  0.37*** 
(0.06) 
  0.39*** 
(0.07) 
  0.32*** 
(0.07) 
  0.18** 
(0.08) 
Number of foreign missions 
  0.09*** 
(0.02) 
  0.11*** 
(0.02) 
  
Embassies 
    0.96*** 
(0.09) 
  0.65*** 
(0.10) 
Consulates 
    0.08*** 
(0.02) 
 0.03* 
(0.02) 
Constant 
-0.86 
(0.607) 
-0.61*** 
(0.65) 
  -5.50*** 
(0.64) 
180.48 
(641.85) 
Fixed effects NO NO NO YES 
N 3730 3706 3706 3706 
R2 0.68 0.66 0.66 0.57 
Adjusted R2 0.67 0.66 0.66 0.56 
Note: Standard errors reported in parentheses, *,**,*** implies significant at the 90%, 95% and 
99% levels respectively. Dependent variable equation (1)-(3) is log exportsij. Dependent 
variable of equation (4) is ln(Xij/Yi*Yj). Eq. (4) uses importer and exporter fixed effects and 
clustered standard errors. 
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5.5.2 Economic diplomacy and trade in product groups 
We now test our hypothesis that more complex product groups stand to 
benefit more from economic diplomatic intervention compared to easily 
tradable product groups. We investigate the effects of Embassies and Con-
sulates on total trade flows and the trade in homogeneous, reference 
priced and differentiated product groups. We use our preferred econo-
metric specification that corrects for both bilateral and multilateral re-
sistance. Results are presented in Table 5.3. 
Table 5.3 
The effect of economic diplomacy on exports of different types of goods 
 Homogenous 
goods 
Reference priced 
goods 
Differentiated 
goods 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Log Distance   -1.43*** 
(0.07) 
 -1.34*** 
(0.05) 
 -1.17*** 
(0.05) 
Common language   0.42*** 
(0.14) 
  0.56*** 
(0.10) 
  0.88*** 
(0.10) 
Common border 0.10 
(0.18) 
0.33** 
(0.14) 
0.24 
(0.16) 
Landlocked 89.19 
(78.04) 
3.79 
(59.57) 
-77.94 
(48.12) 
Island 149.46 
(129.21) 
-3.41 
(24.93) 
-126.12 
(79.62) 
Land Area 36.74 
(31.99) 
2.74 
(24.39) 
-30.63 
(19.71) 
Colonial relation   0.61*** 
(0.18) 
  0.37*** 
(0.12) 
0.26* 
(0.14) 
Currency union 0.08 
(0.17) 
 -0.42*** 
(0.13) 
 -0.60*** 
(0.12) 
Free trade agreement   0.49*** 
(0.11) 
  0.18** 
(0.08) 
  0.11 
(0.07) 
Embassy   0.32** 
(0.15) 
  0.86*** 
(0.11) 
  0.75*** 
(0.09) 
Consulate   0.06*** 
(0.02) 
  0.04** 
(0.01) 
  0.06*** 
(0.02) 
Fixed effects YES YES YES 
N 3378 3568 3655 
R2 0.49 0.57 0.75 
Adjusted R2 0.47 0.55 0.74 
Standard errors in parentheses, *, **, *** implies significant at the 90%, 95% and 99% levels 
respectively. Importer and exporter fixed effects included. Clustered standard errors 
used. Constant included but not reported. Dependent: ln(HOMij/Yi*Yj), ln(REFij/Yi*Yj), 
ln(DIFFij/Yi*Yj) respectively. 
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We observe that the volume of trade in homogeneous, reference 
priced and differentiated goods is influenced by similar factors. The sign 
of the coefficients is similar across specifications except for our Land-
locked, Land Area, Island and Currency Union variables. The coefficients for 
Landlocked, Land Area and Island are, however, never significant. The neg-
ative significant coefficients for our Currency Union variable is a spurious 
finding caused by the dominance of one major currency zone in the 
sample (the EMU currency zone). The negative sign reflects being in or 
out of this zone of high income countries (that dominantly trade in ref-
erence priced and differentiated products) (Yakop and Bergeijk, 2011)14.    
The empirical results by and large confirm our expectations. We find 
Embassy coefficients of 0.32 for homogeneous goods, 0.75 for differenti-
ated goods and 0,86 for reference priced goods. This corresponds with a 
38 per cent, 112 per cent and 136 per cent increase in exports of the 
grouped goods respectively.  However, a Wald test shows that not all 
Embassy coefficients differ significantly. The coefficients for the group of 
homogenous goods is always statically different from the coefficient of 
the other product groups. The coefficients for the group of reference 
priced and differentiated goods are different from the group of homoge-
neous goods but not meaningfully different from one another (Chi 
square=0.92, p=0.33)15. Consulates have an effect on exports of between 4 
per cent and 6 per cent depending of the group of traded goods. The 
observed difference between reference priced and differentiated goods is 
statistically meaningful (Chi square=3.34, p=0.07)16. Overall, this con-
firms our hypothesis that the effect of economic diplomacy is more sub-
stantial when trade concerns more complex goods17. 
We also note that between homogeneous goods and reference priced 
goods there is substantial difference in coefficients both concerning our 
main variables of interest (economic diplomacy variables) and other con-
trol variables in our model18. This to us is clear indication that homoge-
neous and reference priced goods should not be treated and discussed as 
similar like in the studies of Lankhuizen et al. (2015) and Harding and 
Javorick (2012b) because heterogeneity between the group of heteroge-
neous and reference priced goods gets lost. 
Furthermore, in line with the literature we observe that of the two 
economic diplomacy variables, embassies have a more substantial effect on 
trade than consulates. This shows (again) that in the higher ranked diplo-
matic representations have more impact on trade (Bergeijk et al., 2011; 
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Rose, 2007). Rauch’s classification, which according to Guiso et al. 
(2009) can also be interpreted as a classification of the degree of trust-
intensiveness of the different goods, thus also indicate that economic 
diplomats increase trust in bilateral exchange. 
5.5.3 Market entry, economic diplomacy and product groups 
We test the effect of economic diplomacy on the likelihood that coun-
tries form a bilateral trade relation. This is presented by the first stage of 
our Heckman regressions. Predicted components of the first stage selec-
tion equation are then used in the second regression equation stage to 
estimate the gravity equation. Common religion is used as an exclusion 
variable19. The second stage presents (sample) bias corrected coefficients 
(see Table 5.4 below). We disregard the Currency Union variable in these 
regressions. The EMU currency zone is the major zone in the sample 
and all EMU member trade between one another. The currency union 
variable was thus dropped from our regressions because of perfect col-
linearity in the selection stage.  
We observe that the formation of trade relations is partially influ-
enced by similar factors as the trade volume. This is in line with the em-
pirical literature (e.g. Helpman et al., 2008). Distance reduces the likeli-
hood that countries trade and reduces trade volume. Speaking a similar 
language and being part of the same free trade area (FTA=1) increases the 
likelihood that country i exports to country j and increases the trade vol-
ume. Statistically less robust but also generally converging in the direc-
tion of its effect is our common border dummy. We observe that being ad-
jacent has a positive effect on both the group of reference priced and 
differentiated goods, but only significant for the group of differentiated 
goods.  
There are, however, also various regressors where our selection equa-
tion and regression equation divert. This is the case for our landlocked, 
island states and colony dummy and the land area variable. These variables 
indicate that land locked countries, island states and countries that have 
or had a colonial relation are less likely to trade between one another. 
This is probably caused by the higher risks associated with several of the 
Sub Saharan countries in our sample where countries are less inclined to 
build a trading relation with. The selection equation is likely to be quite 
heavily influenced by countries with many zero flows, in this case Sudan 
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and Algeria. This may explain the negative coefficients for the colony 
dummy and land area variable since Sudan (landlocked, Former Egyptian 
and English colony) and Algeria (former French colony) are the 9th and 
10th largest countries in the world20.  
Table 5.4 
The effect of economic diplomacy on market entry and bilateral exports in dif-
ferent types of goods21 
 Homogene-
ous goods 
selection 
(1a) 
Homogene-
ous goods 
regression 
(1b) 
Reference 
priced goods 
Selection    
(2a) 
Reference 
priced goods 
regression 
(2b) 
Differentiat-
ed goods 
selection    
(3a) 
Differenti-
ated goods 
regression 
(3b) 
Log Distance -0.68*** 
(0.12) 
-1.44*** 
(0.07) 
-0.51*** 
(0.17) 
-1.33*** 
(0.05) 
-0.62*** 
(0.19) 
-1.15*** 
(0.05) 
Language 0.47** 
(0.20) 
0.42*** 
(0.14) 
0.74*** 
(0.27) 
0.56*** 
(0.10) 
0.37 
(0.34) 
0.87*** 
(0.09) 
Common border -0.08 
(0.41) 
0.11 
(0.18) 
4.43*** 
(0.64) 
0.31** 
(0.14) 
 0.22 
(0.16) 
Landlocked -17.55*** 
(2.26) 
88.08 
(76.39) 
-24.10*** 
(5.51) 
11.78 
(58.31) 
-22.06*** 
(2.73) 
-66.35 
(47.28) 
Island -13.35*** 
(2.06) 
82.10 
(69.58) 
-19.88*** 
(5.01) 
11.89 
(53.09) 
-17.35*** 
(2.46) 
-60.84 
(43.04) 
Land Area -6.64*** 
(0.92) 
36.29 
(31.31) 
-8.85*** 
(2.24) 
4.91 
(23.89) 
-8.48*** 
(1.08) 
-27.37 
(19.37) 
Colony -1.48*** 
(0.52) 
0.60*** 
(0.18) 
-7.30*** 
(0.95) 
0.40*** 
(0.12) 
 0.31** 
(0.14) 
Free trade agreement 0.35*** 
(0.14) 
0.49*** 
(0.11) 
0.27 
(0.19) 
0.15** 
(0.08) 
-0.20 
(0.27) 
0.07 
(0.07) 
Embassy 0.48*** 
(0.13) 
0.32** 
(0.14) 
0.73*** 
(0.16) 
0.87*** 
(0.11) 
0.95*** 
(0.23) 
0.76*** 
(0.09) 
Consulate 0.37 
(0.22) 
0.06*** 
(0.02) 
0.24 
(0.39) 
0.03** 
(0.01) 
-0.32 
(0.38) 
0.06*** 
(0.02) 
Common Religion 0.22** 
(0.11) 
 0.19 
(0.14) 
 -0.08 
(0.19)  
Fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 3906 3906 3906 
“Censored” 528 338 251 
rho 0.01 
0.02 
1.97 
0.02 
0.02 
1.44 
-0.06 
-0.08 
1.26 
lambda 
sigma 
Standard errors in parentheses, *,**,*** implies significant at the 90%, 95% and 99% levels 
respectively. Importer and exporter fixed effects included. Clustered standard errors used. 
Constant included but not reported. All regressions are estimated using Heckman maximum 
likelihood. The selection equation for differentiated goods did not fully converge we therefor 
also estimated the same equation using the Heckman (1979) two step procedure. Coefficients 
were of similar size and direction as the reported maximum likelihood estimates. 
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The volume of trade is higher if countries have a (or had) a colonial 
relation which is in line with common economic reasoning. Our Heck-
man regressions also show that embassies are important for market access 
and the volume of trade. This is observed for all groups of traded goods, 
however embassies increase the probability that country i exports to coun-
try j more for the more complex differentiated goods and goods that do 
not have an organized exchange. Holding the other variables of our 
model at fixed value country i is 62 per cent (exp (0.48)) more likely to 
export homogeneous goods, 108 per cent (exp (0.73)) more likely to ex-
port reference priced goods and 158 per cent (exp (0.95)) more likely to 
export differentiated goods to country j if country i has an embassy in 
country j22. This is pattern is as expected because especially differentiated 
goods are trust-intensiveness and economic diplomats try increase trust 
in bilateral exchange/minimize uncertainty.   
Consulates do not contribute significantly to the formation of trade re-
lations for the countries in our sample. This may be due to the fact that 
consulates are mainly present in the more developed markets, and the 
role to reduce trade uncertainty is less obvious for these markets. Consu-
lates do contribute to the volume of trade once trading relations are es-
tablished.  
A final remark is that the selection equation for differentiated goods 
did not fully converge our colony and common border dummies23. We used 
maximum likelihood estimations because these generally perform better 
than the simple Heckman (1979) two-step estimator (Mohlman et al., 
2010; Nawata, 1994 and 2004). The maximum likelihood estimator is, 
however, known to be computationally demanding. We therefore also 
estimated the two-step estimator for estimating the group of differentiat-
ed goods24. This estimation procedure is easier to compute and is fre-
quently used in (economic) literature (Cheung et al., 2012; Nawata, 1994; 
2004). The economic diplomacy coefficients were of similar size and sig-
nificance as the coefficients of our (not fully converged) selection stage 
estimation reported as empirical specification 3a in Table 5.425.  
5.5.4 Econometric challenges 
The literature on economic diplomacy has dealt with endogeneity and 
causality issues in several ways. Most papers use instrumental variables, 
elaborate fixed effects approaches or both to get consistent estimates 
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(e.g. Harding and Javorick, 2012b; Nitsch, 2007; Rose, 2007; Veenstra et 
al., 2011; Yakop and Bergeijk; 2011). We also apply these methods, but it 
should be noted that trade broken down by goods category is less vul-
nerable for inconsistent estimates because reversed causality is less of an 
issue. 
Our main data concerns categories of traded goods instead of total 
trade flows at country level. Countries may decide to open diplomatic 
offices because of a high level of aggregate exports. It is however unclear 
that they will do so for the exports of a particular group of traded goods. 
Furthermore, the total trade sample and homogeneous, reference priced 
and differentiated goods samples move in similar directions between 44 
per cent and 96 per cent of the time (Table 5.5 below). There is no statis-
tical logic to assume that, if reversed causality is an issue in one sample, it 
would also apply to another sample that shows limited correlation (i.e. 
does not move in similar direction). This, at a minimum, reduces the risk 
reversed causality across the presented results in this chapter, especially 
for the group of homogeneous goods that shows the lowest correlation 
with the other samples in this paper.   
Table 5.5 
Correlation between total trade and categories of traded goods 
 Differentiated 
goods 
Homogeneous 
goods 
Reference 
priced goods 
Total 
trade 
Differentiated goods 1    
Homogeneous goods 0.44 1   
Reference priced goods 0.83 0.56 1  
Total trade 0.96 0.62 0.91 1 
 
In addition to the qualitative approach to determine causality de-
scribed above we test the causal relation of our specifications using an 
instrumental variables (IV) approach. We use a set of IVs (Table 5.6) 
which correlate with the number of foreign representations and yet are 
uncorrelated with the error term of bilateral trade flows between coun-
tries26. We use two groups of variables that relate to the geopolitical 
weight of countries and the attractiveness of living/visiting a country 
because they give other motives for opening up a diplomatic establish-
ment (Rose, 2007; Yakop and Bergeijk, 2011). Conforming to the litera-
ture we use both a simple and more extended set of instrumental varia-
bles. The simple set is retrieved from the Yakop and Bergeijk (2011) 
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sample. We also opted for broader variables that indicate the attractive-
ness, prestige and importance of the country.  
Table 5.6 
Instrumental variables 
 DESCRIPTION  SOURCE 
SIMPLE SET  Proven oil and gas reserves Yakop  and Bergeijk (2011) 
 Number of lonely planet guides sold Yakop  and Bergeijk (2011) 
Monsoonal climate Yakop and Bergeijk (2011) 
EXTENDED SET27  
the average temperature WB Climate Change Data 
 the average precipitation WB Climate Change Data 
the UN happiness index UN SDSN World Happiness Report 2013 
military expenditure in USD28 WB World Development Indicators 
migration flows WB Global Bilateral Migration Database
Number of lonely planet guides sold Yakop  and Bergeijk (2011) 
Monsoonal climate Yakop and Bergeijk (2011) 
Note: World Bank and UN databases are accessed on 31 March 2016.  
 
We first duplicate the approach of the leading publication on the ef-
fect of the diplomatic network and use the total number of representa-
tions variable in the 2SLS analysis(e.g. Rose, 2007 and Yakop and Ber-
geijk, 2011). The F-statistic of the first stage of this 2SLS regression is 
sufficiently strong (F-STAT=204,5 for the simple set and 301,3 for the 
extended set). Results for total trade are comparable to earlier reported 
results (Rose, 2007; Yakop and Bergeijk, 2011). Furthermore, the earlier 
established pattern where more complex product groups report higher 
economic diplomacy coefficients is also still observable.  
To check the causality of our embassy and consulates coefficients sepa-
rately we adapt our approach. The nature of the embassy variable is like a 
dummy; either you have an embassy or you don’t (binary). Following 
Wooldridge (2002) we transform the dichotomous endogenous variable 
(i.e. our embassy variable) into a continuous variable using probit esti-
mates obtained via an additional regression ran before our first stage es-
timations. These estimates serve as instruments in an ordinary 2SLS set-
ting. The consulates variable is continuous and the first stage regression is 
the standard OLS regression used in a 2SLS regression that includes in-
strumental variables. In the second stage the fitted values for embassies 
and consulates are combined into a single OLS regression (details and em-
pirical specifications are provided in Appendix E)29. Table 5.7 below pre-
sents the results. The instrumental variables approach confirms the earli-
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er established pattern. Economic diplomacy has a more enhancing effect 
on trade when trade concerns more complex products, especially when 
economic diplomacy involves the establishment of an embassy. 
Table 5.7 
Instrumental variables 
Total # of representa-
tions 
Base regression 
(1) 
2SLS (simple) 
(2) 
2SLS (extended) 
(3) 
Total trade   0.05*** 
(0.02) 
  0.26*** 
(0.09) 
  0.08** 
(0.04) 
Homogeneous goods   0.07*** 
(0.02) 
0.23* 
(0.12) 
0.02 
(0.06) 
Reference priced goods   0.07*** 
(0.02) 
  0.23*** 
(0.09) 
0.07* 
(0.04) 
Differentiated goods   0.09*** 
(0.02) 
  0.28*** 
(0.09) 
  0.15*** 
(0.05) 
Standard errors in parentheses, *,**,*** implies significant at the 90%, 95% and 99% levels re-
spectively. Importer and exporter fixed effects included. Clustered standard errors used. 
Dependent: ln(Xij/Yi*Yj) ln(HOMij/Yi*Yj), ln(REFij/Yi*Yj), ln(DIFFij/Yi*Yj) respectively. Other 
gravity variables included but not reported. 
 
Embassy Base regression 
(1) 
PROBIT IV  (simple) 
(2) 
PROBIT IV (extended) 
(3) 
Total trade 0.65*** 
(0.10) 
1.78*** 
(0.35) 
0.98*** 
(0.25) 
Homogeneous goods 0.32** 
(0.15) 
-0.44 
(0.52) 
-0.99** 
(0.39) 
Reference priced goods 0.86*** 
(0.11) 
2.08*** 
(0.38) 
1.18*** 
(0.27) 
Differentiated goods 0.75*** 
(0.09) 
1.98*** 
(0.40) 
1.30*** 
(0.29) 
Standard errors in parentheses, *,**,*** implies significant at the 90%, 95% and 99% levels re-
spectively. Importer and exporter fixed effects included. Clustered standard errors used. 
Dependent: ln(Xij/Yi*Yj),. ln(HOMij/Yi*Yj), ln(REFij/Yi*Yj), ln(DIFFij/Yi*Yj) respectively. Other 
gravity variables included but not reported. 
 
Consulate Base regression 
(1) 
2SLS IV (simple) 
(4) 
2SLS IV (extended) 
(5) 
Total trade 0.03* 
(0.02) 
0.38*** 
(0.10) 
0.07* 
(0.04) 
Homogeneous goods  0.06*** 
(0.02) 
0.23* 
(0.14) 
-0.01 
(0.06) 
Reference priced goods 0.04** 
(0.01) 
0.37*** 
(0.10) 
0.07 
(0.04) 
Differentiated goods 0.06*** 
(0.02) 
0.40*** 
(0.11) 
0.13*** 
(0.05) 
Standard errors in parentheses, *,**,*** implies significant at the 90%, 95% and 99% levels re-
spectively. Importer and exporter fixed effects included. Clustered standard errors used. 
Dependent: ln(Xij/Yi*Yj) ln(HOMij/Yi*Yj), ln(REFij/Yi*Yj), ln(DIFFij/Yi*Yj) respectively. Other 
gravity variables included but not reported. 
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The base regression is similar to the earlier presented estimates in Ta-
ble (5.3). These are the Anderson and Wincoop (2003) estimates for total 
trade and trade in the Rauch classified product groups. The IV results are 
even closer to our a priori expectation that the effect of economic di-
plomacy on trade is more substantial when product complexity increases.  
Earlier (Table 5.3) our consulates coefficients indicated rather similar per-
centage increases in the three Rauch classified groups of exported goods 
when a consulate was opened. The IV estimates associate consulates 
with a between ~0 per cent and 25 per cent increase in trade for homo-
geneous goods, 7 per cent and 45 per cent for reference priced goods 
and 14 per cent and 49 per cent for differentiated goods. These estimates 
are not always significant and post estimation test show that IV estimates 
with the simple set of instrumental variables for reference priced and 
differentiated goods are not significantly different from one another. 
However, taken as a whole they follow the pattern that the effect of eco-
nomic diplomacy is most noticeable on differentiated goods, followed by 
reference priced goods and with a lesser effect on homogeneous goods. 
5.6 Conclusions 
This chapter investigated the effect of the diplomatic network taking into 
account product characteristics. The presented results follow up on 
Chapter 4 of this thesis by testing and confirming that economic diplo-
macy is important for both the likelihood that countries establish a trade 
relation (country extensive margin of trade) and the traded volume.  
The hypotheses that economic diplomacy has a role to play when in-
formation asymmetries (that relate to the complexity of the traded prod-
uct) are large was tested. The hypothesis is confirmed for both the estab-
lishment of trade relations and the volume of traded goods. Trade in 
homogeneous goods is on the whole less influenced by the diplomatic 
network as compared to the trade in reference priced and differentiated 
goods. This suggests that economic diplomacy is an important instru-
ment to deal with information asymmetries and trust issues in interna-
tional exchange.  
Our findings show clear differences between diplomatic representa-
tions. Embassies contribute clearly to the likelihood that countries form 
a trade relation. Equally, embassies contribute significantly to bilateral 
trade in our sample and the largest effects on grouped product trade 
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flows are found for trade in more complex goods. Consulates on the 
other hand do not have a statistically meaningful effect on the formation 
of bilateral trade relations and have only modest trade stimulating effects 
in the main specifications of this chapter. 
This chapter discussed the causality of economic diplomacy in a 
quantitative and qualitative manner, as well as established that the effect 
indeed runs from economic diplomacy to trade. The findings show that 
an analysis of product group trade flows is additional to the use of the 
(often unsatisfactory) instrumental variables regressions. The approach 
involves investigating the correlation between micro and/or meso level 
and macro level trade data and presenting key figures about the composi-
tion of trade between countries. This approach will not take away con-
cerns about causality completely but does provide an understanding 
whether or not causality is an issue in the specific study and the extent to 
which the causality question may vary between countries within the same 
study. Furthermore, the presented analysis is applicable for cross sec-
tional data which is frequently the case. 
Finally, literature indicates that economic diplomacy is especially ef-
fective for increasing the extensive margin of trade for (developing) 
countries (Moons, 2012; Gil-Paraja et al., 2015; Volpe Martincus and 
Carballo, 2012). These studies concentrate on the number of trades 
products and the number of firm active in international trade. This chap-
ter additionally shows that economic diplomacy also increases the for-
mation of trade relations on a country level (country intensive margin). For 
future research that is of high value and also for policy making and eval-
uation. As mentioned in Chapter 4, it would be very useful to meta-
analyze the effect of economic diplomacy on the various different trade 
margins. This would help in selecting the bilateral diplomatic interven-
tion that suites the trade promotion goal policymakers strive to achieve 
(more volume or diversification of exports). 
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Notes 
 
1 Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the ETSG 2014 in Munich, 
Pharmmaccess 2015 seminar series in Amsterdam and at a 2016 EDEM seminar. 
I thank the participants for their suggestions and remarks.  
2 These studies do allow for country specific fixed effects. 
3 These papers are, in order of the reference, specific to Latin-America, Costa 
Rica and Spain.  
4 The mere fact that economic diplomacy has a clear cut economic rationale does 
not provide insight into the cost of intervention. 
5 The usual assumption is that the standard errors are independently and identi-
cally distributed. We use the, more realistic, assumption that errors are clustered 
i.e. that observations within group i are correlated in some unknown way, but 
that groups i and j do not have correlated errors. In the presence of clustered er-
rors, OLS estimates are still unbiased but standard errors are biased. 
6Heckman (1979) introduces the Heckman selection procedure to correct for 
selection bias. In the selections stage variables are included that explain the selec-
tion into bilateral exports (zero or positive exports) but not the value of these 
exports. Common religion is frequently used as one of these variables that is in-
cluded in the selection stage. However, these ‘identification’ variables are fre-
quently criticized (Möhlman et al., 2010). Based on the first stage the inverse of 
the Mills ratio is constructed and then included in the second stage to correct for 
sample selection effects. 
7 Rauch made both a conservative and a liberal classification, with the former 
more biased towards differentiated goods than the latter. We divided the 4-digit 
SITC trade flows into the three Rauch categories using both the liberal and con-
servative Rauch classification. For the regressions presented in the remainder of 
this paper we used a sample with the liberal classification only. Using the con-
servative classification leads to negligible changes in the results and are available 
upon request. 
8 A possible explanation is that the original Rauch classification predates our da-
taset by a few years, and new products have been introduced since. Also, dividing 
trade into smaller groups of traded products leads to some confidentiality issues 
for smaller trade flows. 
9 http://econweb.ucsd.edu/~jrauch/rauch_classification.html date accessed 3rd 
March 2017 
10 Sample is downloaded January 28th 2017: 
http://www.columbia.edu/~xs23/data.htm  
11 Yakop and Bergeijk (2011) use IMF trade data, we use UN Comtrade data. 
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12 Two things should be noted relating to our embassy variable. The first is that 
some embassies have a regional hub function that service multiple countries. We 
do not have this information in our sample so the reported coefficient may be 
inflated due to this effect. Second, embassies have export promotion agencies in 
house. To address this more specifically a sample containing diplomatic activities 
should be used. 
13 The Wald-test was used to test and confirm that Embassies and Consulates are 
significantly different from zero (F-STAT=21.77) and to test and confirm that 
the Embassies coefficient is significantly different from the Consulates coefficient 
(F-STAT=39.74).  
14 83 per cent of the trade between high income countries in our sample consists 
of reference priced and differentiated products 
15 Both the coefficient of reference priced and differentiated goods are signifi-
cantly different from homogeneous goods at the 5% level or better. 
16 The hypothesis that the consulates coefficient for homogenous goods is the same 
as for the group of reference priced and differentiated goods cannot be rejected 
(p=0.19 and p=0.93 respectively). 
17 Based on the theory, we would expect the coefficients of differentiated 
goods>reference priced goods>homogenous goods. This is not fully observed 
but it is clear that coefficients for reference priced and differentiated goods> 
homogeneous goods. 
18 The hypothesis that the embassy coefficient for homogeneous goods was simi-
lar to the coefficient for reference priced goods was rejected (Chi-square=10.31, 
p=0.001). 
19 The number of satisfying exclusion variables, i.e. variables that strongly impact 
the formation of trading relations yet are not associated with an impact on the 
traded volume, is very limited. Some even argue that exclusion variables are not 
needed (e.g. Linders and Groot, 2006). We tested the first stage both with and 
without common religion as exclusion variable. The differences are negligible. Con-
form with the literature we present the selection regressions with common religion. 
20 The sample is based on 2006 when Soudan was not divided yet. Since the divi-
sion of North and South Soudan in 2011 Algeria is larger than Sudan. 
21 We also estimated the Heckman equations for our total trade variable. The 
Heckman model for our total trade variable reported many non-intuitive results 
and did not compute many of the country specific dummies. The difficulties are 
to our opinion a result of the very limited number of zero’s (200) compared to 
the high number of coefficients that need to be estimated (63 imported and ex-
porter dummies plus the variables of our estimated equation) 
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22 A Wald-test shows that coefficients between the groups of traded goods are 
significantly different from each other (p=0.000) 
23 We used STATA 13 and allowed for 1500 iterations.  
24 Estimations available up on request 
25 The embassy coefficient in the selection stage was 0.98*** and 0.73*** in the 
regression stage. The consulate coefficient in the selection stage was -0.35 and 
0.06*** in the regression stage. 
26 This is notoriously difficult to find and some authors argue it is better to use 
dyadic fixed effects (Head and Mayer, 2013). However, since our dataset contains 
only 1 year, dyadic fixed effects are not viable. 
27 Oil and gas are excluded from the extended set, because they may intuitively 
not be the strongest instrument; they also influence trade directly (not only 
through the presence of an embassy). 
28 Military expenditure is included to conform to the seminal work of Rose (2007) 
who included military expenditure in his instrumental variables approach. 
29 We also tested a normal 2SLS on the sample where embassies and consulates 
are separately included in the analysis. Especially the first stage of the (dummy) 
embassy variable seems to be problematic, as was to be expected. Coefficients in 
the second stage were extreme and non-credible. Results are available at the au-
thors upon request. 
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6 Do economic diplomats stimulate Foreign Direct Investment?1 
 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction  
Policymakers around the world are engaged in fierce competition for 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) (Barthel et al., 2010; Ma, 2013). One of 
the instruments used in this competition is economic diplomacy. Eco-
nomic diplomacy pursued by governments and non-state actors aims to 
influence decisions about cross-border economic activities (Bayne and 
Woolcock, 2007; Bergeijk, 2009; Okano-Heijmans, 2011). It involves the 
activities of economic diplomats and the use of economic diplomatic 
networks.  
The role of economic diplomacy is increasingly researched in interna-
tional economics2. The research agenda has so far focused on the rela-
tion between the diplomatic network and bilateral trade (Afman and 
Maurel, 2010; Bergeijk et al., 2011, Creusen and Lejour, 2013; Hayakawa 
et al., 2014a; Rose, 2007; Segura-Cayuela and Villarubia, 2008; Veenstra 
et al., 2011; Yakop and Bergeijk, 2011) and the activities organized within 
that network (Creusen and Lejour, 2013; Head and Ries, 2006; Nitsch, 
2007). Next to this, the effect of export promotion offices was analyzed 
(Gil Pareja et al., 2015; Lederman et al., 2010; Volpe Martincus and Car-
ballo, 2008; Volpe Martincus et al., 2010a). 
The latest strand of the literature about economic diplomacy deals 
with the effect of economic diplomacy on the margins of trade (Chapter 
4 of this thesis; Moons, 2012; Gil Pareja et al., 2015). Specifically, the 
literature addresses the question if economic diplomacy is more effective 
in enhancing the traded volume of already internationally traded prod-
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ucts with existing trade partners, i.e. increase the intensive margin. Or 
that economic diplomacy is more effective in creating new trading rela-
tionships by increasing the number of newly traded products or due to 
the entry of new markets, i.e. increase the extensive margin of trade 
(Chapter 5 of this thesis; Gil Pareja et al., 2015; Moons and Boer, 2017; 
Volpe Martincus et al., 2010a and 2010b; Volpe Martincus and Carballo, 
2010). 
Although the understanding of the effect of economic diplomacy on 
bilateral trade flows is getting refined with every publication, few anal-
yses exist on the relationship between economic diplomacy and FDI 
(Chapter 3 of this thesis; Moons and Bergeijk, 2016). Nigh (1985) looked 
into the effect of diplomatic cooperation between countries and con-
cluded that cooperation has a positive effect on FDI flows. Biglaiser and 
DeRouwen Jr (2007) present similar, but country specific, findings for 
the US. The effect of the diplomatic network on US investors is also in-
vestigated by Du et al. (2008); according to them, US firms are more like-
ly to make an investment in a foreign market when the US has a diplo-
matic representation in that market. US investors are also more likely to 
invest in developing countries when these countries target US invest-
ments via their investment promotion agency (Harding and Javorcik, 
2011). Morriset (2003) shows that investment promotion agencies also 
generally contribute to incoming FDI. This has been put into context in 
more recent studies that show that sector targeting by investment pro-
motion agencies is associated with a substantial increase in FDI inflows 
in the targeted sector (Harding and Javorcik, 2011; and 2012b). Further-
more, the effectiveness of the investment promotion agency is largely 
determined by the type of activities the agency engages in, with policy 
advocacy being most effective. In line with these findings Harding and 
Jovorcik (2012a) establish a positive relation between investment promo-
tion activities and FDI, especially for those investment promotion agen-
cies that provide high quality (digital) information. Case studies show 
that effective investment promotion should combine marketing with 
company targeting and investment after-care as well as that the effec-
tiveness depends on the age of the investment promotion agency (Loe-
wendahl, 2001; Lim, 2008).   
The amount of empirical evidence on the effect on the diplomatic 
network, i.e. embassies and consulates, on FDI thus is still rather limited. 
It can be expected that generally there is a positive causal relation that 
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shows heterogeneous effects of economic diplomacy depending on the 
cultural proximity of the FDI originator and recipient (Cezar and Esco-
bar, 2015; Guiso et al., 2009). There is however no specific literature that 
invests this relation. This gap in the literature is remarkable, as many 
countries use their diplomatic network to facilitate FDI. The mission 
statement of various Foreign Affairs ministries have a global trade and 
investment component (Rose, 2007). Also the websites of individual 
embassies clearly offer services to their domestic companies that want to 
invest abroad. And to foreign companies that want to invest in the em-
bassies home country. The Dutch embassy in Australia for example 
states: 
We can help Dutch companies doing business in Australia or help Austral-
ian companies to trade with the Netherlands. (The Netherlands Embassy 
in Australia, http://australia.nlembassy.org/doing-business accessed 3 
January  2015) 
The UK embassy in Canada states:  
Encouraging Canadian investment in the UK and increasing the number 
of British firms successfully doing business in Canada. (The UK Embassy 
in Canada, https://www.gov.uk/government/world/canada accessed 3 
January  2015) 
And the Danish embassy in India states: 
The Trade Council offers the following services tailored to the individual 
client: …. Information about establishing a company… (The Danish Em-
bassy in India, http://indien.um.dk/en/the-trade-council/services-
provided-by-the-trade-council/ accessed 3 Janaury  2015) 
And the Polish ministry of Economy states: 
Trade and Investment Promotion Sections of Polish Embassies and Con-
sulates were created to help Polish businesses to internationalise, particu-
larly SMEs. Our mission is not only to help Polish companies but, also, to 
assist foreign businesses looking to buy goods and services in Poland or 
locate their activity in our country. Our offices around the world are equal-
ly sensitive to the needs and requests of Polish as well as foreign business-
es. (The Polish ministry of Economy, 
https://polska.trade.gov.pl/en/o_nas accessed 3 January  2015) 
120 CHAPTER 6 
This chapter will provide, to our knowledge, the first multidimension-
al analysis of the effect of the diplomatic network on FDI3. We use a 
unique multiyear sample that shows the dynamics within the diplomatic 
network of 64 countries between 2006 and 2012. We add to the literature 
by testing for the effect of the diplomatic network on outgoing invest-
ment flows and answer the question whether or not economic diplomats 
have an effect on FDI. We allow for differences in the effect of econom-
ic diplomacy based on the difference in the continent of the FDI origina-
tor and recipient. Finally, we analyze the effect of competition for FDI 
by economic diplomats by allowing interactions between the diplomatic 
network of various origin countries in one FDI recipient and researching 
the effect of ‘the market share’ of diplomatic establishments. The re-
mainder of this chapter is structured as follows: section 6.2 gives the ra-
tionale for economic diplomacy. Section 6.3 discusses the empirical de-
sign. Section 6.4 describes the data, section 6.5 gives the results of the 
regression analysis and section 6.6 presents a sensitivity analysis of our 
results. Section 6.7 concludes and gives recommendations for future re-
search. 
6.2 FDI and the rationale for economic diplomacy  
The literature provides ample evidence for the impact of distance on in-
ternational trade and FDI (see the seminal work of Cezar and Escobar, 
2015; Disdier and Head, 2008). The cultural and institutional barriers, 
associated with the increase in distance, have an impact on FDI (see, e.g. 
Cezar and Escobar, 2015; Globerman and Shapiro, 2003; Guiso et al., 
2009; Lankhuizen et al., 2011; Siegel et al, 2013). Economic diplomacy 
interacts with the intangible effects of distance because it, among others, 
enhances trust. As pointed out by Lankhuizen et al. (2011), FDI is more 
vulnerable to instability than trade is. A country needs a certain level of 
stability and security as a precondition to investments by multinational 
corporations (Loewendahl and Ertugal-Loewendahl, 2000). Political risk 
is a major factor in dealing with cross border transactions (Hayakawa et 
al., 2014b ; Moser et al., 2008). Once the investor has capital into an in-
vestment, the bargaining power tends to shift towards the host country 
(Biglaiser and DeRouen Jr, 2007). Having economic diplomats in the 
country of investment may serve as a token of trust. The investor may 
turn to the economic diplomat in case the investment runs into trouble 
with the local government. And having diplomats of the investors’ home 
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country in the country of his investment may provide the investor with 
the comfort that there are no major conflicts about to erupt that could 
potentially harm his investment (Naray, 2011). Diplomats can also re-
duce the insecurity about potential political upheaval about an invest-
ment by tapping into the local government and informing them (in an 
early stage) about the intention to invest and the good nature of the in-
vestment.    
The economic rationale for economic diplomacy lies in positive ex-
ternalities, i.e. it counters market failure (see for example Chapter 1 of 
this thesis; Bergeijk, 2009; Loewendahl, 2001; Moons and Bergeijk, 2016; 
Volpe Martincus et al., 2010a and 2010b; Yakop and Bergeijk, 2011). 
Firms that engage in international activities invest a significant amount of 
money and time in information gathering about both tangible and intan-
gible barriers to investments. They need to understand local rules and 
regulations, find financiers for their international expansion, know local 
norms and behavior and find reliable local business partners (Siegel et al., 
2013). This search by the first mover and the associated investments re-
veal information that may be used by other investors, who do not have 
these initial costs because they can free ride on the successful search of 
the first moving firm (Rauch, 1996)4. The potential gains of being a first 
mover and investing in the production of new knowledge about entering 
new foreign markets is thus reduced. Due to this potential free riding the 
private returns from developing knowledge about how to invest abroad 
could be lower than the corresponding social returns, leading to a sub-
optimally low production (Westphal, 1990). The diplomatic network 
plays an important role in transmitting information to investors regard-
ing national and regional rules, regulations and culture, thereby reducing 
private costs of information gathering and stimulating the production of 
information about investing abroad. In other words, economic diplomats 
reduce information asymmetries (Harding and Javorcik, 2012a).   
Not a first best economic motive, but an important motive within 
politics is that economic diplomacy may be used for leveling the playing 
field. The information supply on where to locate is far from perfect and 
foreign investors have an information asymmetry compared to domestic 
investors. The spatial distribution of FDI can partially be determined by 
the information costs for the foreign investor, instead of the production 
and transportation cost of the host country (Lim, 2008). Economic dip-
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lomats can improve the information position of enterprises from their 
home country.  
6.3 Empirical design 
Just like trade, FDI has been successfully explained by gravity structures 
(Anderson, 2011; Head and Mayer, 2013). Different from trade is the 
fact that the theoretical micro economic foundation of the gravity model 
for FDI is less developed, although work by Kleinert and Toubal (2010), 
Bergstrand and Egger (2010) and Sousa and Lochard (2011) has made 
progress. We derive the gravity equation to investigate the relation be-
tween economic diplomacy and FDI. The basic gravity equation for FDI 
can be written as: 
 
FDIij=β0, GDPiβ1 ,GDPjβ2 Distanceijβ3 εij   ……………… (6.1)  
 
The basic intuition behind this equation is that outward FDI5 from 
home country i to affiliates in host country j is increasing in the sum of 
their economic sizes (GDP). That is, bigger markets attract more FDI 
and there is more FDI coming from firms located in bigger markets. At 
the same time distance has a negative effect on FDI. In equation (6.1) β0, 
β1, β2 and β3 represent parameters to be estimated and the error term ߝij 
is assumed to be statistically independent of the regressors. To this basic 
equation we add several variables common to the gravity literature on 
FDI. These variables capture the tangible and intangible costs of invest-
ing in foreign markets from the perspective of the investor. The log line-
arized form of our gravity equation then becomes: 
 
ln (FDIijt) = β0 + β1ln(GDP p.c.it) + β2ln(GDP p.c. jt) + β3 ln(Popit) + β4 
ln(Popjt) + β5 ln(w Dij) + β6 RTA+ β7 Common Currency + β8 Common Lan-
guage + β9 Common Border + β10 Island + β11 Landlocked + β12 Col + β13 
ln(Land Areai*Land Areaj) + β14 Tax Haven + ɣ1 Number of diplomatic repre-
sentationsij + λit + λjt + φij+ ξt  + εij  ………………  (6.2) 
 
Where i and j are FDI partners and t is time. GDP p.c. stands for the 
Gross Domestic Product per capita of the investment partners, Pop for 
the population of the investment partners and D for the distance be-
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tween investment partners. Furthermore, RTA, Common Currency, Common 
Language, Comon Border, Island, Landlocked, Col and Tax Haven represent 
dummy variables that take the value of 1 if the home and host are part of 
a Regional Trade Agreement, if the partners are part of a similar Currency 
Zone, have a Common Language, have Common Borders, are an Island, are 
Landlocked, have (had) a Colonial Relation and if the destination country is 
classified as a Tax Haven. Land area is included as the product of the land 
areas of the home and host countries. Finally the Number of diplomatic rep-
resentations is the main variables of interest and gives the number of dip-
lomatic establishments of country i in country j. These variables are dis-
cussed in more detail in the sections below. To our equation we add λit 
and λjt which represent fixed origin-year and destination-year dummies, 
year dummies ξt and country pair random effects φij to account for unob-
served within and between country sources of variance6. This is the most 
promising approach to deal with endogeneity related issues (Bacchetta et 
al., 2012; Baltagi et al., 2016; Head and Mayer, 2013). Finally, εij repre-
sents the error term. Country pair clustered standard errors are used.  
We will present an instrumental variable approach of equation (6.2) as 
an alternative to our fixed and random effects analysis to further deal 
with endogeneity issues in section 6 of this chapter. In section 6 we will 
also present two alternative ways to deal with the structure of our sample 
(how zero flows are divided) by applying a Poisson Pseudo Maximum 
Likelihood approach (Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006; 2011) and a zero 
inflated regression. 
6.4 Data 
6.4.1 Dependent variable 
Compared to trade, FDI data are harder to obtain and can vary substan-
tially between different sources. Commonly used sources include the 
OECD FDI statistics database, the IMF coordinated direct investment 
survey and UNCTAD’s bilateral FDI statistics. Investigating these three 
sources the UNCTAD data proved to be the most complete for the 
countries under investigation. We are using a dataset of 64x64 countries 
for the years 2006 and 2012. From a maximum of 8064 datapoints 
(64*64*2-64), we have 5465 observations7. This includes 2489 zero-
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observations. The dataset contains a mix of countries from different 
continents (see Table 6.1 below).  
We follow others and use FDI stocks instead of flows because stock 
data have the advantage of containing less negative observations, being 
less volatile and are better measured (see for instance Bergeijk, 1995; 
Blonigen and Wang, 2004; Du et al., 2008; Lankhuizen et al., 2011). We 
are using outward stocks because, analogous to research on trade, we are 
looking for the effect of embassies of origin countries in destination 
countries incoming investments. We take the natural log of FDI stocks 
because this allows for an easy interpretation of estimated coefficients as 
elasticities and reduces skewness of the dependent variable, which in-
creases goodness of fit of the model (Berger et al., 2013; Blonigen, 2005).  
Table 6.1 
Geographical distribution sample  
Region % of observations % of investment 
Africa and Middle East 23 0.5 
Asia 22 11.7 
Europe 38 67.3 
Latin America 12 0.8 
North America 5 19.7 
 
6.4.2 Data on the diplomatic network 
The explanatory variable of main interest is the number of foreign representa-
tion. To construct a sample of these diplomatic representations we first 
checked if updated versions of samples used in previous studies were 
available (Elkins et al., 2006; Yakop and Bergeijk, 2011). Unfortunately 
we found none8, 9. Therefore the websites of 64 ministries of foreign af-
fairs were manually consulted in 2012 and the beginning of 2013. For 
2006 we make use of part of the embassies and consulates sample used 
in Yakop and Bergeijk (2011) which is available via the DANS website10. 
We observe that many more representations (embassies and consu-
lates) were opened than closed (over 1600 as compared to 450)11, 12. Eu-
ropean and Latin American countries in our sample were responsible for 
the majority of the new representations. Taking into account the relative 
size of Latin American countries in our sample we see that these coun-
tries were most active in terms of opening new establishments. European 
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and African and Middle Eastern countries closed down the most repre-
sentations, followed by Asian countries.  
Figure 6.1 shows where most countries opened and closed their rep-
resentations. Relative to the existing network of representations we see 
the biggest percentage change in Latin America, followed by Africa and 
the middle East and Asia. In absolute numbers most new representations 
were opened in Europe (627) and Asia (390). At the same time we also 
see that most representations were closed in Europe (183). Below the 
surface we see a lot of dynamics in Europe, particularly in Central and 
Eastern Europe, where large numbers of representations are both closed 
and opened. This is done by many different countries, not just European 
countries among each other but also for example by many Latin Ameri-
can. This may be due to the combination of a large, attractive market, 
with many different cultures and business climates. On the other hand, 
the economic circumstances during the period under investigating (slow 
economic growth in Europe due to the 2008 crisis) may be a reason to 
reconsider diplomatic representations in Europe, which can explain the 
closing of representations.   
Figure 6.1 
Change in diplomatic network between 2006 and 2012 (where) 
 
 
6.4.3 Other explanatory variables 
Next to the diplomatic network, other common gravity variables are in-
cluded in the right hand side of the estimated equation:  
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x The log of origin and destination GDP per capita in (current) USD,  
taken from the October 2013 IMF World Economic Outlook da-
tabase13 (WEO), to control for the level of development in the 
origin and destination country (Bloningen and Piger, 2014).  
x The log of Population of the country of origin and destination. The 
log of population of the origin and destination country together 
with the log of the squared root of Land Areaij serves to control for 
market size, which is expected to have a positive influence on FDI 
(market-seeking FDI) (Bloningen and Piger, 2014). 
x Bilateral weighted Distance (ln(w Dij)) is included as a proxy for tan-
gible and intangible investment costs that increase over distance. 
The log of weighted distance is obtained from the CEPII GeoDist 
database14. The weighted bilateral distance is a function of the in-
ter-city distances weighted by the share of the city in the overall 
country’s population. A negative impact on FDI is expected based 
on earlier papers (see Bergstrand and Egger, 2010; Bloningen and 
Piger, 2014; Markusen and Maskus, 2002; Paniagua et al., 2015; Pe-
tri, 2012). Or as Martin and Drogendijk (2014:4) put it: “Distance 
means trouble.” 
x Regional Trade Agreements are taken from the CEPII Gravity data-
base. Theory suggests that when bilateral trade costs are reduced, 
bilateral trade becomes the more likely mode to serve the market 
and at the same time investment in that market becomes economi-
cally less attractive (McCulloch, 1993; Paniagua and Sapana, 2014). 
At the same time reduced trade costs and regional trade agree-
ments make productive investments that serve international mar-
kets more attractive (Bloningen and Piger, 2014; Paniagua et al., 
2015; Petri, 2012).  
x A few other variables are taken into account that are likely to in-
fluence the similarity or dissimilarities between countries. We in-
clude Common Language, Common Currencies and Common Borders tak-
en from the CEPII GeoDist database. Based on earlier papers we 
expect positive coefficients (Brakman et al., 2010; Guiso et al., 
2009; Mohlmann et al., 2010)15. We use a colonial relationship dummy 
to account for past colonial relations between the origin and desti-
nation country of FDI. Here also a positive relationship is ex-
Do economic diplomats stimulate FDI?   127 
pected because cultural understanding and similarity is bigger if a 
past colonial relationships exists (Bloningen and Piger, 2014; 
Brakman et al., 2010).  
x Also natural advantages and disadvantages are included, specifical-
ly whether the FDI recipient is an Island or Landlocked country. 
This information is also extracted from the CEPII GeoDist data-
base. We expect negative coefficients based on the trade literature 
(see, e.g. Afman and Maurel, 2010; Rose, 2007; Yakop and Ber-
geijk, 2011).  
x Various authors have included dummies for Tax havens in the past 
to control for the effect that investments in these tax havens are 
driven mainly for their tax characteristics (Bloningen and Piger, 
2014). Following Van t’Riet and Lejour (2014) the dummy tax ha-
ven is constructed out of the results from an extensive study by 
Gravelle (2013). She summarized the literature about tax havens 
for the US congress. A positive coefficient for the tax haven dum-
my is expected.  
Summary statistics of the dependent variable, the explanatory variables 
and instrumental variables (that will be introduced in section 6.6) are in-
cluded in Appendix F. 
6.5 Empirical results 
6.5.1 The diplomatic network and FDI 
We test for the effect of the diplomatic network on FDI, of which the 
results are presented below. Table 6.2, column (1) and (2) present OLS 
estimates. Column (3) presents our preferred fixed and random effects 
equations. We use our fixed and random effects to address various forms 
of endogeneity. This forces identification to come from the within di-
mension of the data. We use FDI originator-year and FDI recipient-year 
fixed effects to correct for unobserved endogeneity relating to the home 
and host country of FDI. Time fixed effects are included to capture 
across year variance. We furthermore use country pair random effects to 
control for unobservable sources of between-country variance. With this 
approach theoretical concerns about omitted variable bias is greatly re-
duced (Anderson, 2011; Bacchetta, 2012; Head and Mayer, 2013). 
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 The overall explanatory power of the model (see adjusted R2) is 
comparable to, or better than, recently published gravity models on FDI 
that report adjusted R2 statistics of between 0.20 to 0.66 (e.g. Brakman et 
al., 2010; Paniagua et al., 2015; Paniagua and Sapana, 2014; Petri, 2012; 
Subasat and Bellos, 2013). We observe that the OLS estimates seem to 
somewhat overestimate the impact of speaking a common language and the 
influence of having a favorable tax climate (Tax Haven=1). The estimates 
in column (1) are based on the constraint that the intercept is identical 
for each country for each year. In column (2) this constraint is relaxed by 
allowing for (more realistic) year varying intercepts. This is important if 
the mode omitted important time-varying variables (Afman and Maurel, 
2010).    
Looking to the preferred fixed and random effects specification we 
observe that coefficients are as expected, showing similar directions as in 
previous gravity analysis on FDI (e.g. Paniagua et al., 2015; Paniagua and 
Sapana, 2014; Petri, 2012). Distance negatively impacts FDI, similar to the 
pattern observed for the gravity model in international trade and other 
publications estimating distance effects on FDI. The less tangible dimen-
sions of distance also have a significant effect on FDI, the coefficients 
for having a Colonial Relation and having a Common Language are positive 
and highly significant. Our econometric investigation also makes clear 
that policy influences the behavior of foreign investors, our Regional Trade 
Agreement suggest a big FDI stimulus if a country has trade agreements in 
place (similar to Bloningen and Piger, 2014).  
Finally, both the OLS and fixed and random effects specification in-
dicate that the diplomatic network, our main variable of interest, is a fac-
tor that matters for the location of FDI. Table 6.2 indicates that a unit 
increase in the diplomatic network of the FDI originator would lead to 
an increase in FDI of between 4 per cent and 7 per cent, depending on 
the specification. These positive and significant coefficients are compa-
rable to those observed in trade literature (Moons and de Boer, 2017; 
Rose, 2007; Yakop and Bergeijk, 2011). This is in line with the idea that 
FDI follows “the flag”, a relation established for trade by Pollins (1989a).  
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Table 6.2 
Determinants of Bilateral FDI Stocks 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 OLS OLS Fixed & random 
effects 
Log GDP p.c. origin  1.98*** 
(0.04) 
 2.00*** 
(0.04) 
 
Log GDP p.c. destination  0.78*** 
(0.04) 
 0.82*** 
(0.04) 
 
Log Pop origin  1.08*** 
(0.04) 
 1.10*** 
(0.04) 
 
Log Pop destination  0.80*** 
(0.04) 
 0.84*** 
(0.04) 
 
Landlocked 0.07 
(0.10) 
0.06 
(0.10) 
1.26 
(1.93) 
Island -0.12 
(0.08) 
-0.15* 
(0.08) 
-1.02 
(4.06) 
Log Land Area  -0.10*** 
(0.02) 
 -0.10*** 
(0.02) 
0.49 
(2.53) 
Log Distance  -0.81*** 
(0.05) 
 -0.80*** 
(0.05) 
 -1.25*** 
(0.07) 
Common Language  1.44*** 
(0.12) 
 1.44*** 
(0.12) 
 0.80*** 
(0.16) 
Common border 0.27 
(0.17) 
0.28 
(0.17) 
0.28 
(0.20) 
Colonial relation 1.18*** 
(0.25) 
1.17*** 
(0.24) 
1.31*** 
(0.26) 
Regional Trade Agreement  0.44*** 
(0.10) 
 0.47*** 
(0.10) 
 0.30*** 
(0.11) 
Common currency 0.16 
(0.16) 
0.10 
(0.16) 
-0.28 
(0.18) 
Tax haven  1.31*** 
(0.23) 
 1.26*** 
(0.23) 
4.16 
(16.37) 
Number of Diplomatic Represen-
tations (Origin in Destination) 
  0.07*** 
(0.02) 
  0.06*** 
(0.02) 
  0.04*** 
(0.01) 
Year 2006   0.45*** 
(0.08) 
 
Fixed and Random effects No No Yes# 
Observations 2826 2826 2826 
Adjusted R2 0.63 0.63 0.77 
Dependent: ln (FDIijt). Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. # 
Includes origin-year, destination-year, year-fixed effects and country pair random effects. 
Clustered standard errors are used. Included in the regression but not reported: the constant. 
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6.5.2 Heterogeneous effects of the diplomatic network on FDI 
stocks between regions 
Based on the literature it can be expected that the diplomatic network is 
more important for culturally more distant locations (Cezar and Escobar, 
2015; Harding and Javorcik, 2011 and 2012b; Hayakawa, 2014a and b; 
Yakop and Bergeijk, 2011). We want to test this relation and investigate 
whether or not we observe differences in the effect of the diplomatic 
network if the FDI originator is located in a different continent than the 
FDI recipient.  
We investigate the effect of diplomatic offices on FDI between re-
gions by introducing a dummy that captures intercontinental FDI flows 
and interacting this dummy with our diplomatic network variable. In 
column (1) and (3) of Table 6.3 we introduce our different region dummy. 
By including this dummy we allow for region varying intercepts (next to 
the earlier introduced year intercept in our OLS model). Ceteris paribus 
some regions may invest more/less than others. This is confirmed by the 
highly significant different region dummy both in our OLS and fixed and 
random effect models16. The baseline estimate uses FDI from origin 
countries to destination countries in the same continent.  
In column (2) and (4) we introduce the interaction: Number of diplomat-
ic representations* Different Region to our OLS and fixed and random effects 
estimations. This interactions is used to test for the effect of the diplo-
matic network in relation the investments within the same geographical 
continent as compared to investments on a different continent. The es-
timates present interesting results.  The diplomatic network is relevant 
for FDI between continents. Here we see significant coefficients of be-
tween 0.07 for the fixed and random effects equation and 0.12 for the 
OLS equation. In the model presented in column (2) and (4) the Number 
of diplomatic representations variable is not significant. For investments with-
in the same continent diplomats play a very limited role (if one at all).  
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Table 6.3 
Determinants of bilateral FDI stocks taking into account differences in regions 
 (1) 
OLS 
(2) 
OLS 
(3) 
Fixed & 
Random Effect 
(4) 
Fixed & 
Random Effects 
Log GDP PC origin 2.01*** 
(0.04) 
2.01*** 
(0.04) 
  
Log GDP PC destination 0.83*** 
(0.04) 
0.81*** 
(0.04) 
  
Log Population origin 1.10*** 
(0.04) 
1.11*** 
(0.04) 
  
Log Population destination 0.85*** 
(0.04) 
0.83*** 
(0.04) 
  
Landlocked 0.08 
(0.10) 
0.07 
(0.10) 
1.43 
(1.91) 
1.18 
(1.92) 
Island -0.25*** 
(0.08) 
-0.23** 
(0.08) 
-0.89 
(4.05) 
-1.55 
(4.08) 
Log Land area -0.11*** 
(0.02) 
-0.12*** 
(0.02) 
0.58 
(2.53) 
0.11 
(2.55) 
Log Distance -0.59*** 
(0.07) 
-0.57*** 
(0.07) 
-1.06*** 
(0.11) 
-1.05*** 
(0.11) 
Common Language 1.42*** 
(0.12) 
1.38*** 
(0.12) 
0.77*** 
(0.15) 
0.74*** 
(0.15) 
Common border 0.32** 
(0.17) 
0.48*** 
(0.18) 
0.36* 
(0.20) 
0.44** 
(0.20) 
Colonial relation 1.32*** 
(0.25) 
1.20*** 
(0.25) 
1.41*** 
(0.27) 
1.35*** 
(0.27) 
Regional Trade Agreement 0.44*** 
(0.10) 
0.44*** 
(0.10) 
0.28*** 
(0.11) 
0.27** 
(0.11) 
Common currency 0.00 
(0.16) 
0.02 
(0.17) 
-0.34* 
(0.18) 
-0.31* 
(0.18) 
Tax haven 1.23*** 
(0.23) 
1.22*** 
(0.23) 
4.57 
(16.36) 
1.43 
(16.51) 
Number diplomatic representations 0.06*** 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
Year 2006 0.45*** 
(0.08) 
0.45*** 
(0.08) 
  
Different region -0.56*** 
(0.12) 
-0.80*** 
(0.13) 
-0.42** 
(0.17) 
-0.55*** 
(0.18) 
Interaction Number of diplomatic 
representations*Different Region 
 0.12*** 
(0.03) 
 0.07*** 
(0.02) 
Fixed and Random effects No No Yes# Yes# 
Observations 2826 2826 2826 2826 
Adjusted R2 0.63 0.63 0.77 0.77 
Dependent: ln (FDIijt). Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  # 
Includes origin-year, destination-year, year-fixed effects and country pair random effects. 
Clustered standard errors are used. Included in the regression but not reported: the constant. 
6.5.3 Policy competition 
Policy competition for FDI via fiscal incentives is manifest (Ma, 
2013). In international relations it is also frequently suggested that dip-
lomats compete for FDI (e.g. Capik, 2007; Stopford et al., 1991). Econ-
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ometric investigations on this topic were until now not available. We 
make a first effort to quantify these dynamics in two ways. In Table 6.4 
below.  
Column (1) and (3) include the number of diplomatic representations 
of competing countries in our regression, i.e. if next to country j other 
countries have a presence in country i, these representations are included 
in our regression via our Number of Diplomatic network (other) variable. 
Next, column (2) and (4) add the interaction between the network of 
country i and the diplomatic network of other countries to test for its 
effect on FDI stocks. The OLS results in column (1) and (2) show that 
FDI stocks not only relate to the diplomatic network of the country of 
origin, but also to the network of other countries17. The reported nega-
tive coefficient for the interaction term (in column (2)) indicates that the 
effect of the network of the country i in j decreases as the network from 
other (competing countries) increases. The marginal effect is, however, 
economically negligible. The effect of representations of other countries 
on FDI stocks disappears in the fixed and random effects estimates re-
ported in column (3) and (4). Here both the Number of Diplomatic network 
(other) variable and the interaction term is insignificant. The observed 
OLS estimates may thus be an effect of omitted variables or country 
specific characteristics that interact with our interaction term.   
Column (5) of Table 6.4 tests the question of competition between 
diplomatic establishments using a different approach. In the estimated 
model in column (5) the share of diplomatic representations from the 
origin country in the total number of diplomatic representations that is 
present in the destination country is included. For example, if country i 
has 3 diplomatic offices in country j on a total of 50 diplomatic offices in 
that country, country i has a market share in the network of 6 per cent. 
The share of network variable is significant at the 1 per cent level. Accord-
ing to our estimates having a larger share in the number of diplomatic 
representations in the country of destination is beneficial. The coefficient 
shows that an increase of 1 per cent point in market share amounts to 
about 5 per centmore bilateral investment. Since opening a representa-
tion on average amounts to increase in the market share of a little over 1 
per cent point, this is in line with our other results18. It may accidentally 
also capture the effects of market size (the larger the market, the more 
representations there are, the smaller the share of representations for a 
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single country). This makes us cautious with putting too much weight on 
the column (5) estimates.  
Table 6.4 
Competing for FDI stocks: effect of the diplomatic network  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 OLS OLS Fixed & Ran-
dom Effects 
Fixed & Ran-
dom Effects 
Fixed & Ran-
dom Effects 
Log GDP PC origin   2.01*** 
(0.04) 
 2.01*** 
(0.04) 
   
Log GDP PC destination   0.61*** 
(0.05) 
  0.57*** 
(0.05) 
   
Log Population origin   1.13*** 
(0.04) 
  1.13*** 
(0.04) 
   
Log Population destina-
tion 
  0.61*** 
(0.05) 
 0.57*** 
(0.05) 
   
Landlocked 0.02 
(0.10) 
0.02 
(0.10) 
2.08 
(1.46) 
1.87** 
(0.85) 
1.45 
(1.93) 
Island -0.05 
(0.08) 
-0.03 
(0.08) 
0.87 
(1.98) 
0.42 
(1.26) 
-0.64 
(4.06) 
Log Land area -0.13*** 
(0.02) 
-0.13*** 
(0.02) 
1.87* 
(0.99) 
1.50 
(1.33) 
0.78 
(2.53) 
Log Distance -0.82*** 
(0.05) 
-0.80*** 
(0.05) 
-1.25*** 
(0.07) 
-1.25*** 
(0.07) 
-1.25*** 
(0.07) 
Common Language  1.38*** 
(0.12) 
 1.37*** 
(0.12) 
 0.80*** 
(0.16 
 0.79*** 
(0.16) 
 0.80*** 
(0.16) 
Common border 0.35* 
(0.17) 
0.32* 
(0.17) 
0.29 
(0.20) 
0.28 
(0.20) 
0.27 
(0.19) 
Colonial relation 1.11*** 
(0.24) 
1.09*** 
(0.24) 
1.32*** 
(0.26) 
1.31*** 
(0.26) 
1.31*** 
(0.26) 
Regional Trade Agreement   0.49*** 
(0.10) 
  0.49*** 
(0.10) 
  0.30*** 
(0.11) 
  0.30*** 
(0.11) 
  0.31*** 
(0.11) 
Common currency 0.04 
(0.16) 
0.02 
(0.16) 
-0.28 
(0.18) 
-0.28 
(0.18) 
-0.28 
(0.18) 
Tax haven   1.21*** 
(0.23) 
  1.21*** 
(0.23) 
  13.44** 
(6.35) 
10.87 
(10.48) 
6.11 
(16.35) 
Year 2006  0.46*** 
(0.08) 
  0.47*** 
(0.08) 
   
Number of diplomatic 
representations (own) 
 0.04** 
(0.02) 
  0.14*** 
(0.03) 
  0.03*** 
(0.01) 
 0.05** 
(0.02) 
 
Share of network   
 
    0.05*** 
(0.02) 
Number of Diplomatic 
network (other) 
  0.01*** 
(0.00) 
  0.01*** 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
 
Interaction Log Diplomatic 
network (own)* Diplomat-
ic network (other) 
  -0.00*** 
(0.00) 
 -0.00 
(0.00) 
 
Fixed and Random effects No No Yes# Yes# Yes# 
Observations 2826 2826 2826 2826 2826 
Adjusted R2 0.63 0.63 0.77 0.77 0.77 
Dependent: ln (FDIijt). Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. # 
Includes importer-year, exporter-year, year fixed effects and country pair random effects. 
Clustered standard errors are used. Included in the regression but not reported: the constant. 
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Of the reported regressions in Table 6.4 three out of five estimations 
indicate that there is correlation between the effect of diplomatic repre-
sentations of the home country with diplomatic representations of others 
in the destination country. In two out of five, including our preferred 
fixed and random effects model, the correlation is not significantly 
measurable. This remains a relevant issue for future research. 
6.6 Robustness 
6.6.1 Two econometric challenges: Endogeneity and zero flows 
So far we assumed a relation between the diplomatic network and FDI. 
Specifically that the diplomatic network has influence on FDI flows be-
tween the country of origin and the country of destination. It is, howev-
er, possible that diplomatic representations are set up in countries with 
which a strong FDI-relation already exists. If so, reversed causality leads 
to inconsistent and biased estimates. Next to the earlier applied fixed and 
random effects we therefore test our results using an instrumental varia-
bles approach (IV) (results are reported in Table 6.5). We introduce a set 
of instrumental variables, which correlate with the number of foreign 
representations and yet is uncorrelated with the error term of bilateral 
FDI flows between countries. In the case of the diplomatic network, this 
is notoriously difficult to find and some authors argue it is better to use 
dyadic fixed effects (Head and Mayer, 2013). We therefore use dyadic 
effects in our baseline equations up to here and for the sake of robust-
ness we also present our results using instrumental variables19. We use 
two groups of variables that relate to the geopolitical weight of countries 
(military expenditure) and the attractiveness of living/visiting a country 
(tourism flows) because they give other motives for opening up a diplo-
matic establishment (Rose, 2007; Yakop and Bergeijk, 2011).  
We estimate regressions both with and without fixed effects and, fol-
lowing Yakop and Bergeijk (2011), include Generalized Method of Mo-
ments results. The F-statistic of the first stage of the 2SLS regression 
(not reported) is 13, which shows that these instruments are sufficiently 
strong. Using two stage least squares both with 2SLS and GMM we find 
that previous results still hold. The estimates for our main variable of 
interest, the number of diplomatic representations, are in three out of four in-
stances larger than earlier presented (Table 6.2, column (1)). In column 
(2) the diplomatic representations variable is no longer significant. Corrected 
Do economic diplomats stimulate FDI?   135 
for unobserved within and between country sources of variance and us-
ing instrumental variables to obtain consistent estimates results in an in-
significant and negative coefficient. Based on the overall reported find-
ings we are, however, confident that our estimates do not suffer from 
reversed causality.   
Table 6.5 
Instrumental variables  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 2SLS: IV (military 
expenditure, 
tourism flows) 
2SLS:IV + FE (mili-
tary expenditure, 
tourism flows) 
GMM: IV (military 
expenditure, 
tourism flows) 
GMM: IV + FE (mil-
itary expenditure, 
tourism flows) 
Log GDP PC origin 1.89*** 
(0.06) 
 1.88*** 
(0.06) 
 
Log GDP PC destination 0.47*** 
(0.14) 
 0.48*** 
(0.14) 
 
Log Population origin 1.01*** 
(0.05) 
 1.03*** 
(0.05) 
 
Log Population destination 0.41*** 
(0.16) 
 0.43** 
(0.17) 
 
Landlocked 0.13 
(0.12) 
2.63 
(1.58) 
0.10 
(0.11) 
 
Island 0.08 
(0.13) 
1.62 
(2.13) 
0.05 
(0.13) 
-1.42*** 
(0.33) 
Log Land area -0.17*** 
(0.04) 
2.27* 
(1.17) 
-0.18*** 
(0.04) 
0.99*** 
(0.02) 
Log Distance -0.66*** 
(0.09) 
-1.27*** 
(0.34) 
-0.66*** 
(0.09) 
-1.17*** 
(0.06) 
Common Language 1.33*** 
(0.14) 
0.81*** 
(0.11) 
1.28*** 
(0.14) 
 
Common border -0.41 
(0.36) 
0.41 
(0.71) 
-0.24 
(0.37) 
0.36** 
(0.15) 
Colonial relation 0.40 
(0.44) 
1.37* 
(0.81) 
0.61 
(0.51) 
1.34*** 
(0.20) 
Regional Trade Agreement 0.33*** 
(0.13) 
0.25** 
(0.10) 
0.32*** 
(0.12) 
0.26** 
(0.10) 
Common currency 0.23 
(0.19) 
-0.22 
(0.22) 
0.16 
(0.17) 
-0.11 
(0.13) 
Tax haven 1.16*** 
(0.26) 
15.86** 
(2.41) 
1.08*** 
(0.23) 
9.69*** 
(0.33) 
Number of diplomatic rep-
resentations 
0.55*** 
(0.19) 
-0.06 
(0.58) 
0.54** 
(0.23) 
0.13*** 
(0.04) 
Fixed and Random effects  No Yes## No Yes## 
Observations 2777 2777 2777 2777 
Adjusted R2 0.54 0.76 0.52 0.75 
Dependent: ln (FDIijt). Standard errors in parentheses,* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, ##In-
cludes importer-year, exporter-year and year fixed effects20. Clustered standard errors are 
used. Included in the regression but not reported: the constant. 
 
 A second econometric concern we want to address is the number of 
zero flows within the sample. Anderson and Wincoop (2004) and Help-
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man et al. (2007) show that omitting the zero-valued observations in a 
gravity analysis leads to a non-random sample that can result in biased 
results  (Kleinert and Toubal, 2010). Our sample has 45 per cent zero 
flows which are not to distributed randomly21. There is a reason that 
people from one country do not invest in the other. This may indeed be 
the essence of the relationship that we are testing. We apply several solu-
tions to the zero observation problem; we follow Santos Silva and Ten-
reyro (2006, 2011) who propose Poisson Pseudo maximum likelihood 
regressions, which offers consistent estimates when using data with a 
vast amount of zero observations. Furthermore we also add a small con-
stant to zero-flows resulting in a zero-inflated regression (Winkelmann, 
2008). Results are presented in Table 6.6.  
Table 6.6 
Zero flows 
 (1) (2) 
 PPML Zero inflated FE, RE22 
Landlocked 0.87** 
(0.39) 
-110.79*** 
(7.09) 
Island 1.25*** 
(0.38) 
-367.58*** 
(28.47) 
Log Land area -0.29* 
(0.16) 
-256.17*** 
(21.30) 
Log Distance -0.65*** 
(0.07) 
-3.17*** 
(0.21) 
Common Language 0.59*** 
(0.11) 
2.82*** 
(0.46) 
Common border -0.04 
(0.11) 
-0.37 
(0.60) 
Colonial relation 0.47*** 
(0.13) 
1.04 
(0.82) 
Regional Trade Agreement 0.02 
(0.11) 
0.75** 
(0.32) 
Common currency 0.28** 
(0.12) 
-0.11 
(0.66) 
Tax haven 2.62*** 
(0.46) 
-1721.21*** 
(146.50) 
Number of diplomatic repre-
sentations 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
0.14*** 
(0.05) 
Fixed and Random effects  Yes## Yes# 
Observations 4722 5286 
Adjusted R2 0.86 0.66 
Dependent: ln (FDIijt). Standard errors in parentheses,* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, #In-
cludes importer-year, exporter-year and year fixed effects, and country pair random effects, 
##Includes importer-year, exporter-year and year fixed effects. Does NOT include country pair 
random effects. Clustered standard errors are used. Included in the regression but not re-
ported: the constant. 
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 We see the total explanatory power of the model increase using 
PPML. This cannot be said for the zero inflated model. Here we see the 
R2 decrease and also observe some changes in the presented results, like 
the very negative and significant coefficient for the tax haven dummy, that 
we cannot explain. We therefore focus on the PPML results. Taking into 
account the zero FDI stocks in our sample has no mark able influence 
on the sign and significance of our main variable of interest. We see that 
the coefficient of the number of diplomatic representations reduces somewhat 
in size but its positive effect remains mostly undisputed. This is also the 
case for the colonial relations, common language and tax haven dummy. This 
downward effect on the coefficient estimate is to be expected when 
many zero flows are added to the equation. 
6.6.2 Does the diplomatic network work stimulate outgoing FDI as 
well as help attract incoming FDI?  
Until here we focused on the stimulus of the diplomatic network on 
outgoing FDI, i.e. the effect of the diplomatic network of the FDI origin 
country. The symmetric nature of our sample also allows us to test for 
the opposite: the effect of the diplomatic network of the destination 
country on their incoming FDI. We have seen from the web statements 
of various embassies that they often have a dual ambition. On the one 
hand they want to support their domestic companies in foreign markets. 
On the other, they want to help foreign companies to invest in the repre-
sentations’ country of origin. We investigate this econometrically by in-
cluding both the Number of diplomatic representations of country i in country 
j and country j in country i (results are presented below).  
We focus on the main variable of interest: the number of diplomatic repre-
sentations. We see no changes in the earlier reported coefficients for the 
effect of the diplomatic network of the FDI origin country. The OLS 
and fixed and random effects estimates in Table 6.7 are very similar to 
the estimates documented in Table 6.2 (column (2) and (3)). The findings 
for the interaction between the diplomatic network and FDI stocks be-
tween regions are also comparable to earlier reported results (Table 6.3, 
column (4)). Based on the regressions in Table 6.7 the diplomatic net-
work of the destination country has no significant on the estimated ef-
fect of the diplomatic network of the FDI origin country.  
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Table 6.7 
The dual FDI mandate of the diplomatic network explored 
 (1) 
OLS 
(2) 
Fixed & 
Random 
Effects 
(3) 
Fixed & Random 
Effects 
+Interactions 
(4) 
PPML 
Log GDP PC origin 1.98*** 
(0.04) 
   
Log GDP PC destination 0.81*** 
(0.04) 
   
Log Population origin 1.07*** 
(0.04) 
   
Log Population destination 0.84*** 
(0.04) 
   
Landlocked 0.07 
(0.10) 
1.18 
(1.93) 
1.05 
(1.92) 
0.82** 
(0.38) 
Island -0.13 
(0.08) 
-1.24 
(4.06) 
-1.76 
(4.09) 
1.18*** 
(0.37) 
Log Land area -0.11*** 
(0.02) 
0.36 
(2.53) 
0.01 
(2.55) 
-0.29* 
(0.16) 
Log Distance -0.79*** 
(0.05) 
-1.24*** 
(0.07) 
-1.04*** 
(0.11) 
-0.61*** 
(0.07) 
Common Language 1.42*** 
(0.12) 
0.80*** 
(0.15) 
0.73*** 
(0.15) 
0.63*** 
(0.11) 
Common border 0.24 
(0.17) 
0.26 
(0.20) 
0.46** 
(0.20) 
-0.12 
(0.11) 
Colonial relation 1.19*** 
(0.24) 
1.30*** 
(0.26) 
1.32*** 
(0.27) 
0.46*** 
(0.13) 
RTA 0.46*** 
(0.10) 
0.30*** 
(0.11) 
0.26** 
(0.11) 
0.03 
(0.11) 
Common currency 0.11 
(0.17) 
-0.27 
(0.18) 
-0.29 
(0.18) 
0.29** 
(0.12) 
Tax haven 1.29*** 
(0.23) 
3.28 
(16.35) 
0.89 
(16.52) 
2.71*** 
(0.46) 
Year 2006 0.44*** 
(0.08) 
   
Number of diplo reps i in j 0.06*** 
(0.02) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
Number of diplo resp j in i 0.04** 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.02) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
Different region   -0.61*** 
(0.18) 
 
Interaction number of diplo 
reps i in j * Different region 
  0.06*** 
(0.02) 
 
Interaction number of diplo 
reps j in i * Different region 
  0.04 
(0.02) 
 
Fixed and Random Effects No Yes# Yes# Partial## 
Observations 2826 2826 2826 4722 
Adjusted R2 0.63 0.767 0.769 0.864 
Dependent: ln (FDIijt). Standard errors in parentheses,* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, #In-
cludes importer-year, exporter-year and year fixed effects, and country pair random effects, 
##Includes importer-year, exporter-year and year fixed effects. Does NOT include country pair 
random effects. Clustered standard errors are used. Included in the regression but not re-
ported: the constant. 
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The results furthermore show that the diplomatic network of the FDI 
destination country is effective in attracting FDI. Our OLS and PPML 
estimates report a modest FDI attracting effect of 3 to 4 per cent when 
the number of representations increases with one extra diplomatic office. 
This effect is not robust across specifications and does not show the ear-
lier observed heterogeneity in effect in relation to the geographical origin 
of the investments. 
6.6.3 Differentiation in the network 
The final source of variation in the diplomatic network we want to ad-
dress is the ranking of the diplomatic office under consideration in the 
regressions. We know from trade literature that  differences  in the polit-
ical ranking of representations may lead to variation in the coefficients 
(Chapters 3 and 5 in this thesis; Moons, 2017). The main idea boils down 
to the fact that an embassy is politically higher ranked than a consulate. 
It may therefore be the case that embassies are better equipped to lobby 
for important policy issues. On the other hand there generally are many 
consulates, often in important regions of the host country with the task 
to assist citizens and firms. Therefore it is also possible that consulates 
have more specific knowledge about local rules and regulations of use 
for the investor, thereby potentially having a bigger effect on FDI than 
embassies (Volpe Martincus et al., 2010a).  Table 6.8 shows the effects of 
embassies and consulates on FDI for our sample using our preferred 
model (equation 6.2) but replacing the number of diplomatic representations 
variables by one variable for embassies and one for consulates.  
Similar to papers in the trade literature we observe more substantial 
coefficients for embassies as compared to consulates. These coefficients 
are, however, insignificant. The coefficients for consulates on the other 
hand are positive and significant for both the fixed and random effects 
and PPML estimations. Econometrically, it thus seems that consulates 
contribute more significantly to stimulating FDI from the country of 
origin than embassies. Appendix G explores these coefficients further 
using a Heckman (1979) two-step approach. The Heckman approach 
suggests that coefficients for embassies are significant and of larger magni-
tude than the equally significant coefficients for consulates. The effect on 
FDI of different diplomatic establishments is a relevant issue for future 
research. Furthermore, these results, similar to the findings in Chapter 3 
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of this thesis, confirm the importance of reporting embassy and consu-
late estimates separately.   
Table 6.7 
Embassies versus Consulates  
 (1) (2) 
 Fixed Effects PPML 
Landlocked 1.33 
(1.92) 
0.89** 
(0.39) 
Island -1.03 
(4.05) 
1.26*** 
(0.38) 
Land area 0.46 
(2.52) 
-0.31* 
(0.16) 
Distance -1.25*** 
(0.07) 
-0.65*** 
(0.07) 
Common Language 0.80*** 
(0.16) 
0.59*** 
(0.11) 
Common border 0.29 
(0.20) 
-0.04 
(0.11) 
Colonial relation 1.31*** 
(0.26) 
0.46*** 
(0.13) 
RTA 0.31*** 
(0.11) 
0.00 
(0.11) 
Common currency -0.27 
(0.18) 
0.29** 
(0.12) 
Tax haven 3.85 
(16.37) 
2.63*** 
(0.46) 
Embassy 0.21 
(0.18) 
0.34 
(0.24) 
Consulate 0.03*** 
(0.01) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
Fixed and Random effects Yes# Partial## 
Observations 2826 4722 
Uncensored   
Adjusted R2 0.767 0.856 
Dependent: ln (FDIijt). Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, #In-
cludes importer-year, exporter-year and year fixed effects, and country pair random effects, 
##Includes importer-year, exporter-year and year fixed effects. Does NOT include country pair 
random effects. Clustered standard errors are used. Included in the regression but not re-
ported: the constant. Country specific variables (population and GDP per capita) are included 
but not reported because these variables can no longer be identified in the presence of fixed 
effects (Head and Mayer, 2013). 
 
6.7 Conclusions 
We established the relation between diplomatic representations and FDI, 
differentiated the effect of the diplomatic network for investments with-
in versus investments between continents and looked into effect of 
competition based in the number of diplomatic representations. 
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The results show that the diplomatic network of the FDI country of 
origin exerts a robust, positive, FDI stimulating effect. The presented 
preferred specification that accounts for time and country varying 
sources of variation reports a 3 per cent to 7 per cent increase in out-
going FDI associated with a one unit increase in the number of diplo-
matic representations. This confirms that economic diplomats are suc-
cessful in assisting firms from their home country. The effects are 
concentrated on transactions between different continents as compared 
to transactions within the same continent. Which is inline with the intui-
tion that for intercontinental transaction, where cultural differences are 
most substantial, the trust enhancing and information supplying function 
of the diplomatic network is the largest. Based on the presented findings 
we cannot come to definite conclusions about the effect of the diplomat-
ic network on attracting FDI. The findings show a less robust relation 
for attracting FDI as compared to the opposite (outgoing FDI). Similar-
ly, the reported estimates are not (yet) conclusive about policy competi-
tion via the diplomatic network for FDI. Three out of five estimates in-
dicated that representations of “other” countries may influence the FDI 
stimulating effect of the diplomatic network of the home country. The 
effect was however not significant in our preferred fixed and random 
effects estimations and the other reported effects may be caused by 
omitted variables bias.  
We tested for reversed causality using an instrumental variables ap-
proach. Based on the findings reversed causality is not a major issue in 
the relation between the diplomatic network and FDI. Also, zero flows 
were accounted for by Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood and zero 
inflated estimations. Taking zero flows into account did not influence 
the conclusions about the positive and significant effect of the diplomat-
ic network on outgoing FDI. 
Following up on Chapter 3 of this thesis we ended this chapter with 
an investigation of the different forms of diplomatic representation. The 
results show that it is rewarding to separately report on embassies and 
consulates. Where in the literature on economic diplomacy and trade 
embassies seem to have the most pronounced effect this research shows 
the opposite. Different estimation techniques could, however, provide 
new insight on the relation between embassies and consulates and FDI 
(as Appendix G of this thesis also shows). It is thus advised that the ef-
fect on FDI of different forms of economic diplomacy is area of future 
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research. Future research should also focus on data availability. FDI data, 
especially for developing countries are still hard to come by. We have 
managed to include a substantial number of them in our sample, yet 
greater data availability would provide additional methodological options 
to researches and possibly delivers new insights.  
 
Notes
 
1 I would like to thank Remco de Boer who was co-author of the research paper 
that is the fundament for this Chapter. An early version of this paper was pre-
sented during my Post Field Work Seminar the 28th of April 2016. I thank the 
participants of this seminar for their valuable suggestions. I would like to thank 
Sophie Leeuwenburgh and Zahra Zarepour for providing assistance with data 
collection.  
2 For a thorough discussion on the recent literature about economic diplomacy 
see the meta-analyses of Moons and Bergeijk (2016) and Moons (2017) 
3 As stated in the introduction the relation between FDI and investment promo-
tion agencies is explored to a certain extend (e.g. Morriset, 2003; Harding and 
Jovorcik, 2011 and 2012). The scope of investment promotion agencies is much 
more narrow as compared to the diplomatic network. The majority of overseas 
investment promotion agencies are located in only 6 high income markets. The 
average OECD country investment promotion agency has 7 overseas offices. 
Developing countries that have overseas offices generally only have three of them 
(UNCTAD; 2001). Analysis the diplomatic network, that has a much broader 
geographic coverage, is very additional to was is known to day about the effects 
of investment promotion agencies. 
4 Rauch paper was talking about the cost of trading. But a similar reasoning can 
be followed for foreign investments 
5 Some papers use affiliate sales because they can be compared across time and 
industries with less concern over divergent accounting methodologies. However, 
affiliate sales data are scarce. Furthermore, Lankhuizen et al. (2011) show correla-
tions up to 92 per cent between affiliate sales and FDI data. 
6 A Hauman test was used to test if the random effects were appropriately used. 
The Hausman test confirmed that the country pair random effect estimates are 
efficient compared to the fixed effects alternative.  
7 We downloaded the FDI files on November 12th  2015. 
8 We are hopeful that initiatives such as http://embassyworld.com/ will provide 
future researchers with the possibility to get their hands on extended samples 
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with information about the diplomatic network of countries. The initiative does 
prove a substantial amount of information about embassies and consulates of 
many countries. The sample is however far from complete when we compared it 
with the website information of the various Foreign Affairs websites (check per-
formed March 2013).  
9 Various authors in the past used the Tagish Diplomatic Directory, which should 
be available at http://www2.tagish.co.uk/Links/embassy1b.nsf/ (see, e.g. Elkins 
et al., 2006). The particular sample seems no longer available online, neither di-
rectly nor via links which are for example given by the University of Berkley web-
site (date of last check January 2nd 2015). 
10We are grateful to Peter van Bergeijk who provided us with the Yakop and Ber-
geijk (2011) sample (also available via https://dans.knaw.nl/nl ). This sample is 
collected in 2006 and originally includes 63 countries. To this sample we added 
the United Arab Emirates.  
11 The data were collected between summer 2012 and summer 2013 by visiting 
the foreign affairs websites of 64 countries. Valuable research assistance was de-
livered by Zahra Zarepour (PhD student at ISS) and Sophie Leeuwenburg (at that 
time Master Student at the VU Amsterdam). A final check was performed by 
Selwyn Moons in December 2016 on all observations where the difference be-
tween 2006 and 2013 was more than 2 representations. 
12 Even though we double checked all the results from our website search we still 
did not think the large number of newly opened representations was credible. We 
therefor did a google search on the 24th of February 2017 with the search term 
“open new embassies”. From the various statements on the first two pages of the 
google search we already saw more than 60 new embassies announced (excluding 
an additional 50 new EU embassies that we did not include in this number be-
cause EU embassies are not included in our sample). Because of this quick 
search, only in the English language, we grew more confident of dynamics ob-
served in our sample.   
13 All databases (IMF world Economic Outlook, CEPII Gravity Database and 
GeoDist, World Bank, UNCTAD) are accessed December 2013 
14 A full description of the various variables in the CEPII Gravity Database and 
its origin is provided by Mayer and Zignago (2011) 
15 In Brakman et al. (2010) the sign of the common border dummy varies over 
time and across specifications. Guiso et al. (2009) does not include the colonial 
relations dummy 
16 The highly significant different region dummy also is an indication that im-
portant region varying variables are omitted in our model 
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17 A Wald test reports that for column (1) and (2) the null hypothesis that the 
coefficient Number of Diplomatic network (other) is zero can be rejected (F-statistic, 1 
numerator 2807 denominator degrees of freedom, 39.55 and 51.98 respectively, 
both with p=0.00). 
18 We must note that not all diplomatic representations are of similar size and 
importance. The results presented are an estimation of the average effect for all 
the representations and countries in our sample. Clearly a one man post in a 
country versus a large embassy or consulate will have a different effect on FDI. 
But we do not have sufficient disaggregated data to also correct for these issues. 
19 As stated before in endnote VI we tested for the use of country pair random 
instead of fixed effects via a Hausman test. The results presented so far are thus 
in line with the advised dyadic fixed effects approach.  
20 Country pair random effects were not included because they were to computa-
tionally demanding 
21 Skewness of FDI stock=11.82, Kurtosis=187.77 two strong indications that 
the distribution is not normally distributed. 
22 We also ran the regression without the tax haven dummy variable because we 
found the reported coefficient in column (2) of Table 6.6 difficult to explain. This 
regression is available upon request with the author. Removing the tax haven 
dummy had no influence on the other reported estimates. 
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7 Summary and Conclusions 
 
 
7.1 Summary of the thesis   
This thesis investigates the heterogeneous effects of economic diploma-
cy. This heterogeneity is analysed by looking into economic diplomacy 
instruments, observing other determinants of heterogeneity and analys-
ing developments. 
In Chapter 1 of this thesis six main research questions and three sub 
questions were set out: 
1) How can economic diplomacy contribute to bilateral relations between developed 
and developing countries?   
2) What is the meta-effect of economic diplomacy on trade and FDI? 
a) Which (methodological) factors can be found that influence observed eco-
nomic diplomacy effects? 
b) What is the effect of instruments of economic diplomacy on observed eco-
nomic diplomacy effects? 
c) Is there consensus about the effect of economic diplomacy between scientific 
disciplines? 
3) How does economic diplomacy affect trade volumes (the intensive margin of 
trade) and the number of trading relations (the extensive margin of trade)?  
4) What is the effect of product characteristics on the observed economic diplomacy 
effect? 
5) How does economic diplomacy affect FDI?  
6) What are sources of heterogeneity in the effect of economic diplomacy on FDI? 
All of these questions relate to topics on economic diplomacy which 
have as yet received little to no academic research.  
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Each chapter of this thesis deals with a different dimension of the 
heterogeneity in economic diplomacy effects and the instruments, de-
terminants and developments behind it. More specifically, Chapter 2 
identifies forms of economic diplomacy that could be part of future bi-
lateral relations of (former) developing countries. The chapter connects 
economic diplomacy to the field of development studies. Chapter 3 stud-
ies the ‘meta’ impact of economic diplomacy: it summarizes the litera-
ture, in particular the reported effects of economic diplomacy, by means 
of a meta-analysis. It furthermore identifies sources of heterogeneity 
stemming from research design and the instrument of economic diplo-
macy used. Chapter 4 reviews the literature and presents what is known 
about the relation between economic diplomacy and the margins of 
trade. Chapter 5 econometrically investigates the effect of the diplomatic 
network on market entry and the trade volume of Rauch classified inter-
nationally traded goods. The chapter shows that economic diplomacy 
has the most influence on goods not traded in organized exchange. The 
chapter also reconfirms the need to diversify between economic diplo-
macy instruments. Chapter 6 econometrically establishes the relation be-
tween diplomatic representations and FDI and shows the heterogeneous 
economic diplomacy effects in relation to FDI between regions.  
In this thesis, a research design is applied that uses mixed methods 
and analyzes primary and secondary data. Chapter 2 reviews the litera-
ture, analyzes documents and uses a detailed case study for the Nether-
lands. Here, scholarly and academic sources, official documents and the 
so-called grey literature were triangulated. Chapters 3 and 4 rely on col-
lection of secondary data through literature review. Chapter 3 uses all the 
relevant information about study design, the instrument of economic 
diplomacy under investigation and the dependent variable on which the 
effect of economic diplomacy was tested, to construct our meta-analysis 
database. For Chapter 4 the estimates on the effect of economic diplo-
macy on the margins of trade were collected from the literature. Chapter 
5 relies on the collection of secondary data from databases that are pro-
vided by well-known institutions, such as the World Bank and United 
Nations, that make data available online. Chapter 6 relies on the collec-
tion of both primary and secondary data. The primary data are obtained 
by manually checking the websites of Ministries of Foreign Affairs to 
harvest the available information about their diplomatic network. The 
secondary data are obtained online from well-known and frequently used 
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sources. The data are used in a variety of empirical approaches, among 
which a meta-effect analysis (Chapter 3) and various econometric inves-
tigations (Chapters 5 and 6). The results of the different chapters suggest 
that heterogeneity is a key element for understanding economic diploma-
cy. The main findings per chapter are summarized below.  
Chapter 2 contributes to the literature by linking economic diplomacy 
to development studies. The chapter starts with an investigation of de-
velopment cooperation and trade policies. The combined development 
cooperation and trade portfolio offers a basis for a continually evolving 
bilateral agenda with (former) developing countries. Applying a devel-
opment studies perspective, the chapter identifies economic diplomacy 
components that can be part of bilateral relations, in which the combina-
tion of development cooperation and trade and investment relationships 
can be mutually reinforcing. Because of these elements, economic di-
plomacy can be an important aspect of the new “development” relations 
that countries such as Denmark, Ireland and the Netherlands are imple-
menting. It furthermore offers important element for policies that aim to 
stimulate South-South, North-South and South-North trade.  
Chapter 3 contributes to the literature by providing the first meta-
analysis in the field of economic diplomacy and presenting a methodo-
logical innovation in meta-analysis data collection. The chapter offers a 
meta-analysis of the empirical literature on the impact of economic di-
plomacy on international trade and FDI published between 1985 and 
2011. A unique database was constructed with 963 economic diplomacy 
estimates and a variety of study characteristics that could be of influence 
on the reported effects in primary studies. While collecting our data, we 
were confronted with a lack of information in primary studies (and lack 
of response by the authors when information was requested) which pro-
hibited us to transform many of the reported coefficients into elasticities. 
To resolve this issue we focused the meta-regression analysis on estab-
lishing the meta-significance of economic diplomacy estimates. By using 
the reported minimum levels of significance we introduced a methodo-
logical innovation that allowed us to increase the number available ob-
servations by 50 per cent. This innovation is relevant to each meta-
analysis for a multidisciplinary field of research with different reporting 
standards.  
The meta-regression analysis points towards a general positive and 
significant effect of economic diplomacy. This is however not the same 
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across the board. The analysis shows significant heterogeneity between 
economic diplomacy instruments and highlights the importance of re-
search design and other characteristics of the primary studies. In particu-
lar we find that primary studies that only use one source country are less 
likely to report significant positive effects. It also concluded that studies 
that use a variable that combine embassies and consulates(-general) into 
a single indicator miss that these instruments differ significantly and 
should thus be included as separate instruments in such research. The 
chapter also shows that research on the relation between economic di-
plomacy and FDI is rare. The meta-analysis, furthermore, shows that 
peer reviewed economics journals report fewer significant economic di-
plomacy coefficients compared to coefficients reported in international 
relations journals and working papers.  
Chapter 4 provides the first literature review of the effect of econom-
ic diplomacy on the margins of trade. The chapter reviews 987 estimates 
from 12 studies published between 2000 and 2011 that deal with the 
question whether economic diplomacy creates new trading relations (ex-
tensive margin of trade) or if economic diplomacy primarily impacts the 
traded volumes within already existing relations (intensive margin of 
trade). Categorizing the estimates between those that apply to OECD 
countries and those that apply to non-OECD Latin-American countries 
(unfortunately, data on other sets of countries are scarce or incomplete) 
the review concludes that most significant positive estimates are ob-
served for the effect of economic diplomacy on the extensive margin of 
trade. Findings for the impact on the intensive margin are more ambigu-
ous. In general, economic diplomacy does not seem to influence the in-
tensive margin of trade significantly. Investigating the two groups of es-
timates, however, reveals that this result is mainly driven by the large 
number of insignificant observations for the non-OECD Latin-
American countries.  
Chapter 5 contributes to the literature by providing the first economic 
diplomacy estimates on Rauch classified internationally tradable goods, 
using a sample that covers a broad range of both developing and devel-
oped countries. The chapter also offers two methodological approaches 
that are applicable to other research. The first approach is the use of in-
terpolation to solve missing data problems. While building our sample 
we were confronted by a number of missing Rauch 4 digit SITC classifi-
cations. These were highest for the developing countries in our sample. 
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Chapter 5 provides a methodology to supplement missing Rauch 4 digit 
SITC classifications via interpolation. This reduced the number of miss-
ing observations in Chapter 5 from 10 per cent to 3 per cent. The second 
contribution is that the chapter uses data that reduce concerns regarding 
causality, which is fundamental to the economic diplomacy literature. 
Countries may decide to open diplomatic offices because of a high level 
of aggregate exports. It is however unclear (and less likely) that they will 
do so for the exports of a particular group of traded goods. Using lower 
aggregated data, as Chapter 5 does, is a relevant recommendation for 
other areas of research where causality is an issue. 
The econometric contribution of Chapter 5 is the investigation of the 
effect of the diplomatic network on market entry and the bilaterally trade 
volume Rauch classified goods; i.e. homogeneous, reference priced and 
differentiated goods. The chapter differentiates between representations 
in the diplomatic network. The results show that economic diplomacy is 
relevant for both market entry and the bilaterally traded volume, espe-
cially for products that are not traded in organized exchange. Differentia-
tion of diplomatic representations furthermore reveals that embassies 
have the most pronounced effect for both market entry and the traded 
volume.   
Chapter 6 adds to the literature by, for the first time, analyzing the re-
lation between FDI and economic diplomacy for a large group of devel-
oped and developing countries. For the chapter a unique sample of 64 
countries for the years 2006 and 2012 was constructed. The sample re-
veals substantial expansion in the number of diplomatic representations 
for many countries (especially Latin American ones). The reported esti-
mates show a positive and significant relation between diplomatic repre-
sentations and outgoing FDI. These results are particularly strong for 
FDI over different continents. The results show no substantial effect of 
diplomatic offices on attracting FDI. Furthermore, a majority of the es-
timates in Chapter 6 indicate that representations of “other” countries 
may influence the FDI stimulating effect of the diplomatic network of 
the home country. More specifically, it shows that countries with a larger 
share in the total number of diplomatic representations generate more 
FDI. Finally, differentiation of diplomatic representations shows that 
consulates have more effect on FDI as compared to embassies.  
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7.2 Policy recommendations    
This thesis contributes to understanding the heterogeneous effects of 
economic diplomacy on international trade and investment. With the 
presented results in mind, the following policy recommendations should 
be taken into account in order to optimize the deployment of economic 
diplomacy by governments:  
a) Economic diplomacy can be a useful part of bilateral relations with 
developing countries and amongst developing countries (see Chap-
ter 2). Economic diplomacy can contribute to shaping these rela-
tions because the subject of economic diplomacy offers benefits to 
both developed and developing countries. Economic diplomacy 
serves to reduce markets access barriers and enhances trust. This is 
a precondition for establishing (mutually beneficial) trade and in-
vestment relations. 
b) The significance of economic diplomacy instruments is heteroge-
neous and depends on the instrument that is used and characteris-
tics of the primary study under investigation (see Chapter 3). Gov-
ernments can use the presented results when evaluating economic 
diplomacy policies and when shaping their bilateral economic di-
plomacy efforts. Researchers can use the presented results to im-
prove their study design.  
c) The network of diplomatic representations is an effective instru-
ment to increase the number of trade relations (see Chapters 4 and 
5). Economic diplomacy can consequently be used to diversify ex-
ports, which is particularly relevant for developing countries.  
d) The focus of economic diplomacy is best targeted on products that 
are not traded in organized exchange (i.e. more complex prod-
ucts/transactions). This result is reported for both the market en-
try decision and the bilaterally traded volume of goods (see Chap-
ter 5). Trade promotion efforts are thus best focused on trade in 
more complex products.  
e) The effects of economic diplomacy on bilateral trade and invest-
ment are more pronounced when transactions are towards more 
culturally and institutionally distant markets (see Chapters 1 and 6). 
If efficiency and effectiveness in investment and trade promotion 
is the objective, this thesis recommends that trade and investment 
promotion efforts focus on those markets. 
 Summary and Conclusions 151 
 
f) There are various factors that drive FDI. One of those factors is 
the share in the total number of diplomatic establishments on a 
foreign market for facilitating FDI to that market (see Chapter 6). 
Without advising for policy competition between diplomatic estab-
lishments, this thesis does recommend to include an analysis of 
representations of other countries when thinking about the geog-
raphy of the diplomatic network. This supplements the analysis on 
other factor that determine FDI between countries.   
7.3 Discussion and further avenues for research 
In this thesis, many new or improved insights were reported. It is also 
important to report what has not been covered. The focus of this thesis 
was on economic diplomacy by governments. As a consequence, this 
thesis does not deliver insights into the effect of economic diplomacy by 
non-state actors and the interaction between state and non-state actors in 
economic diplomacy which is growing in popularity in international rela-
tions research (Strange, 2015). The thesis also does not cover other ob-
jectives (political, consular) of the diplomatic network. Nor does it in-
clude the effect of various international representations that relate to the 
various international institutions. The presented conclusions represent 
research into the effect of economic diplomacy on trade and investment 
and the conclusions should be interpreted against that background. 
The thesis established in Chapter 3, 4 and 6 that economic diplomacy 
is heterogeneous in relation to the instrument deployed. Based on these 
chapters, new questions also present themselves. The chapters do not 
deliver an understanding of the complementarity between instruments. 
Understanding of the interaction between instruments will shed light on 
possible crowding out effects when several instruments are used simul-
taneously. This possible effect is shown in Veenstra et al. (2011) and 
Creusen and Lejour (2013). Simultaneously testing for the effect of ex-
port promotion agencies and the effect of embassies and consulates, 
Veenstra et al. (2011) find no significant effects for export promotion 
agencies while the impact of embassies and consulates on bilateral trade 
flows remains substantial. Creusen and Lejour (2013), also testing several 
instruments of diplomacy simultaneously, show that private sector trade 
missions are not effective for stimulation trade while trade missions with 
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Ministers or the head of State do have a positive and significant effect on 
trade flows.  
In Chapter 3, the thesis established that economic diplomacy has a 
positive significant effect on trade and FDI. However, Chapter 3 does  
not deliver an estimate of the ‘true’ economic diplomacy effect. This 
should remain the ambition of future research and is an effort worth 
pursuing because it can contribute to answers about the efficiency of 
economic diplomacy. This is still under-researched, although Nooij et al. 
(2017) provide first estimates for the Netherlands. The step towards es-
tablishing a meta-size effect is not (only) a matter of producing more re-
search, but much more a matter of reporting the results in a way that all 
relevant information about estimates is included in the literature. In or-
der to calculate the elasticity on average from linear models one needs to 
know average values of the dependent and explanatory variables, but a 
number of studies does not report this basic and essential information. 
Chapter 3, 4 and 5, furthermore identified a meta-analysis in the effect of 
economic diplomacy on the margins of trade as an additional area of in-
vestigation that is promising because of the increased availability of esti-
mates. 
In Chapter 6, the thesis established the relation between economic 
diplomacy and FDI. In the differentiation between the different diplo-
matic establishments consulates seemed to facilitate FDI more than em-
bassies. When using different estimation techniques (as presented in the 
Appendix G of this thesis) this relation turned around. The effect of in-
struments of diplomacy, specifically the diplomatic network, is an im-
portant subject of future research. The research should include both the 
formation of investment relations and the bilaterally invested volume. 
Both these elements are relevant potential economic diplomacy effects 
that, even though Chapter 6 contributed to the literature on this subject, 
remain under explored.  
As mentioned in Chapter 3, it is important that economic diplomacy 
research addresses the issues of causality. In Chapter 5 of this thesis ad-
ditional methodological suggestions are made to address/prevent causali-
ty. Furthermore, in Chapter 5 and 6 we also present what is the current 
standard of dealing with causality issues: an instrumental variables ap-
proach. Still, various possible methodologies to address causality have 
not been used in economic diplomacy research or only very marginally 
so. For example, we have seen very limited use of time lags (with the use 
 Summary and Conclusions 153 
 
of General Method of Moments models) and structural vector auto-
regressions. In the coming years, these methods could be explored to 
further establish the causal relation between economic diplomacy and 
international economic flows.  
The thesis estimates the relation between economic diplomacy and 
Rauch categorized goods for the year 2006 in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 esti-
mates the effect of economic diplomacy on FDI for a sample with the 
years 2006 and 2012. These samples were relatively limited in terms of 
the timespan covered, simply because the number of sources where eco-
nomic diplomacy data are available remains very limited. The effect of 
economic diplomacy could vary over time, like what is already measured 
for the effect of distance (Disdier and Head, 2008). This is an interesting 
area of further research.  
Finally, this thesis has shown the heterogeneous effects of economic 
diplomacy. We revealed the effect of instruments, showed the many de-
terminants of heterogeneity and discussed future elements for economic 
diplomacy policies and research. This dissertation provides relevant in-
sights for both policy makers and academics in the field of economic 
diplomacy. Based on the presented lessons in this dissertation, economic 
diplomacy can be deployed more effectively by governments and inter-
esting avenues of research can be further explored.  
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Appendix A 
Summary statistics moderator variables meta regression 
Variable # Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent Variables  
T values 627 3.23 2.81 2.96 -5.08 16.66 
T values no outliers 565 3.06 2.81     2.05  -0.87 8.22 
5% significant observations 963 0.49 0 0.50 0 1 
1% sigificant observations 963 0.38 0 0.49 0 1 
Empirical Design Factors 
Observations 774 12612.87 600 41266.71 36 409684 
Notols 963 0.37 0 0.48 0 1 
Countryspecific 963 0.63 1 0.48 0 1 
Endogeneity 963 0.54 1 0.50 0 1 
Gravity 963 0.89 1 0.31 0 1 
PRE2000 963 0.40 0 0.49 0 1 
Primary study dependant variable 
Export 963 0.65 1 0.48 0 1 
Import 963 0.29 0 0.45 0 1 
Total Trade 963 0.00 0 0.06 0 1 
FDI 963 0.06 0 0.23 0 1 
Instruments of diplomacy 
Embassies and Consulates 963 0.20 0 0.40 0 1 
Embassies 963 0.04 0 0.19 0 1 
Consulates 963 0.07 0 0.26 0 1 
Foreign EPA office 963 0.11 0 0.31 0 1 
Export Prmotion Agency 963 0.04 0 0.19 0 1 
Investment Promotion Agency 963 0.05 0 0.21 0 1 
Trade mission 963 0.02 0 0.14 0 1 
State Visit 963 0.07 0 0.26 0 1 
Diplomacy 963 0.40 0 0.49 0 1 
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Appendix B 
Marginal effects of factors explaining economic diplomacy significance 
This annex B reports the marginal effects of factors that explain the sig-
nificance of economic diplomacy coefficients. The marginal effects are 
reported against the earlier used baseline in Chapter 3. Exports is the 
reference for the dependent variable and embassies and consulates is the 
reference for the instrument of diplomacy under investigation in the 
primary study. The references for the empirical design factors are based 
on studies using standard OLS regression models based on multiple 
country databases published after 2000.  
Marginal effects show the discrete change in probability when the 
predictor or independent variable increases by one unit for my categori-
cal variables (NOTOLS, COUNTRYSPECIFIC, ENDOGENEITY, 
GRAVITY, PRE2000). For the primary study dependant variables this 
should be interpreted as the increased/decreased probability of observ-
ing a positive and significant coefficient against the EXPORTS baseline. 
Similarly the marginal effects for economic diplomacy instruments 
should be interpreted against the EMBASSIESANDCONSULATES 
baseline variable. For my continuous variable (OBSERVATIONS) the 
marginal effect represents the instantaneous change given a one unit 
change. In table B.1 the predicted probability of finding a significant 
economic diplomacy coefficient for each economic diplomacy instru-
ment is presented, holding all other variables in the model at their means.  
The marginal effect confirm the importance of study design factors 
and instruments of diplomacy and show the magnitude of their influ-
ence. Across the various econometric specifications country specific 
studies are between 35 and 53 per cent less likely to report significant 
economic diplomacy coefficients. If a sample increases with 100.000 ob-
servations the probability of finding significant coefficients increases 
with ~25 per cent and the older studies in my sample (PRE2000=1) are 
~30 per cent more likely to report significant coefficients. 
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Table B.1 
Marginal effects  
 logit 5% 
Weighted 
logit5% Logit1% 
weighted 
logit1% 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
OBSERVATIONS (10^-5)  0.27*** 0.25*** 0.27*** 0.21*** 
    0.06    0.08    0.05    0.08 
NOTOLS    0.16*** 0.08 0.09  0.11***  0.08* 0.05 
0.04 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.06  
COUNTRYSPECIFIC   -0.37*** -0.53*** -0.53***  -0.36***  -0.51*** -0.46*** 
0.04 0.03 0.04  0.04 0.04  0.05 
ENDOGENEITY 0.08 0.14  0.08 0.07 0.17** 0.05 
0.07 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.08 
GRAVITY -0.13* -0.33*** -0.30** -0.04 -0.13  -0.11 
0.07  0.09  0.13 0.07  0.09  0.11 
PRE2000   0.29*** 0.33*** 0.30***  0.30*** 0.35*** 0.33*** 
     0.02 0.02 0.02 0.05  0.02 0.03 
IMPORT     -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.07**  -0.04 -0.02  
     0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03  
TOT TRADE -0.42*** -0.38*** -0.11 -0.30***  -0.29*** -0.03  
     0.08 0.04 0.39 0.10  0.04 0.32 
FDI  0.34*** 0.42*** 0.43*** 0.45*** 0.54*** 0.54***  
      0.13 0.15 0.16 0.11 0.10 0.10  
EMBASSIES    -0.12* -0.18*** -0.11* -0.02 -0.18** -0.07 
    0.07 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.08 
CONSULATES -0.45*** -0.51*** -0.44*** -0.48*** -0.63*** -0.52*** 
    0.06 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.08  0.074 
FOREIGN EPA OFFICE    -0.04 -0.02 0.04 -0.04 -0.04* 0.06 
    0.03 0.02 0.03  0.04  0.02 0.05 
EXPORT PROMOTION AGENCY  -0.36*** -0.50*** -0.34** -0.42*** -0.56***  -0.41*** 
    0.10 0.14  0.16  0.10 0.14 0.14  
INVESTMENT PROMOTION AGENCY -0.70*** -0.80*** -0.72*** -0.75*** -0.90***  -0.80*** 
     0.11 0.08 0.08 0.05  0.02 0.06 
TRADE MISSION -0.22** -0.42*** -0.20 -0.24** -0.64***  -0.11 
0.085      0.14 0.17 0.115 0.13 0.16 
STATE VISIT -0.41*** -0.42*** -0.35*** -0.43*** -0.57*** -0.42***  
0.08     0.09 0.10 0.07 0.10 0.11 
DIPLOMACY -0.71*** -0.75*** -0.66*** -0.64*** -0.78***  -0.64***  
    0.05 0.03 0.06  0.07 0.03  0.08 
Note: standard errors in parentheses, *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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Compared to the baseline of EMBASSIESANDCONSULATES we 
observe substantial lower probabilities for significant coefficients for all 
other instruments of diplomacy. CONSULATES, EXPORT 
PROMOTION AGENCY, TRADE MISSIONS and STATE VISITS 
are between 35 per cent and 65 per cent less likely to report significant 
coefficients depending on the tested model. Investment promotion 
agencies (INVESTMENT PROMOTION AGENCY=1) and the diplo-
matic relations divert even more from the baseline with negative margin-
al effects going as high as 90 per cent.  
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Appendix C 
Country sample Chapter 5 
Countries in sample 
Algeria Iran, Islamic Rep. Romania 
Argentina Ireland Russian Federation 
Australia Israel Saudi Arabia 
Austria Italy Singapore 
Bangladesh Japan South Africa 
Belarus Kenya Spain 
Belgium Korea, Rep. Sudan 
Brazil Kuwait Sweden 
Bulgaria India Switzerland 
Canada Indonesia Thailand 
Chile Malaysia Tunisia 
China Mexico Turkey 
Czech Republic Morocco Uganda 
Denmark Netherlands Ukraine 
Dominican Republic New Zealand United Kingdom 
Ecuador Nigeria United States 
Egypt, Arab Rep. Norway 
 
Finland Pakistan 
 
France Peru 
 
Germany Philippines 
 
Greece Poland 
 
Hungary Portugal 
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Appendix D 
A different approach to multilateral and world resistance 
The Baier and Bergstrand (2010) gravity estimation provides the option 
to calculate theoretically motivated multilateral resistance terms using 
OLS1. The advantage of this method is that country specific variables 
can be reported which in case of using fixed effects would be precluded. 
Furthermore, it allows for asymmetric bilateral trade cost (the Anderson 
and Wincoop (2004) mode is built under the assumption of symmetric 
trade cost). This leads to the following Baier and Bergstrand (2010) 
model that uses equal weights instead of GDP shares to calculate multi-
lateral and world resistance terms2: 
 
Ln(Xij /Yi*Yj) = β0 + β1 Landlij + β2 Islandij + β3 ln(Areai*Areaj) – β4 (1–σ) 
lnDij  – β5(1–σ) Lang – β6(1–σ)Contij  – β7(1–σ)(Colij) –β8(1–σ)CUij – β9(1–
σ)FTAij  – β10(1–σ)Embassyij  – β11(1–σ)Consulatesij + γ4(1–σ) MWRDij + 
γ5(1–σ)MWRLang + γ6(1–σ)MWRContij + γ7(1–σ)MWRColij + γ8(1–
σ)MWRCUij + γ9(1–σ)MWRFTAij + γ10(1–σ) MWREmbassyij + γ11(1–
σ)MWRConsulatesij + εij  …………………(C.1) 
 
 Here the explanatory variables are similar to the earlier presented 
models. MRW represents the multilateral and world resistance term.3  
The MRW is created for every variable that relates to trade cost and has 
bilateral variance, i.e. distance, common border, common language, co-
lonial relation, currency union, trade agreement, embassy and consulate. 
We estimate the model for the different Rauch goods categories. For 
those econometric analyses ln(REFij/Yi*Yj), ln(DIFij/Yi*Yj) and 
ln(HOMij/Yi*Yj) are the dependent variable. This leads to the following 
estimates.  
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Table D.1 
A different approach to multilateral and world resistance: Baier Bergstrand 
(2010) estimations  
 Total 
trade 
Homogeneous 
goods 
Reference 
priced goods 
Differentiated 
goods 
Log Distance -1.17*** 
(0.06) 
-1.39*** 
(0.08) 
-1.32*** 
(0.06) 
-1.17*** 
(0.07) 
Landlocked -0.13 
(0.09) 
-0.82*** 
(0.12) 
-0.40*** 
(0.09) 
0.27*** 
(0.10) 
Island -0.37*** 
(0.06) 
-0.64*** 
(0.09) 
-0.43*** 
(0.07) 
-0.23*** 
(0.07) 
Land Area -0.13*** 
(0.01) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.16*** 
(0.01) 
-0.21*** 
(0.02) 
Common Language 0.68*** 
(0.12) 
0.40** 
(0.16) 
0.43*** 
(0.13) 
0.72*** 
(0.14) 
Common border -0.25* 
(0.14) 
-0.12 
(0.18) 
-0.32** 
(0.15) 
-0.19 
(0.18) 
Colonial Relation 0.34** 
(0.15) 
0.58** 
(0.26) 
0.38** 
(0.16) 
0.32 
(0.21) 
Currency Union -0.52*** 
(0.15) 
0.15 
(0.18) 
-0.31** 
(0.15) 
-0.46** 
(0.19) 
FTA 0.20** 
(0.10) 
0.47*** 
(0.13) 
0.24** 
(0.10) 
0.19* 
(0.11) 
Embassies 0.57*** 
(0.12) 
0.22 
(0.17) 
0.72*** 
(0.13) 
0.56*** 
(0.14) 
Consulates 0.04** 
(0.02) 
0.06** 
(0.03) 
0.06** 
(0.02) 
0.09*** 
(0.02) 
Constant -36.91*** 
(0.34) 
-42.36*** 
(0.43) 
-37.89*** 
(0.33) 
-36.03*** 
(0.41) 
Fixed Effects No No No No  
Observations 3706 3378 3568 3655 
Adjusted R2 0.24 0.19 0.29 0.22 
Standard errors in parentheses, multilateral and world resistance terms included for distance, 
language, border, colony, currency union, trade agreement, embassy and consulate. Depend-
ent: ln(exportij/gdpi*gdpj). * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 The Baier Bergstrand estimations again show that the diplomatic net-
work has the largest trade stimulating effects for trade in more complex 
products and when cultural differences are big. Table C.1 shows this pat-
tern even more pronounced than Table 5.2 especially for the baseline: 
the trade from high to low income countries. But substantial net coeffi-
cients also remain for trade in several product groups from low income 
countries (both towards high income countries as well as between low 
income countries).  
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 Looking into the interaction between the diplomatic network and the 
income level of the exporting and importing country we see that the 
network is most important for transactions between high income ex-
porters and low income importers. All the other coefficients are negative, 
(but not all of them significant) indicating a smaller effect. We again see 
net coefficients close to zero for consulates for the majority of the coef-
ficients, the exception being the trade of differentiated goods coming 
from low income countries. 
 
 
Notes 
 
1 The Baier and Bergstrand (2010) model is an extention of the Baier and Berg-
strand (2009) model. The Baier and Bergstrand (2010) model provides a simpeler 
derivation of the multilateral resistance terms compared to the Baier and Berg-
strand (2009) model. 
2 Baier and Bergstrand (2010), pp. 104-105 
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Z is the multilateral and world trade cost variable, i is the importer and j is the 
exporter. The first term is essentially an average of trade cost for exporter j across 
all importers i and the second term is an average of trade cost for importer j 
across all exporters i. 
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Appendix E 
Explanatory notes to the instrumental variables approach (presented in Table 5.7) 
Similar to Rose (2007) and Yakop and Bergeijk (2011) we presented a 
regular two stage least squares approach for the Number of foreign missions 
variable in table 5.7 of Chapter 5. Additionally we present an instrumen-
tal variables approach for our embassies and consulates variables. Because of 
the nature of the embassy variable (binary) an additional step is needed to 
derive fitted values for this variable (Wooldridge, 2002). The “normal” 
two stage procedure thus becomes a three stage procedure. This annex 
presents the regressions used. First there is a pre stage to the normal two 
stage least squares IV regressions. This pre first stage regression is as fol-
lows: 
 
P(êij=1) = β0 + β1lnDij + β2  Lang + β3 Contij + β4Landlij + β5 Islandij + β6 
ln(Areai*Areaj) + β7 (Colij) + β8 CUij + β9 FTAij + β10,…, [instrumental varia-
ble ij]1 + εij    …………………………   (E.1) 
 
 Where eij is a binary variable that serves as the dependent variable. eij 
takes the value of 1, if country i has an embassy in country j. And, eij = 0 
if not. The relation between the dependent and the explanatory variables 
is estimated with a binary response model. A probit regression enables 
calculation of the probability p that the explanatory variables used in our 
model predict the embassy presence of country i in country j. We distin-
guish the same set explanatory variables as presented in our preferred 
(Anderson and Wincoop (2004)) regressions and add the sets of instru-
mental variables. We run separate regressions for both the simple and 
the extend set of instrumental variables.  Following we perform a regular 
two stage regression. The first stage equation is: 
 
Êij = β0 + β1lnDij + β2  Lang + β3 Contij + β4Landlij + β5 Islandij + β6 
ln(Areai*Areaj) + β7 Colij + β8 CUij + β9 FTAij + β10êij + εij    ……… (E.2) 
 
 Where Êij presents the regular embassy variable, i.e. the number of em-
bassies that country i has in country j.  The relation between the depend-
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ent and explanatory variables is estimated using OLS. The explanatory 
variables in equation (E.2) are similar to those in equation (E.1) and the 
fitted values of the embassy values acquired via the probit regression (êij) 
are also included. Simultaneously, the first stage for the consulate variable 
is executed, this is the normal OLS regression that one would expect in a 
2SLS that includes the instrumental variables. The first stage consulates 
regression is: 
 
Cij = β0 + β1lnDij + β2  Lang + β3 Contij + β4Landlij + β5 Islandij + β6 
ln(Areai*Areaj) + β7 (Colij) + β8 CUij + β9 FTAij + β10,…[instrumental varia-
bleij] + εij     …………………………………… (E.3) 
 
 Next we perform the second stage of the two stage least squares. The 
second stage equation is: 
 
 Ln(Xij/Yi*Yj) = β0 + β1lnDij + β2 Lang + β3 Contij + β4 Landlij + β5 Islandij 
+ β6 ln(Areai*Areaj) + β7 (Colij) + β8 CUij + β9 FTAij + β10Êij + β11 Cij + εij    
……………………………………………….  (E.4) 
 
 Where Ln(Xij/Yi*Yj) is the income weighted trade between country i 
and j. Êij and Cij  are the fitted values for the embassies and consulates 
acquired from the first stage regressions (equations E.2 and E.3). The 
other explanatory variables are similar to the earlier presented preferred 
regressions. The relation between dependent and explanatory variables is 
estimated using OLS. These regressions are presented for the different 
groups of dependent variables, i.e. total trade, homogeneous goods, ref-
erence priced goods and differentiated goods, and two sets of instrumen-
tal variables. Coefficients in Table 5.8 in chapter 5 thus present 24 indi-
vidual regressions for which coefficients are corrected for causality 
issues. 
 
 
 
Notes 
 
1 In the equation we used the simple set of instrumental variables. We however 
also run separate regressions for the extended set 
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Appendix F 
Summary statistics variables Chapter 6 
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Investment (stocks USD) 5465 3.84E+09 700000 2.01E+10 -2.98E+09 4.64E+11 
GDP per capita 8064 21114.54 10913.31 21013.32 419.75 101172.1 
Population 8064 8.87E+07 3.15E+07 2.19E+08 3183000 1.35E+09 
Landlocked 8064 0.08 0 0.27 0 2 
Island 8064 0.25 0 0.46 0 2 
Land area 8064 1542101 33853.5 3086929 646 1.71E+07 
Distance 8064 7364.08 7345.39 4666.57 160.93 19650.13 
Common language 8064 0.10 0 0.30 0 1 
Common border 8064 0.03 0 0.18 0 1 
Common religion 8064 0.47 0 0.50 0 1 
Colony 8064 0.01 0 0.12 0 1 
Trade agreement 8064 0.24 0 0.43 0 1 
Common currency 8064 0.03 0 0.16 0 1 
Tax haven 8064 0.05 0 0.21 0 1 
Diplomatic network 7937 1.42 1 1.83 0 46 
Embassy 7937 0.81 1 0.39 0 1 
Consulate 7937 0.62 0 1.73 0 45 
Tourism flows 7875 1.26E+07 6995000 1.61E+07 90000 8.31E+07 
Military expenditure 8001 2.22E+10 4.49E+09 7.75E+10 2.71E+08 6.85E+11 
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Appendix G 
Embassy and consulate coefficients  
A Heckman (1979) two-step approach is used to further investigate the 
effect of the diplomatic network on bilateral FDI. The Heckman ap-
proach takes account of potential sample selection effects and reduces 
biased estimates (for a thorough discussion see Linders and Groot, 
2006).  The first estimation stage in essence presents the likelihood of 
bilateral FDI between two countries determined by the factors included 
in the first stage regression. The first stage selection equation should at 
least contain the same independent variables as the second regression 
stage (Linders and Groot, 2006; Möhlman et al., 2010). We include 
Common Religion as an additional regressor in the selection equation to 
conform to the empirical practice in FDI and trade modeling (e.g. 
Helpman et al., 2008; Möhlman et al., 2010). If the first stage is positive 
the second stage regression determines the potential size of bilateral 
FDI. Results are presented in Table G.1. 
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 Table G.1 
Embassy and consulate coefficients explored 
 (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) 
 Heckman 
Selection 
Heckman Re-
gression 
Heckman Selection Heckman Regression 
Landlocked 10.15*   
(1.71)    
0.91    
(0.34)    
9.98* 
(1.67) 
 
0.96 
(0.36) 
 
Island 7.07**  
(2.45)    
-1.16 
(-0.16)    
7.11** 
(2.45) 
 
-1.46 
(-0.20) 
 
Land area 4.91*** 
(4.43)    
0.61    
(0.13)    
4.94*** 
(4.44) 
 
0.37 
(0.08) 
 
Distance -0.95*** 
(-15.21)   
-1.30*** 
(-20.25)    
-0.93*** 
(-14.86) 
 
-1.29*** 
(-20.14) 
 
Common Language 0.95*** 
(8.75)    
0.89*** 
(7.50)    
0.96*** 
(8.84) 
 
0.90*** 
(7.64) 
 
Common border -0.13    
(-0.70)    
0.190    
(1.31)    
-0.09 
(-0.51) 
 
0.21 
(1.47) 
 
Colonial relation 0.76    
(1.39)    
1.23*** 
(5.82)    
0.77 
(1.39) 
 
1.23*** 
(5.79) 
 
Regional Trade Agree-
ment 
0.08    
(0.88) 
0.25**  
(2.42)    
0.07 
(0.77) 
 
0.23** 
(2.30) 
 
Common currency -0.06    
(-0.27)    
-0.18    
(-1.10)    
-0.05 
(-0.26) 
 
-0.14 
(-0.89) 
 
Tax haven 32.65*** 
(5.04)    
5.23 
(0.16)    
32.71*** 
(5.03) 
 
3.51 
(0.11) 
 
Common Religion 0.55*** 
(7.10)    
 0.55*** 
(7.01) 
 
 
Number of diplomatic 
establishments 
 0.056**  
(2.45)    
0.07*** 
(4.37)     
 
Embassy    0.39*** 
(4.06) 
 
0.64*** 
(4.21) 
 
Consulate   0.04* 
(1.75) 
 
0.06*** 
(4.16) 
 
Fixed effects Included Included Included Included 
Observations 7937 
2826 
7937 
2826 Uncensored 
Mills lambda 0.39*** 
(3.36) 
0.43*** 
(3.68) 
 
Rho 0.25 0.28 
Sigma 1.53 1.53 
Lambda 0.39 0.43 
Dependent selection equation (1a, 2a): binary variable that takes the value of 1 of country i invests in
country j in year t, and 0 otherwise. Dependent regression equation (1b, 2b): ln (FDIijt). Standard errors in
parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, importer-year, exporter-year and year fixed effects includ-
ed. Clustered standard errors are used. Included in the regression but not reported: the constant, country 
specific variables are included but not reported because these variables can no longer be identified in the
presence of fixed effects (Head and Mayer, 2013: 31). 
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The Heckman (1979) selection regressions (1a, 2a) reveal that the like-
lihood that country i invest in country j is positively influenced by factors 
that reduce the intangible barriers to FDI (Common Language and Common 
Religion). Bigger markets (Land Area), landlocked countries and island states 
and Tax Havens are also more likely to invest internationally. As expected 
Distance negatively influences the likelihood that countries have a bilateral 
investment relation. Zooming in on our economic diplomacy variables 
we observe that both the more generic Number of diplomatic establishments 
variable and the separately reported Embassies and Consulates variable are 
associated with increased likelihoods of bilateral investments. For exam-
ple, if country i has a consulate in country j, country i is 4 per cent more 
likely to invest in that country. Having an Embassy even increase the like-
lihood of bilateral investment by 48 per cent.  
Our inverse Mills ratio is positive significant, which indicates that 
there are unobserved factors in the first stage selecting process that af-
fect the volume of bilateral FDI in the second stage. The positive direc-
tion of the Mills ratio indicates that (unobserved) factors that make bilat-
eral investment more likely tend to be also associated with higher FDI 
flows in the second stage. The Mills ratio is therefore included as an ad-
ditional regressor in the second stage to correct for this bias.  
The second stage of our regressions, which are controlled for selec-
tion effects, shows that the factors that drive the amount of investment 
are not fully identical as those that determine the invest-or-not-to-invest 
decision. We observe that having a Regional Trade Agreement and Colonial 
Relation stimulates the volume of FDI. These variables had no significant 
influence in the selection phase. The opposite is observed for our Tax 
Haven dummy and our markets size variable (Land Area), these variables 
were highly significant for selection into an investment relation but does 
not seem to influence the volume of FDI in the second stage.  Our eco-
nomic diplomacy variables are highly significant and indicate that having 
an embassy increases FDI with 64 per cent and having an additional 
consulate increases FDI with 6 per cent.  
Al in all, using the Heckman (1979) two-step procedure helped to get 
a better understanding of the effect of our embassy and consulate varia-
bles. Prior regressions in this chapter did not produce significant embas-
sy coefficients and pointed towards a significant effect of consulates. The 
Heckman (1979) estimations show that both embassies and consulates 
are important in bilateral FDI. The estimations indicate that the effect of 
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embassies and consulates is observable in both the invest-or-not-to-
invest decision and in the volume of bilateral FDI. It is worthwhile ex-
ploring this relation further in future research. The results presented in 
this annex could be caused due to the fact that computing power forced 
us not to include dyadic fixed effects in our Heckman estimations. We 
were also unable to estimate the relation in a maximum likelihood set-
ting.  
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